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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about foundationalism in epistemology. It distinguishes between different 
forms o f foundationalism and defends one particular version o f this doctrine. Chapter 1 
gives an account o f the motivations for foundationalism, including the so-called 
epistemic regress argument. It criticizes recent accounts o f the core doctrines o f 
foundationalism, such as those o f Michael Williams and Ernest Sosa, and proposes a 
different account according to which foundationalism is the view that (a) some o f our 
beliefs must be non-inferentially justified, (b) perception is a source o f non-inferential 
justification, and (c) perception is a basic source o f such justification. Chapter 2 gives an 
account o f traditional foundationalism and tries to identify both what is right with it and 
what is wrong with it. It argues that the basic insight o f traditional foundationalism can be 
detached from some o f the other doctrines with which it was associated by the traditional 
foundationalists. That insight concerns the role o f perceptual awareness or acquaintance 
as a regress-terminating source o f epistemic justification. Chapter 3 exploits this idea in 
defending a more modest form of foundationalism according to which ordinary 
perceptual beliefs may be foundational. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on two influential 
arguments against the view that ordinary beliefs about the world around us can be non- 
inferentially justified by perception. The first argument trades on the alleged fallibility o f 
perceptual justification, the second on its defeasibility. It is shown that neither argument 
poses a genuine threat to the more modest version o f foundationalism that I defend. 
Chapter 5 compares perception with other sources o f non-inferential justification such as 
memory and testimony. It defends the view that perception is a privileged source o f non- 
inferential justification, even if it isn't the only source o f such justification. It also 
contrasts foundationalism with traditional forms o f extemalism such as reliabilism and 
explains why the latter should not be counted as a form o f foundationalism.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL
PREFACE
When I first encountered foundationalism as a topic in epistemology I had a certain 
understanding o f what it was supposed to be. I thought that foundationalism was roughly 
the view that not all o f our justification could be inferential and that perception is the 
basic source o f justification that is not inferential. So foundationalism, as I understood it, 
was a doctrine both about the structure o f human knowledge or justification, and its 
sources. This initial impression was strengthened when I read Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge by Pollock and Cruz. They claim:
The simple motivation for foundations theories is the psychological observation 
that we have various ways o f sensing the world and that all knowledge comes to 
us via those senses. The foundationalist takes this to mean that our senses provide 
us with what are then identified as epistemologically basic beliefs. We arrive at 
other beliefs by reasoning (construed broadly). Reasoning, it seems, can only 
justify us in holding a belief if  we are already justified in holding the beliefs from 
which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source o f justification. 
Only perception can do that. We thus acquire the picture o f our beliefs forming a 
kind o f pyramid, with the basic beliefs provided by perception forming the 
foundation, and all other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning that traces 
back ultimately to the basic beliefs (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 29).
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Though Pollock and Cruz ultimately mishandle this insight they remain virtually the only 
commentators in this area to acknowledge the importance o f perception. Their book had a 
lasting impact on my thinking.
I thought that if  I had correctly understood foundationalism it was pretty obviously true. 
Although some o f our beliefs are justified because we have inferred them from other 
things that we are justified in believing it seemed obvious to me that they cannot all be 
justified in this way. Some o f our beliefs must be non-inferentially justified and 
perception is the obvious source o f such justification. How then could foundationalism -  
which says just this -  fail to be true?
It came as something o f a surprise, then, when I discovered that not only is 
foundationalism not a position that most philosophers think is true. It is a position that 
most philosophers think is false. That left me puzzled: how could so many philosophers 
be so critical o f a position that seems to get so much right? This thesis is to a large extent 
a direct product o f that puzzlement and a more or less direct attempt to resolve it.
The first thing that I discovered when I starting reading more widely was that other 
people don’t all understand foundationalism in the way that I did. The historical 
foundationalists -  people like C. I. Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and A. J. Ayer - agreed 
that our knowledge o f the world rests upon a foundation o f basic beliefs and that those 
beliefs are not justified in the way that the rest o f our beliefs are justified. But while I 
took basic beliefs to include ordinary beliefs about objects and events in the world around
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us, the historical foundationalists took them to be beliefs about our own minds.1 And 
while I thought that the basic beliefs are justified by perception the historical 
foundationalists claimed those beliefs are infallible and so either justify themselves or are 
justified by some sort o f special introspective awareness. This seemed a long way from 
the rather commonsensical doctrine that I had always taken foundationalism to be.
In recent years foundationalism has enjoyed something o f a renaissance. Unfortunately, 
the form o f foundationalism that is popular nowadays is a long way from the position that 
I call foundationalism. Sometimes called ‘formal foundationalism’, the new 
foundationalism is a bland doctrine that normally involves no more than a commitment to 
the idea that epistemological properties like justification supervene on non- 
epistemological ones. Since this makes just about everyone a foundationalist it’s not a 
position that I felt very excited about defending.
I think that foundationalism is a substantive doctrine though not the very unattractive 
doctrine the historical foundationalists made it out to be. Foundationalism, as I 
understand it, has got three basic components. The first is that there must be such a thing 
as non-inferential justification and there must be because otherwise we face a vicious 
epistemic regress. This is the least contentious o f what I regard as the three basic 
elements o f foundationalism. I think that the so-called epistemic regress argument for
1 It sounds odd to say the foundational beliefs include ‘ordinary b eliefs’ about the world. Aren’t ordinary 
beliefs supposed to be the beliefs that are supported by more basic beliefs? If the former are basic, what 
would be an example o f  a non-basic belief? This problem arises where we assume we can individuate the 
foundational beliefs in terms o f  their subject-matter. We will see later this is a mistake: foundational beliefs 
are not ‘about’ any particular subject-matter. What distinguishes these beliefs is the source o f  their 
justification. Here, all I mean is that the foundational beliefs might include beliefs like this: ‘the squirrel is 
on the fence’ ‘Ross is at the party’ and so on. This is something more traditional foundationalists denied.
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foundationalism is a good one and I will explain why in chapter 1. Later in later chapters 
3 and 4 I will counter various arguments that are supposed to show that there could not be 
any such thing as non-inferential justification.
The second component o f foundationalism is that one o f the sources o f non-inferential 
justification is perception. Standard undergraduate textbooks on foundationalism tell us 
that the basic or foundational beliefs are either self-justified or need no justification. Such 
beliefs are obviously not justified by perception. Robert Audi, Keith Lehrer, and Jonathan 
Dancy all think o f basic beliefs in this way. So what I am representing as the second 
essential component o f foundationalism is one that very few standard discussions 
acknowledge.
One reason for this discrepancy is an excessive focus on Descartes and the idea that he is 
really the paradigm foundationalist. I think that is a mistake. If you want some paradigm 
foundationalists you should look to people like Locke and Hume -  philosophers who on 
the face o f it couldn’t have less in common with Descartes. In fact, it’s not at all obvious 
to me that Descartes is a foundationalist. What is important to foundationalism isn’t the 
idea that the foundations o f our knowledge are self-justifying, but that they are 
perceptually justified and Descartes certainly didn’t think that.
The idea that perception is a source o f non-inferential justification will be the focus o f 
Chapters 2 and 3. When I say that perception is a source o f non-inferential justification I 
take it that the beliefs perception can non-inferentially justify are, or include, beliefs
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about non-psychological reality, like the belief that the squirrel is on the fence. So I just 
mean perception in the ordinary sense. In contrast when the historical foundationalists 
said that ‘perception’ is a source o f non-inferential justification they didn’t mean 
perception in the ordinary sense. What they meant by perception is closer to what we 
would call introspection and what Locke called ‘inner perception’. The beliefs that they 
thought perception can non-inferentially justify are beliefs about psychological reality 
rather than beliefs about the world around us.
These further claims are neither sensible nor essential to foundationalism. Historical 
foundationalism therefore represents a perversion o f an otherwise sensible thought. This 
perversion will be the topic o f chapter 2. Chapter 3 will explore a sensible version o f the 
sensible thought. I will show how we can hang onto what is right about traditional 
foundationalism without committing ourselves to its less attractive features.
Many people might agree with me up to this point. They could think, yes -  there is such a 
thing as non-inferential justification and yes - perception is a source o f such justification. 
But there is nothing special about perception; there’s also testimony for example. 
Foundationalism as I understand it denies that there is nothing special about perception. It 
is the view that among our sources o f non-inferential justification perception is a basic 
source. What I mean by this is, roughly, that the other sources could not function as 
sources o f justification at all unless perception is also a source o f justification.2 Although
2 Notice that is weaker than the claim  that Pollock and Cruz attribute to foundationalism in the passage 
quoted. They claim  perception is the only source o f  justification other than reasoning. I claim merely that it 
is ‘a ’ source o f  justification distinct from reasoning and, in some sense yet to be explained, a basic source. 
Still, it is not the only source.
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this view seems to me to be pretty obviously correct it has recently come under attack. I 
will be responding to some o f these attacks in chapter 5.
This is the view I want to defend and these are the places I will be defending it. It should 
be clear that the position I want to defend is ultimately very different from traditional 
foundationalism. Nonetheless, it bears important similarities to that view. An obvious 
question, therefore, is whether the standard objections to that view also apply to my view. 
That depends on what the standard objections are. One is that there are no self-justifying 
beliefs. Clearly, this is not a good objection to my view since on my view 
foundationalism is not committed to thinking that there are any such beliefs. The basic 
beliefs are justified by perception and beliefs that are justified by perception are 
obviously not self-justified.
A different objection is that foundationalism is committed to the ‘myth o f the given’. 
What is that? If the ‘m yth’ just involves thinking that perception is a source o f non- 
discursive justification, then it is not a myth. It is true. But if  what people who press this 
objection are really saying is it is only in the context o f certain social practices that 
perception is a source o f justification, then I am not denying that. I am not claiming that 
perception is an autonomous source o f justification in that sense.
I think that perception can non-inferentially justify beliefs about non-psychological 
reality. These beliefs do not draw their justification from other justified beliefs. The
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justification that perception provides is belief-independent in this sense. Still, it might 
depend on beliefs in some other sense.
This is a distinction we should draw even in cases in which one’s justification does derive 
from other beliefs. So people who press this objection are either denying something that 
is obviously true; or they are insisting on a point that I don’t need to dispute.
So that’s it. In short I am really just going back to the very simple idea with which we 
began and which got me thinking about foundationalism in the first place. I think that 
foundationalism is still a live option in epistemology. One thing that can make this 
difficult to see is a commitment to extemalism. Unlike many externalists I understand 
perception to involve conscious access to the world. So insisting on the centrality o f 
perception just means insisting on the centrality o f consciousness. If we are only 
interested in reliable belief forming mechanisms there is no reason why we should take 
consciously so seriously.
This approach has interesting parallels with John Campbell’s view o f thought. His view, 
very roughly, is that it is consciousness o f the world that makes it possible for us to think 
about it. My view, very roughly, is that it is consciousness o f the world that makes it 
possible for us to know about it. What could possibly be more obvious?
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL 
CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS FOUNDATIONALISM?
1. Introduction
This thesis will defend a form of foundationalism in epistemology. I think that 
foundationalism is an overwhelmingly natural view about the structure and sources o f 
epistemic justification -  that is, a view about what it is to have reasons for our beliefs 
about the world in such a way that these beliefs can constitute knowledge. Not everyone 
agrees. In the literature a tradition has grown up according to which foundationalism is a 
much less attractive doctrine than I will claim. So one thing that I am doing in this thesis 
is taking on a certain tradition o f interpretation.
The tradition that I am opposing is long standing and still has very much the status of 
orthodoxy. It takes foundationalism to be a doctrine involving a commitment to certain 
characteristic claims. One central component o f that doctrine is the idea that there are 
‘epistemically basic beliefs’. By epistemically basic I mean beliefs that are not 
inferentially justified. Here is an example o f an inferentially justified belief: I believe that 
England can no longer win the Ashes and my justification for that belief derives from my 
justification for believing they have performed poorly in the past three tests. This is an 
example of an inferentially justified belief. So when I talk about beliefs that are not 
inferentially justified - or beliefs that are ‘non-inferentially’ justified, as I will often say - 
I just mean beliefs that are not justified in that way. This is not a positive account o f what
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does justify these beliefs and I am not going to give you a positive account at this stage. 
All that is important is that such beliefs are not inferentially justified. According to the 
tradition that I am opposing, the foundationalist is at the very least someone who thinks 
that there are such beliefs.
That is one thing that any foundationalist has got to think, but it is not all she needs to 
think according to this tradition. Michael Williams makes this point well.
Basic beliefs are the stock in trade o f  epistemological foundationalists... 
According to foundationalism all justification starts with basic beliefs and flows 
“upward” from them. However, there is more to foundationalism than this. If 
foundationalism were no more than a structural-descriptive account o f everyday 
knowledge it is hard to see why everyone would not be a foundationalist. D idn’t 
we just agree that there are lots o f things we “just know”? So aren’t we all 
foundationalists? The answer is “No”. The theoretical commitments o f traditional 
foundationalists are extensive (Williams 2005: 203)
So what are these further commitments? Williams goes on to mention the following four: 
(1) Traditional foundationalism is substantive, rather than merely formal. 
According to substantive foundationalism, the class o f basic beliefs is 
theoretically tractable. In particular, there are non-trivially specifiable kinds o f 
beliefs, individuated by broad aspects o f their content, that are fitted to play the 
role o f terminating points for chains o f justification. The distinction between basic 
and non-basic beliefs is thus ontological rather than merely methodological. (2)
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Traditional foundationalism is strong. Basic beliefs, or terminating judgements 
are indubitable or (a slightly weaker notion) incorrigible. Basic beliefs are always 
basic knowledge. (3) Traditional foundationalism is atomistic. Basic beliefs 
provide absolute terminating points for justificatory chains. To do so, basic beliefs 
must be independently both epistemically and semantically o f other justified 
beliefs. Since basic beliefs constitute encapsulated items o f knowledge, there is 
no objection in principle to the idea o f a first justified belief. (4) Traditional 
foundationalism is radically internalist. The justification-making factors for 
beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects 
o f awareness. At the base level, when I know that P, I am always in a position to 
know that I know that P, and perhaps even always do know that I know that P 
(Williams 2005: 203-4).
In a similar vein, Ernest Sosa claims that:
Classical foundationalism in epistemology is the view that:
(i) every infallible, indubitable belief is justified
(ii) every belief deductively inferred from justified beliefs is itself justified,
and
(iii) every belief that is justified is so in virtue o f (i) or (ii) above (Sosa 2000: 
14).
Williams and Sosa are not alone. The view that they describe, according to which there is 
a layer o f epistemically basic beliefs, distinguished in terms o f their content and 
supporting everything else that we know, is how most people in the literature understand
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foundationalism. I have said that I want to defend foundationalism, but I do not want to 
defend the very unattractive position that Williams and Sosa describe. As others have 
pointed out it is doubtful that we have so many indubitable, incorrigible, beliefs or that 
these beliefs would provide enough o f a foundation for the rest o f what we know. Most 
ordinary beliefs about the world -  like the belief that there is squirrel on the fence or the 
belief that Ross is on the mend - can be mistaken, they can be doubted, and they can be 
rationally revised. Such beliefs therefore cannot provide the foundations we are alleged to 
need. It is doubtful any can. Foundationalism is therefore a form of scepticism and that is 
not a very attractive position to want to defend.
I am not going to be defending what people like Williams and Sosa call foundationalism. 
My conception o f foundationalism is different from and better than the standard view one 
finds in the literature. When I say that I want to defend foundationalism, I mean I want to 
defend what I call foundationalism. I am therefore proposing a distinctive account of 
what foundationalism really is, as well as a defence o f the doctrine so defined.
So what do I call foundationalism and how does it differ from how these other authors 
understand that doctrine? As mentioned above, I take foundationalism to be a view about 
the structure o f epistemic justification (a) and a view about its sources (b) & (c). With 
respect to (a) I take foundationalism to be a view about the structure o f justification that 
is motivated by something traditionally called ‘the epistemic regress argument’. I will be 
spelling out that argument shortly. The important point for now is that foundationalism is 
a view about how - in very general terms - you have to conceive o f epistemic justification
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in order to respond satisfactorily to that argument. The foundationalist claims that in 
order to respond to the problem that argument raises we have to distinguish between 
inferentially and non-inferentially justified beliefs. As previously explained the latter 
beliefs are justified, but they do not draw their justification from other beliefs in the way 
in which my justification for believing that England cannot win the Ashes draws its 
justification from my belief they lost the first three tests, or the way my justification for 
believing that Socrates is mortal derives from my justification for believing that he is a 
man and that all men are mortal. The foundationalist claims that as well as inferentially 
justified beliefs such as these there are also non-inferentially justified beliefs. This is 
what Williams and Sosa mean when they talk about ‘epistemically basic beliefs’. So I am 
agreeing with them to at least this extent. Epistemically basic beliefs are beliefs that are 
non-inferentially justified and according to (a) the foundationalist is someone who thinks 
there are such beliefs.
This is not yet the full-blown characterisation o f foundationalism that one normally finds 
in the literature, although it may also be familiar. Nowadays some people think that (a) is 
all there is to foundationalism. Even those who don’t, like Williams and Sosa, often give 
the impression that is what is really essential to foundationalism. Thus, Jonathan Dancy 
writes:
The claim that there are two forms o f justification, inferential and non-inferential,
is the core o f any form of foundationalism in the theory o f justification (Dancy
1985: 56).
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This deflationary reading is gaining in popularity. It appeals to those who find traditional 
foundationalism excessively baroque, but who can’t quite bring themselves to believe 
that all justification is inferential.
I think the deflationary reading is too deflationary; I think that is not all there is to 
foundationalism. I am rejecting Dancy’s deflationary reading just as firmly as I am 
rejecting the traditional reading.
I am rejecting the deflationary reading because foundationalism is also essentially a view 
about the sources o f epistemic justification - about where justification comes from. Or so 
I claim. This is where (b) and (c) come in: with respect to (b) the foundationalist claims 
that perception or observation is a distinctive source o f non-inferential justification; with 
respect to (c) she claims, further, that perception is a basic source o f such justification -  
that perception is a basic way in which we come to know about the world around us.
These commitments will be spelt out further in due course, but this is the core o f 
foundationalism as I understand it. It is a commitment to these three claims that I claim 
really marks foundationalism out as a philosophically interesting position and which 
distinguishes it from its historical rivals, rather than those traditionally focused on in the 
literature.1
1 That does not make foundationalism equivalent to ‘em piricism ’. The latter is a view  about concepts on 
one important reading, whereas what I call foundationalism is a view  about the structure and sources o f  
epistemic justification. It says nothing about concepts and indeed, is perfectly compatible with the denial o f  
empiricism in that sense.
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I will return to the deflationary reading at the end o f this section. How does my 
conception o f foundationalism differ from the standard view with which we began? 
Consider the characterisation Williams offers. On his view, foundationalism isn’t just an 
abstract view about the overall structure o f justification or the claim that there are 
inferentially and non-inferentially justified beliefs as (a) claims. The foundationalist is 
committed to highly substantive doctrines about the sorts o f beliefs that can be non- 
inferentially justified and what it is about them that enables them to be so justified. As 
Williams emphasizes, foundationalism isn’t merely ‘formal’. In contrast, I claim that 
foundationalism is a generic style o f response to a certain argument. As far as (a) goes, 
foundationalism is compatible with lots o f more specific views about how our beliefs fit 
into the abstract structure o f inferential and non-inferential justification dictated by the 
regress argument. It certainly doesn’t require that the non-inferentially justified beliefs be 
indubitable, infallible, or theoretically tractable, and semantically encapsulated items of 
knowledge.
With respect to (b) I claim the foundationalist is someone who holds that perception is a 
source o f non-inferential justification. The traditional definition, by contrast, makes no 
mention o f perception at all. Far from requiring that perception be the basic source o f 
such justification as (c) goes on to claim, the views o f Williams and Sosa are compatible 
with thinking that it is not a distinctive source o f justification at all. On their views there 
must be non-inferential justification but there is no requirement that it must derive from 
perception or that perception enjoys any other sort o f epistemological privilege as I claim
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it does. I think that such a position wouldn’t be recognizable as a form of 
foundationalism; it is certainly not what I understand by that name.
So there can be little doubt that the two characterisations differ in a fundamental way. If 
that is how they differ, what makes my view any better? Three things make my view 
preferable to the view one standardly finds in the literature. First, on my view 
foundationalism has at least some chance o f being true. That seems a pretty remote 
prospect if  foundationalism is understood in the way that Williams and Sosa understand 
it. I think there is no point in saddling people or positions with commitments that 
inevitably have the consequence that what they say is false. But even if  foundationalists 
actually did think what Williams and Sosa suggest they thought, they needn’t have done. 
I am offering them a philosophically respectable alternative. I am telling you what they 
should have thought, regardless o f what they actually thought.
Second, as I characterise it foundationalism is an intuitively appealing position. This will 
become clearer is due course. The basic point though, is very simple: some o f our beliefs 
really do seem to depend for their justification on that o f other beliefs, and some o f them 
do not, and there nothing more ordinary or ‘naive’ than the idea that perception is a basic 
way o f acquiring knowledge o f the world around us. This is basically what the 
foundationalist claims. My view therefore gives foundationalism roots in our 
commonsense thought about knowledge and justification. In contrast, Williams 
specifically aims to rule out this possibility. As he characterises it foundationalism is a 
distinctively philosophical position. His “most fundamental point” is that:
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even if, at some level o f abstraction, ordinary justification appears to accord with 
formal foundationalism this is no reason to suppose that we ought to be 
foundationalists o f the traditional kind...The question o f whether there are basic 
beliefs cannot be decided by appeal to commonsense examples. This is because 
‘basic be lie f is a theoretical concept, subject to stringent theoretical requirements. 
These do not derive straightforwardly from the desire to understand everyday 
justification. Rather, they are set by certain explanatory goals that are distinctively 
philosophical (Williams 2005: 204).
Thirdly, only my characterisation carves up the debate in a historically meaningful way. 
This is important since foundationalism is a label with a partly historical basis. On my 
view it is clear why coherentism and reliabilism, for instance, do not count as versions o f 
foundationalism. They do not count because these positions do not hold that perception is 
a basic source o f justification. According to the coherentist, all justification derives from 
coherence among one’s beliefs (BonJour 1985: esp. 87-222). According to the reliabilist, 
it derives from the fact that one’s beliefs are formed with a reliable process (Goldman 
1986). The former is not a view on which there is such a thing as distinctively perceptual 
justification; neither is a view on which perception is a basic source o f justification. Such 
views therefore won’t count as forms o f foundationalism as I understand it and that is as 
it should be.
It is also clear who does qualify as a foundationalist. On my view it is clear why Locke 
and Aristotle qualify, as well as more self-conscious foundationalists like C. I. Lewis
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(1946) and A. J. Ayer (1956). They qualify because they all have views on which the 
relevant inferential / non-inferential distinction is drawn and on which perception is a 
basic source o f non-inferential justification, despite the otherwise significant differences 
between them. These thinkers may not all understand the deliverances o f the senses in the 
way in which we would, but all allow that perception or observation (in some sense) 
plays an irreducible justificatory role. This is a distinctively foundationalist idea as I 
conceive o f foundationalism.
So my position enables us to carve up the debate in a historically sensitive way. The same 
is not true on the standard view. As Williams and Sosa characterise it, foundationalism is 
a highly specific doctrine. I will argue later that it is doubtful whether there are any 
foundationalists in W illiams’s sense. Even paradigm foundationalists like Russell (1912) 
and C. I. Lewis (1946) did not think that we could individuate the class o f epistemically 
basic beliefs by aspects o f their content. For thinkers such as these it was the epistemic 
source o f these beliefs, rather than their subject-matter that was important. But even if 
these particular thinkers did somehow come out as foundationalists, it is obvious that the 
position Williams describes is not one that has been very widely held. It applies at best to 
a very small minority o f thinkers. This sits oddly next to the central role that 
foundationalism plays in epistemological discussions and makes it hard to see why we 
should be interested in the position so characterised.
At this point proponents o f the standard view are apt to fall back upon the deflationary 
characterisation touched upon earlier. For those familiar with the literature the following
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objection may have been brewing for some time. “It is true”, they will say “that the view 
just characterised accurately describes what we might call ‘substantive foundationalism’. 
But that was always just intended as a label for a particular historical position, roughly, 
the view held and debated at the beginning o f the 20th century by thinkers like Russell 
and Ayer. There is, however, a more general view that deserves the name 
foundationalism and which we can use when we want to understand why foundationalism 
enjoys the broader historical and philosophical significance that it does. This position we 
can call ‘formal foundationalism” ’.
Formal foundationalism is closer to the commitment that I have labelled (a). As Williams 
characterises it, it just involves a commitment to the existence o f ‘epistemically basic’ or 
non-inferentially justified beliefs. Sosa is more explicit: he takes formal foundationalism 
to embody a commitment to the supervenience o f epistemic justification on non- 
epistemic features. He writes:
We need to distinguish, first, between two forms o f foundationalism: one formal, 
the other substantive. A type o f formal foundationalism with respect to a 
normative or evaluative property F is the view that the conditions (actual and 
possible) within which F would apply can be specified in general, perhaps 
recursively. Substantive foundationalism is only a particular way o f doing so and 
coherentism is another (Sosa 2000: 14).
We needn’t worry about exactly how these formulations of formal foundationalism relate 
to one another since the basic strategy fails in either case. The substantive 
characterisation proved too narrow to be useful in delineating the essential nature of
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foundationalism, the more formal characterisations in contrast are far too broad. It is 
unclear which historical positions would fail to count as versions o f foundationalism so 
characterised. Coherentism certainly counts, as Sosa himself acknowledges. And while 
he is happy to accept that, it is a very paradoxical result. Foundationalism is a label with a 
partly historical basis and to apply it to positions that have so little in common with those 
historically called ‘foundationalist’ ultimately leads only to scepticism about the 
significance o f the label.
I think we should avoid characterisations that have this consequence. My characterisation 
provides a way o f understanding foundationalism on which it is both genuinely 
substantive and true.
2. The Epistemic Regress Argument
Now that we have some sense o f what foundationalism is supposed to be we can discuss 
whether there are any good arguments for that view. I said that I would be taking 
foundationalism to be a view about justification that is motivated at least in part by the 
‘epistemic regress argument’. What is that argument and how does it motivate the 
position I’m calling foundationalism? While there is broad agreement on the importance 
of this argument in motivating foundationalism there is less consensus on the form it
2 Regress arguments occur in other philosophical settings. Gilbert Ryle uses one to draw a conclusion about 
the nature o f  voluntary action viz. that voluntary acts can’t be acts caused by a prior act o f  w ill if  acts o f  
will are themselves voluntary (Ryle 1949). Searle uses one in connection with intentionality (Searle 1983).
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should take.3 In the literature several different arguments purport to be the epistemic 
regress argument.
Sometimes people have in mind a dialectical regress in which subjects are invited to 
defend their beliefs in the context o f an argument. This is how BonJour presents the 
argument in the following passage:
The most obvious, indeed perhaps the only obvious way to show that an empirical 
belief is adequately justified (in the epistemic sense) is by producing a 
justificatory argument: the belief that p is shown to be justified by citing some 
other (perhaps conjunctive) empirical belief, the belief that Q, and pointing out 
that P is inferable in some acceptable way from Q. Proposition Q, or the belief 
therein, is thus offered as a reason for accepting proposition P...[But] for the 
belief that P to be genuinely justified by virtue o f such a justificatory argument, 
the belief that Q must itself already be justified in some fashion; merely being 
inferable from an unsupported guess or hunch, for example, can confer no 
genuine justification. Thus the putative inferential justification o f one empirical 
belief immediately raises the further issue o f whether and how the premises of 
this inference are justified...em pirical knowledge is threatened with an infinite 
and apparently vicious regress o f epistemic justification. Each belief is justified
3 Evidence o f  its importance is legion. Thus, Alston claims that the main reason for being a foundationalist 
is “the seem ing im possibility o f  a b e lie fs  being mediately justified without resting ultimately on 
immediately justified b e lie f ’ (Alston 1976: 182); Pryor calls it “the most famous argument in favour o f  
non-inferential justification” (Pryor, 2005: 184); BonJour claims “the main reason for the impressive 
durability o f  foundationalism is not any overwhelm ing plausibility attaching to the main foundationalist 
thesis in itself, but rather the existence o f  one apparently decisive argument, which seem s to rule out all 
non-sceptical alternatives to foundationalism” (BonJour 1978:1); and Bem ecker and Dretske maintain “The 
driving force behind foundationalism has always been the threat o f  an infinite regress” (Bem ecker and 
Dretske 2000: 231).
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only if  an epistemically prior belief is justified, and that epistemically prior belief 
is justified only if  a still prior belief is justified, and so on, with the apparent 
result, so long as each new justification is inferential in character, that justification 
can never be completed indeed can never even really get started -  and hence that 
there is no empirical justification and no empirical knowledge (BonJour 1985: 18- 
19).
The dialectical regress, as I will call it, is concerned with what it takes for subjects to 
show  that they are justified. You challenge me to defend my belief and in order to 
respond successfully to that challenge I must adduce some considerations in its defence 
thereby showing you that my belief is justified.4
This is not the only target o f epistemic regress arguments. Other presentations o f the 
argument focus more on what it takes for subjects to be justified in believing what they 
do. They aim to find out whether or not a subject is justified in a given belief and if so 
what makes it the case that she is justified.5 This is how DePaul presents the argument in 
the following passage:
4 This is even more explicit in Peter K lein’s presentation o f  the argument. He asks us to imagine Fred and 
Doris in conversation “Fred asserts some proposition, say p. Doris says som ething -  who knows what -  that 
prompts Fred to believe that he had better have reasons for p in order to supply som e m issing credibility. 
So, Fred gives his reason, r l, for p. N ow  Doris asks why rl is true. Fred gives another reasons, r2. This 
goes on for a while until Fred.. .arrives at what he takes to be a basic proposition, say b”. (Klein 2005: 133). 
Presentations o f  the regress do not often explicitly claim it concerns what it takes to show that a b elie f is 
justified; the argument is m erely presented in such a way that is what it concerns, whether or not that is 
acknowledged.
5 The regress argument is often thought to be an ancient argument. Ancient presentations are equally 
ambiguous. Thus, Sextus Empiricus asks whether reasoning can ever legitimately lead to assent and writes: 
‘the mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof o f  
the matter proposed needs a further proof, and this again another, and so on ad infinitum, so that the 
consequence is suspension [o f assent], as we possess no starting point for our argument...we have the mode 
based upon hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede ad infinitum take as their starting point 
something which they do not establish but claim to assume as granted sim ply and without demonstration. 
The mode o f  circular reasoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter o f
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According to this ancient argument, when we consider a belief that is justified and 
ask how it is that the belief is justified, we are typically led to another belief that 
supports the first. When we ask about the second belief, we may well be lead to a 
third. The third may in turn lead to a fourth, and so on. But how long can things 
go for in this fashion? There would seem to be only three possibilities: the chain 
o f beliefs either goes on forever, circles back upon itself, or stops. Finding the 
first two possibilities unacceptable, Foundationalists opt for the third, holding that 
there are some beliefs that are justified, but that are not justified by any further 
beliefs. The regress stops with such basic or foundational beliefs, and any other 
beliefs that are justified must be supported by the foundational basic beliefs 
(DePaul 2001: vii).
I’m going to call this the justification-making regress to distinguish it from the dialectical 
regress.6 Very often, however, one finds elements o f both in the context o f a single 
presentation. This is evident in the earlier quotation from BonJour and it is also clear in 
the following passage from Dancy:
inquiry requires confirmation derived from the matter; in this case being unable to assume either in order to 
establish the other we suspend judgement about both” (Sextus Empiricus 1967: 166-9). In contrast, 
Aristotle employs a version o f  what I am calling the justification-making regress to show that some 
justification must be non-inferential (Aristotle, 1993: A3).
6 Similarly, Susan Haack claims: “Suppose A believes that p. Is he justified in believing that p? Well, 
suppose he believes that p on the basis o f  his b elie f that q. Then he is not justified in believing that p unless 
he is justified in believing that q. Suppose he believes that q on the basis o f  his b elie f that r. Then he is not 
justified in believing that q, and hence not justified in believing that p, unless he is justified in believing  
that r. Suppose he believes that r on the basis o f  his belief that s. Then he is not justified in believing that r, 
and hence not justified in believing that q, and hence not justified in believing that p un less.... N ow  either 
(1) this series goes on without end; or (2) it ends with a b elie f which is not justified; or (3) it goes round in 
a circle; or (4) it com es to an end with a belief which is justified but not by the support o f  any further 
beliefs.” Haack claims that if  (1-3) is the case, then A ’s belief that p is not justified and goes on: “If (4), 
however, if  the chain ends with a b elie f which is justified but not by the support o f  any further belief, A is 
justified in believing that p. So, since (4) is precisely what Foundationalism claims, only if  
Foundationalism is true is anyone ever justified in any belief. (Foundationalism is the only tolerable - non- 
sceptical- alternative.)” (Haack 1993: 22). For other statements o f  the justification-m aking regress see 
(Quinton 1973: 119) and (Pryor 2005).
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Suppose that all justification is inferential. When we justify belief A by appeal to 
beliefs B and C, we have not yet shown A to be justified. We have only shown 
that, it is justified if  B and C are. Justification by inference is conditional 
justification only; A ’s justification is conditional upon the justification o f B and 
C. But if  all inferential justification is conditional in this sense, then nothing can 
be shown to be actually, non-conditionally justified. For each belief whose 
justification we attempt, there will always be a further belief upon whose 
justification that o f the first depends, and since this regress is infinite no belief 
will ever be more than conditionally justified...The regress argument therefore 
drives us to suppose that there must be some justification which is non-inferential 
if  we are to avoid the sceptical consequence o f admitting that no beliefs are ever 
actually justified (Dancy 1985: 55-6).
On the face o f it, Dancy confuses the two different things just distinguished. He starts 
with a claim about what it takes to show that a belief is justified and concludes with a 
claim about whether or not the belief in question is justified. This is an easy mistake to 
make, however, since the word ‘justify’ is ambiguous and can be used to refer to both. 
Pryor calls attention to these different uses o f the verb in the following passage:
On the first construal, ‘justifying’ a belief in P is a matter o f proving or showing 
the belief to be just (or reasonable or credible). (Here we can include both 
arguments whose conclusion is P, and arguments whose conclusion is that your 
belief in P is epistemically appropriate, or is likely to be true.) By extension, we 
can also talk about things justifying beliefs; in this extended sense, a thing counts 
as justifying a belief if  it’s something you’re in a position to use to prove or show
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your belief to be ju st...T here’s also a second way to construe the verb ‘justify’, 
which sees it as akin to the verbs ‘beautify’ and ‘electrify’. When a combination 
o f light and colour beautifies a room, it’s not proving that the room is beautiful; 
rather, it’s making the room beautiful. Similarly, on this understanding, justifying 
a belief is a matter o f making a belief just or reasonable, rather than a matter o f 
showing the belief to be just (Pryor 2005: 194).
We have seen that it is possible to initiate a regress argument using either notion. The 
important point is that the regresses thereby initiated will differ. One will concern 
whether a given belief has been shown to be justified; the other, whether a given belief is 
justified.7
Given that they differ, which do we have reason to prefer? When I talk about 
foundationalism as a position that is motivated in part by the regress argument what I 
mean is that it’s a position motivated by the justification-making version of that 
argument. This is the more fundamental version o f the argument for several reasons. It is 
the more prevalent, and w e’ll see shortly that it is by far the more plausible o f the two 
arguments, but the most important reason is that it is only the justification-making 
version o f the argument which threatens us with a truly unacceptable epistemological 
conclusion. It is only the justification-making regress which threatens to show that none 
o f our beliefs is justified. The dialectical regress, in contrast, only promises to show that
7 In requiring that the subject respond to the question about what makes it the case she is justified it is easy 
to miss the fact that the questioning effectively goes higher-order: if  she replies, she gives expression to a 
belief about what she thinks makes it the case that she is justified. To ask what justifies this belief is 
therefore to ask what justification she has for believing that she has a given justification. This is easy to 
miss since it’s easily confused with the case in which one appeals to beliefs as a source  o f  justification. In 
the latter case, the beliefs one appeals to must be justified. To ask what justifies those beliefs is therefore 
not to ask a higher-order question. That is quite unlike the dialectical case where I merely give expression  
to a belief in saying what makes it the case that I am justified.
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we cannot, or have not, shown that our beliefs are justified. The latter conclusion, while 
somewhat counter-intuitive, is not one we must do everything we can to avoid.8
Things would be different if  we had some reason to link these two notions o f justification 
and tie the conditions under which a belief can be justified with the conditions under 
which one has shown that it is justified. On certain views o f justification one cannot be 
justified unless one can show that one is justified. Dancy’s mistake may not then be a 
mistake but a substantive claim about the underlying nature o f justification. This is a 
view about justification with eloquent exponents. Thus McDowell describes ‘the time 
honoured connection in our discourse between reasons the subject has for believing as 
she does and reasons she can give for thinking that way’ and criticises writers like 
Peacocke for having to ‘sever’ that connection (McDowell 1994: 162-166).
There is clearly something to the picture o f justification that McDowell recommends 
here. It is certainly true that when we have reasons for our beliefs, we can very often give 
them. It is also true that we normally expect other people to be able to give us their 
reasons (the very young think that we should be able to do that indefinitely) and we 
frequently take the fact that others can’t give us their reasons as a sign that they do not 
really have any. That is partly why, as Austin pointed out, the question o f why the subject 
believes as she does can be asked not just out o f “respectful curiosity”, but pointedly; her
8 This is especially plausible when one thinks about what it takes to show that something is the case. Alston 
draws attention to this in the following passage “showing by its very nature requires the exhibition o f  
grounds. Furthermore, grounds must be different from the proposition to be shown. (This latter follows 
from the pragmatic aspect o f  the concept o f  showing. To show that p is to present grounds that one can 
justifiably accept without already accepting p. Otherwise showing would lack the point that goes towards 
making it what it is” (Alston 1976: 178-9).
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inability to answer can only reveal that she ought not to have been so bold (Austin 1979: 
78). These are no doubt some o f the reasons the dialectical regress can strike us as 
plausible. When one has reasons, the normal expectation is that one will be able to give 
them.
However, this is just an expectation and it is defeasible. At least, that is how I will be 
talking about justification. When I talk about justification I am going to allow that a 
subject can have reasons or justification for believing what she does without necessarily 
being able to show that she has them, much as a person can be honest or funny without 
necessarily being able to defend the claim that she is honest or funny when under attack. 
This seems the more natural usage and the more plausible. At the most basic level talk o f 
justification is a way o f appraising someone who is doing well in her thoughts; there is no 
reason to think that necessarily brings with it the ability to show that you are justified.9 
The latter requires that you recognise that you are justified and have the ability to 
articulate and perhaps even defend the claim that is so. This looks like a more 
sophisticated cognitive achievement. Even where we are able to defend the claim that we 
are justified it is still important to distinguish between what it is that shows that we are 
justified and what it is which makes it the case that we are justified. Not everything that 
plays one role may be capable o f playing the other. In order to show that you are justified 
you have to adduce claims to that effect, which claims are expressive o f your beliefs. 
Showing that you are justified may therefore always involve appeal to beliefs. We will 
see shortly that it is crucial to foundationalism that being justified does not.
9 Alston claims this as an “elementary point” (Alston 1976: 178).
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None o f this to deny that there is something gripping about, what we might call, the 
‘intemalism’ McDowell here expresses - the idea that when one is justified one’s 
justification ought to be somehow ‘available’ to one. It is very plausible to think that for 
something to be your reason as opposed to just a reason, or for it to be what makes you 
justified in believing, it has to accessible to you: it has to be a basis upon which you can 
justifiably form a belief, not just a basis upon which a belief could be so formed. But 
since it is not in virtue o f your ability to articulate your reasons as your reasons that they 
count as yours we can acknowledge what is right about this line o f thought without going 
as far as McDowell. They can be your reasons or what makes you justified in believing 
what you do even if  you cannot state that fact when pressed, much less defend it under 
questioning.10 It is also plausible to think that reasons must possess a certain sort o f 
‘evidence’ or perspicuity. They must be the sorts o f things o f which you are somehow 
aware: if they do not consciously reveal the world as being a certain way, what leads you 
to believe it to be one way rather than another? Again though that doesn’t warrant going 
as far as McDowell. What reasons make manifest, first and foremost, is the layout o f the 
world, not their own status as reasons. It is the latter, however, that one would require for 
showing that one is justified.
As I understand it, then, justification is the sort o f thing you can have without necessarily 
being able to show that you have it however often the two may in fact accompany one 
another. And when I talk about foundationalism as a position motivated in part by the
10 If one models accessibility as, in effect, belief -  so that for a given fact to be accessible is for you to 
believe that fact obtains -there would be a much tighter connection between what is accessible and what is 
capable o f  being articulated (assuming beliefs are capable o f  being articulated). But we have no reason to 
model accessibility in that way.
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epistemic regress argument I mean it’s a position motivated by the justification-making 
version o f that argument.
So how does that argument motivate what I am calling foundationalism? Recall that the 
argument starts from reflection on cases o f inferential justification -  that is, cases in 
which one’s justification derives from other things that one has justification for believing. 
This is how many o f our beliefs do seem to be justified. For instance, I may believe that 
Tony Blair will not win another election because I believe his policy in Iraq has been so 
unpopular with the electorate. That belief may be what makes it the case that I am 
justified in my belief about his electoral prospects. Or I may believe that Socrates is 
mortal because I believe that Socrates is a man and that all men are mortal. Some people 
call that ‘mediate justification’ since other beliefs, in this case my beliefs about foreign 
policy and mortality, mediate my justification. I’m going to stick with inferential though, 
since it is an important part o f the reason why those further beliefs justify me that there is 
an acceptable inference between them and the belief they are claimed to justify. The fact 
that Blair’s policies have been unpopular with the electorate makes it likely that he will 
not win: my beliefs stand in a relation o f probabilification. In other cases the relation will 
be one o f implication: that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal implies that Socrates 
is mortal."
11 It is important to what I am calling inferential justification that the inference be available between on e’s 
beliefs. Some people think that all justificatory relations obtain in virtue o f  inferential relations between a 
subject’s attitudes, whether or not the attitudes involved are beliefs. This will not make all justification 
‘inferential’ in the sense in which I am interested. I’ll return to this issue in chapter 3.
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According to the epistemic regress argument where we have a belief that is justified we 
can ask what makes it the case that belief is justified: we can ask why the subject believes 
as she does or what justifies her in that belief. So in answer to the question what justifies 
my belief about Blair’s electoral prospects we can appeal to my belief about his foreign 
policy. But what justifies this belief? If I don’t have any reason to believe his policy has 
been unpopular then I w on’t have any reason to believe that he will not win. So what 
justifies me in the belief about his foreign policy? Here again the answer may involve 
appeal to beliefs and what justifies these beliefs may be yet further beliefs still. But how 
far can things carry on in this fashion?
On the face o f it there seem to be only four ways in which the justificatory regress can 
pan out:
1. The regress ends with a belief that is not justified. While it is not justified it is still
able to justify other beliefs.
2. The regress goes on forever: the belief that p is justified by the belief that q, and
the belief that q is justified by the belief that r, and the belief that r is justified 
b y .. ..and so on, ad infinitum.
3. The regress circles back upon itself: the belief that p is justified by the belief that
q, and the belief that q is justified by the belief that r, and the belief that r is 
justified by the belief that p.
4. The regress ends with a belief that is non-inferentially justified: while it is
justified, it does not draw it’s justification from other justified beliefs.
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If this is the choice with which the regress presents us, what would be a good response? 
According to the position that I am calling foundationalism it is only if the fourth option 
is correct, and some o f our beliefs are non-inferentially justified, that any o f our beliefs 
are justified at all. This is how the regress argument motivates foundationalism. 
According to this argument foundationalism is the only alternative to the view that none 
of our beliefs is justified. This ought to make it irresistible to all but the most sceptically 
minded.12
Now we know what the regress argument is supposed to be, we can ask whether it is any 
good. The argument is an argument by elimination so the case in favour of 
foundationalism is only as good as the case against scepticism and the other options (1- 
3). I am not going to defend the rejection o f scepticism, but I will now defend the 
rejection of the three alternatives. While they all enjoy support in some quarters, a strong 
case can be made against each o f them. The case against them is strong insofar as it relies 
upon assumptions about justification that it is overwhelmingly plausible to make. It may 
be possible to give them up, but why do so unless we really have to?
The first option claims that the regress ends with an unjustified belief. While it is 
unjustified it is still able to justify other beliefs. How can a belief that is not itself 
justified, justify other beliefs? Many writers take that to be obviously impossible. Thus, 
Susan Haack simply states without further ado:
12 It is also possible to frame the argument in terms o f  knowledge. Just as we ask why one believes p, so too 
we also ask how one knows p. It is easy to use the latter to initiate a regress: much o f  what we know we 
know because we have inferred those things from other things that we know, but could all our knowledge 
be like this? Not according to the foundationalist.
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If A believes that p on the basis o f his belief that q, then he is not justified in 
believing that p unless he is justified in believing that q (Haack 1993: 22).
Haack is not alone. The idea that beliefs must be justified in order to justify other beliefs 
is intuitive and it is grounded in a picture o f the way in which beliefs confer justification 
that makes a lot o f broader sense.
Take any central case in which one belief justifies another belief and it seems to do so in 
virtue o f inferential relations between the propositions believed. The reason why my 
belief about Blair’s unpopular foreign policy justifies my belief that he will not win 
another election is that it stands in a relation o f probabilification to the latter. Similarly, 
the reason why my beliefs that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal justifies me in 
believing that Socrates is mortal, is that the former imply the latter. Inferential relations 
are therefore an important part of the story as far as beliefs go. But it is obviously not 
enough for one belief to justify another that it merely stand in inferential relations like 
these to it. That would make it far too easy to be justified since every belief stands in an 
infinite number o f such relations to all manner o f other beliefs (including itself).
O f course such relations might explain ‘why’ I believe certain things, given what else I 
believe. They might, in that sense, make it rationally intelligible that I believe as I do. But 
they do not, by themselves, give me any justification to believe those things, since they 
do not, by themselves, give me any reason to suppose that things actually are as my 
beliefs represent them as being This is what Laurence BonJour is getting at in the 
following passage. He writes:
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For the belief that p to be genuinely justified by virtue o f such a justificatory 
argument, the belief that q must itself already be justified in some fashion; merely 
being inferable from an unsupported guess or hunch, for example, can confer no 
genuine justification (BonJour 1985: 18).
BonJour’s thought is that merely appealing to inferential relations will not do. This seems 
right; we want justification to be a guide to how things actually are in the world. We want 
it to have a connection with truth and mere inferential relations do not secure that.
So we need a further constraint and this is precisely the role played by the requiring the 
beliefs involved be justified. By specifying that the ‘inputs’ to this potential inference be 
justified we plug the intuitive justificatory gap that merely believing something leaves 
open.13 This gives us a picture o f the way in which beliefs confer justification according 
to which justificatory status is inherited. Beliefs justify other beliefs to which they are 
suitably related and they do so by passing on their own justification. This is a compelling 
picture and it explains why an unjustified belief cannot make another belief justified. A 
belief cannot pass on justification it does not itself possess, just as I cannot inherit your
1 4
car if you do not yourself possess one. If so then the first option according to which the 
regress ends with an unjustified belief is a non-starter.
13 In other cases perhaps the sort o f  ‘attitude’ involved might plug that gap, but this is not plausible in the 
case o f  belief: the mere fact that one believes something, together with the fact that what one believes 
implies or probabilifies something else, isn’t enough to confer justification on the latter. Here, we must 
specify that the attitude (viz. belief) have a certain additional property, namely that o f  being justified.
14 In a similar vein, Jose Zalabardo claims “When a proposition p obtains warrant inferentially, it inherits it 
from other propositions to which it is suitably related. And p cannot inherit from other propositions warrant 
that the latter don’t p ossess” (Zalabardo, unpublished).
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Up until now I have talked rather loosely about the way in which beliefs confer 
justification. Actually, the claim being made here is a claim about inference and the 
conditions under which the fact one’s beliefs stand in inferential relations to one another 
is capable o f conferring justification on them. I am claiming that inference, in this sense, 
is a conditional vehicle o f justification; it only confers justification where the input 
beliefs are already justified. Dancy makes a similar point in the following passage:
Inference is basically a matter o f moving from premises to conclusion along an 
acceptable path. If the premises are unjustified there will be no justification for 
the conclusion - at least not by this inference (Dancy 1985: 55).
This makes inference an essentially dependent form o f epistemic justification: its 
existence and functioning as a source o f justification depends upon the existence and 
functioning o f some other source o f justification.15
This is why we need to distinguish between the conditions under which justification is 
‘inferential’ and the conditions under which it derives from beliefs. Beliefs may be 
capable o f furnishing us with a different sort o f justification and in that case it may not be 
true that they must be justified in order to confer justification.16 However, this 
justification will not be inferential justification. This response will then no longer be a 
version o f the first option; it will be a version o f the fourth. It is hard to imagine what that
15 See also (Ginet 2005: 148-9).
16 Suppose I have the unjustified b elie f that Fino is matured in contact with air. Can’t that belief still make 
me justified in believing that I have at least one belief? If so it is not true that only justified beliefs can 
make other beliefs justified, since my belief about Fino is not justified. Perhaps this makes sense; either 
way it would not be a case o f  inferential justification since there are no appropriate inferential relations 
between these two beliefs. There are appropriate inferential relations between the b elie f that I believe that 
Fino is matured in contact with air and the b elie f that I have at least one belief. But it is not obvious the 
former belief is unjustified; it is my views about Fino that are unjustified, not my views about what I 
believe about Fino.
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role might be and that makes it tempting to frame the conclusion that I have drawn about 
inference as a conclusion about beliefs more generally and the conditions under which 
they are capable o f furnishing us with justification. Strictly speaking, though, I have only 
argued for the claim about beliefs insofar as they confer justification by standing in 
inferential relations to other beliefs. I claim that in those circumstances, beliefs can only 
make other beliefs justified where they are themselves justified.
This is a very plausible idea and it rules out the first option according to which the 
regress ends with an unjustified belief. Notice though that is not part o f a general claim 
about justifiers; it is a specific claim about inferentially justified beliefs. It says they can 
only confer justification where they are themselves justified. For all that’s been said there 
may be other things which can make a subject justified -  other things which can confer 
justification upon a belief -  about which it doesn’t even make sense to wonder whether or 
not they are themselves justified. As we will that possibility is central to foundationalism.
What about the second option? Is there anything wrong with supposing that the regress 
goes on ad infinitum? Since we do have actually have an infinite number o f beliefs 
supporting each and every one o f our beliefs, this response cannot be the only non- 
sceptical way o f terminating the regress.17 Assuming it is unacceptable to claim that none 
o f our beliefs is justified, the possibility o f an infinite regress cannot show that 
foundationalism doesn’t accurately describe the actual justificatory structure o f our
17 Some self-styled ‘infm itists’ are not committed to thinking we must actually have an infinite number o f  
beliefs. Peter Klein thinks our beliefs merely becom e more justified, the greater the number o f  beliefs we 
have in support o f  them. This is not a version o f  ‘infinitism ’ as I understand that position; it is a version o f  
coherentism (as Klein him self acknowledges) (Klein 2005).
39
beliefs. This may be all the foundationalist needs but I think we are entitled to a stronger 
conclusion in any case since ‘infinitism’ does not succeed in articulating a justificatory 
structure our beliefs could possibly enjoy (whether or not they actually enjoy it). Or so I 
will now argue.
The reason is very simple and takes us back to the point made at the end of the previous 
discussion in connection with the proposal that the regress ends with an unjustified belief. 
We are now considering a response according to which the regress goes on ad infinitum 
with each belief inferentially justified by some further belief. However. I have already 
argued that inference is an essentially dependent source o f justification: its existence and 
functioning as a source o f justification depends upon the existence and functioning o f 
another source o f justification. Given that is so, it is not possible that inference could be 
the only source o f justification. It is not intelligible that it could be the only way in which 
justification is conferred upon a subject’s beliefs as the present response envisages since
it is not an autonomous source o f justification in that sense. If that is right, then the
18second option according to which the regress goes on ad infinitum is no good either.
What about the third option according to which the regress circles back upon itself? 
According to this option what justifies my belief that it rained last night might be my 
belief that the grass is wet and what justifies my belief that the grass is wet might be my
18 Here is another way to see that: arguments are only as good as their starting points. This is what I mean 
when I say that inference is a conditional vehicle o f  justification - whether it succeeds in conferring 
justification depends on whether the starting points are any good. An infinite regress is compatible with the 
starting points being all good or being all bad. The fact that, for every b elie f there is som e further belief that 
would support it doesn’t suffice to determine whether they do support it. All it rules out is the possibility  
that if  any o f  the beliefs in the series is justified, then they aren’t all justified given that each has successors 
that would justify it. But i f  inferential relations don’t suffice to determine whether any is good though then 
something else must be necessary.
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belief that it rained last night. Does this make sense? It looks like a case in which a belief 
effectively justifies itself and that seems to defeat the whole point o f requiring that beliefs 
be justified in the first place.
The obvious inadequacy o f this response brings out even more clearly the underlying 
inadequacy o f inference as a source o f justification and helps explain why we should 
think that it is a fundamentally dependent form of epistemic justification. If inference 
were not a dependent source o f justification as I have claimed it is unclear why circularity 
o f this sort wouldn’t be acceptable. After all, one o f the beliefs that every belief stands in 
inferential relations to is itself; the belief that p stands in a relation o f implication to the 
belief that p. So if  inferential relations between one’s beliefs were sufficient for 
justification (if inference could in that sense be one’s sole source o f justification) then 
one could be justified in believing anything whatsoever provided only that one does 
believe it.
This is totally unacceptable: beliefs are not justified simply in virtue o f being held and 
they do not in that way justify themselves.19 Indeed, this misses the whole point of 
requiring that beliefs be justified in the first place. The original idea was that there should 
be something which functions as a reason why the belief is likely to be true and makes it 
something you ought to believe - something over and above the mere fact you do believe 
it. Thinking o f inference as a dependent source o f justification as I have done enables us
19 Thus Quinton writes: ‘For a b elief to be justified it is not enough for it to be accepted, let alone merely 
entertained: there must also be good reason for accepting it’ (Quinton 1973: 119).
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to explain why circularity o f this sort is unacceptable. Given that is so, the third option 
according to which the regress goes round in such circles is also no good.
Having just said that I want to acknowledge that this is not the only way that people have 
understood the suggestion that the regress ‘circles’ back upon itself. According to a 
position known as coherentism the objection just raised goes wrong in assuming a 
‘linear’ conception o f conception. According to the coherentist’s holistic alternative we 
are not to think o f justification being passed from one belief to the next, eventually 
landing up back with the belief with which the series begun. Rather, justification is a 
property o f an individual’s entire set o f beliefs. Specifically, it is that property the set 
enjoys when it’s individual members ‘cohere’ with one another and it accrues to each 
individual belief in virtue o f its membership o f such a set o f beliefs.
This is a very implausible account o f what justifies our beliefs, but I do not want to take 
issue with it here. The important point is that this strategy effectively appeals to beliefs 
that are /lort-inferentially justified in terminating the regress. In fact, it says that all o f our 
beliefs are non-inferentially justified, since it says that they are all justified by the fact 
they belong to a coherent set o f beliefs and that is not where justification comes from in 
standard cases o f inferential justification.
What I mean by this is that the relations the coherentist appeals to are not inferential 
relations o f the usual sort - they are not like the relation that Socrates is a man and all 
men are mortal stand in to the belief that Socrates is mortal - they are far more extensive
and encompass all o f an individual’s beliefs. There is also a difference in the sort of 
access the subject has to those relations and the role they play in getting her to be 
justified. In the Socrates case, there’s a fairly robust sense in which I believe that 
Socrates is mortal because I believe that he is a man and that all men are mortal; the latter 
beliefs really are operative in getting me to believe as I do, and if  I had different beliefs 
on that front, I’d adjust my beliefs about his mortality accordingly. This is quite unlike 
the holistic case, where it is doubtful whether I am aware o f the relevant facts about all 
my beliefs and their inter-relations (or could even easily become aware o f them), and 
doubtful these facts are in any way operative in getting me to believe as I do. This may be
the basis on which certain coherentist epistemologists form their beliefs, but it is clearly
20not the basis upon which most o f us do so.
Finally, though, even the coherentist doesn’t just appeal to facts about the inferential 
relations between our beliefs, however extensive we take the set to be. She also has a 
story to tell about why the fact that one’s beliefs cohere makes them likely to be true, and 
hence why it should be a justification that they provide. For instance, Davidson appeals to 
the fact that beliefs are by nature veridical (Davidson 2000). This ought to remove any 
remaining temptation to call this a case o f inferential justification in the ordinary sense. 
We certainly do not ordinarily appeal to facts about the nature o f beliefs in making sense
20 Intuitively to be justified in believing p is to believe p on the basis o f  the facts which give you 
justification to believe p. This is hard for the coherentist to make sense of, since it is very hard to see how a 
b e lie fs  inter-relations to all other beliefs could be the ‘basis’ on which you adopt it. The only obvious way 
o f making sense o f  this is to suppose you believe p on the basis o f  a coherentist meta-argument claiming 
that the belief that p coheres with the rest o f  one’s beliefs, and that beliefs which cohere are likely to be 
true. This makes sense o f  how such facts could intelligibly be the basis upon which one believes but it is 
clearly very implausible as a description o f  the basis upon which most people form their beliefs. 
Coherentism therefore leaves most people’s beliefs unjustified and that isn’t much o f  a recommendation.
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of inferential justification. Coherentism is therefore a version o f the fourth strategy which 
I have associated with foundationalism, rather than the third.
I am not claiming that coherentism is a particularly plausible version o f the fourth 
strategy or that there is nothing awkward about so characterising it. I am just claiming 
that overall it is better seen as a version o f the fourth strategy which appeals to a non- 
inferential source o f justification, than to one which maintains that all justification is 
inferential in the relevant sense. In the end, though, it may be more accurate to say the 
coherentist simply rejects the framework o f inferential and non-inferential justification 
within which the regress is set. After all, that position is one according to which all 
beliefs have the same source o f justification; they are all justified by the fact they are 
members o f a coherent set. Ironically, it may turn out that the best way o f bringing out 
the difference between coherentism and more traditional versions o f the fourth response 
is not by stressing the idea that some justification is non-inferential (since that is 
something the coherentist thinks is true o f all beliefs) but by stressing the idea that some 
justification is actually inferential (some o f it really does derive from other things that we 
have justification for believing). Intuitively, not all beliefs have the same source of 
justification and this is something the coherentist denies.
So I have claimed that inferential justification is a fundamentally dependent form of 
epistemic justification and I have rejected options (1-3) on that ground. However, I have 
also suggested that subtle variations o f those options ought to count as versions o f the 
fourth strategy. It is now time to consider this option -  the option according to which the
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regress ends with a belief that is non-inferentially justified. Would this be a good 
response to the regress?
On the face of it, yes it would. Unlike the other three options there is nothing 
immediately implausible about the suggestion that the regress ends with a belief that is
7 1non-inferentially justified. Some people deny that a belief can be justified by anything 
other than its inferential relations to other justified beliefs. But there is nothing intuitive 
about this view. It rests entirely upon philosophical arguments that we will later find 
wanting. Given that options (1-3) are no good, and that there is nothing intuitively 
problematic with the fourth option, the regress argument does look like a good argument 
in favour o f thinking that there must be such a thing as non-inferential justification.
But is it a good argument in favour o f foundationalism? It is certainly not a good 
argument in favour o f foundationalism in the traditional sense. Nothing in this argument 
supports the demand for a layer o f non-inferentially justified or epistemically basic 
beliefs distinguished in terms o f their content or enjoying the sorts o f strong 
epistemological privileges that Williams and Sosa describe. All this argument supports is 
the claim that there must be some beliefs that are non-inferentially justified; there must be 
some beliefs that do not draw their justification from their inferential relations to other 
justified beliefs. It doesn’t tell us anything about the sorts o f beliefs that can be non- 
inferentially justified or what it is about them that enables them to play that role. Any
21 O f course, it is much harder to see how one would stop the dialectical regress in this way. H ow can one 
show that a b elie f is justified other than by producing a justificatory argument in its favour? See also (Pryor 
2005: 193-4).
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substantive claims on that score are totally unmotivated. The regress argument is 
therefore not a good argument in favour o f foundationalism as traditionally conceived.
Is it a good argument in favour o f foundationalism in my sense? I have claimed that 
foundationalism is a view about the structure o f justification (a) and a view about its 
sources (b) & (c). With respect to (a) I have claimed that foundationalism is a view about 
the structure o f justification that is motivated by the epistemic regress argument. The 
foundationalist claims that we must acknowledge the existence o f non-inferentially 
justified beliefs in order to respond satisfactorily to that argument. This is precisely what 
we have just seen the regress does establish, given that the other three alternatives are no 
good and that scepticism is false. So the regress argument is a good argument in favour o f
(a). That is hardly surprising though since (a) simply commits the foundationalist to 
whatever it is one needs to solve that problem. Once one sees foundationalism as a 
response to the regress argument it is easy to see that my response is a better response to 
that argument than the traditional view, since my view is actually motivated by that 
argument. The traditional view, by contrast, commits itself to all sorts of things that just 
aren’t relevant to solving that problem.
O f course someone might now say: why call that view ‘foundationalism’? In a way this is 
a good question. As we have just seen the regress argument only gets you as far as 
thinking there must be some non-inferential justification. This cannot be all there is to 
foundationalism; it is far too permissive. We have seen that slightly modified versions of 
options (1-3) all appeal to non-inferential sources o f justification on one reading, yet it
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would be wrong to think o f those positions as forms o f foundationalism in any serious 
sense. This is why (a) is only one component o f the position I call foundationalism. 
Foundationalism isn’t just a view about the overall structure o f justification. It is also a 
view about the sources o f justification. This is the point o f (b) and (c). A foundationalist 
also thinks that perception is a distinctive and privileged source o f non-inferential 
justification.
So is the regress argument a good argument in favour o f these claims? No. The regress 
argument doesn’t say anything about where justification actually comes from; it just tells 
us where it doesn't come from. So the regress argument is therefore not a good argument 
in favour o f foundationalism in my sense sense since it doesn’t on its own get you all 
three components o f that position. It is a good argument for (a) but not for (b) or (c).
O f course, once we get as far as acknowledging the existence o f non-inferential 
justification an overwhelmingly natural question presents itself: where does such 
justification come from? There is then a very natural progression from this view to full­
blown foundationalism in my sense, since the natural answer to this question is to advert 
to the senses. This is an independently plausible claim about where justification actually 
comes from and the beauty o f this response is that it looks like it provides just the kind of 
non-inferential justification that we need -  the sort of justification, that is, which doesn’t 
land us back with a form of the regress. Unlike inference, perception isn’t an essentially 
dependent form o f epistemic justification. It doesn’t merely spread around justification
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that is already there or require antecedently justified beliefs as inputs. It can be what, in 
the first instance, gives us justification to believe; it is a source o f new justification.
But this response, however natural, is not mandated by the regress; it is not something 
that argument establishes. This is not to deny that the story one tells about how or why 
the senses are a privileged source o f justification might not be tacitly informed by the 
picture o f justification underlying the regress, or that rivals like coherentism might not 
run counter the spirit o f that argument. I have already pointed out that coherentism sits 
oddly next to the idea that there are both inferential and non-inferential sources o f 
justification, and it repudiates the linear conception o f justification underlying that 
argument by denying that we can meaningfully ask after the justification o f an individual 
belief without settling the status o f all the rest. We will see in later chapters how 
foundationalism is more in keeping with the spirit o f the regress. My point is merely that 
the foundationalist’s claims about the primacy of perception and about where non- 
inferential justification comes from are not an inevitable consequence o f the regress 
argument.
This is a strength rather than a weakness in the foundationalist’s argument since it 
depends upon considerations that even those who claim not to be moved by the regress or 
its linear conception o f justification ought to take seriously. Views like coherentism, 
which fail to do so, and which deny that there is any such thing as distinctively perceptual 
justification are therefore doubly wide o f the mark. The fact that they aren’t ruled out by 
the regress is not enough to save them given that this is not the only thing to be said in
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favour o f foundationalism. Foundationalism is also motivated by the desire to 
accommodate the obvious fact that perception plays a justificatory role and that is 
something the coherentist denies. This is a reason not to take that position seriously quite 
aside from concerns about the regress.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that the epistemic regress argument doesn’t establish as 
much as some have thought since it doesn’t establish foundationalism. It is a good 
argument in favour o f one component o f that view, but not the other. This is not a 
problem for my view, however, since I am not taking foundationalism to be motivated 
solely by the regress argument. The regress argument motivates the foundationalist’s 
claims about the overall structure o f justification. But foundationalism is also a view 
about its sources. Specifically, it is the view that perception or observation is the basic 
source o f justification. This is not motivated by the regress argument and nor is it meant 
to be. It is an independently plausible claim about where justification actually comes 
from. The next chapter will explore two very different ways in which a foundationalist 
can try and hold onto it.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL 
CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONALISTS
1. Introduction
In chapter 1 I offered a certain characterisation of foundationalism. Foundationalism is a 
view about the structure o f epistemic justification and a view about its sources. 
Specifically, it’s the view that (a) some o f our beliefs must be non-inferentially 
justification, and that (b) perception is not only a source o f such justification, but (c) a 
basic source o f such justification. If you look at what actual historical foundationalists 
have said though, their position seems to be quite different from what I’m calling 
‘foundationalism’. They don’t appear to be committed to (b), let alone (c). And they are 
committed to, or at least endorse, a series o f further claims that I don’t talk about at all. 
Historically, foundationalists had distinctive views about the content or nature o f the 
basic or non-inferentially justified beliefs, the source o f our knowledge o f them, and the 
epistemic credentials o f such beliefs. I am silent about these further claims. I do not 
commit the foundationalist to them; and, in fact, my view is that these further claims are 
almost certainly false. So there’s a discrepancy; while I commit the foundationalist to (a),
(b), and (c), foundationalists historically endorsed a very different set o f claims.
Someone might therefore say: ‘you can call your position ‘foundationalism’ if you like, 
but that is not a label that makes any historical sense. Your position is just too different 
from those historically called foundationalist so to insist on calling it that is just
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anachronistic’. My reply to this objection is that we have to distinguish between what the 
historical foundationalists thought and what they should have thought -  that is, between 
those claims they actually endorsed and those they were committed to endorsing. What 
I’ll be arguing in this chapter is that historical foundationalists needn’t have committed 
themselves to these further claims and, what’s more, they shouldn’t have done. They 
needn’t have done because you don’t need to think these further things in order to deal 
with the epistemic regress argument. And they shouldn’t have done for lots of familiar 
reasons; most obviously, you end up with an implausible and unworkable account o f 
what actually justifies most o f our beliefs.
Insofar as the historical foundationalists really did commit themselves on this score, their 
position is no good. That is the moral o f the first half o f this chapter. But this chapter is 
not all negative. Foundationalism isn’t just important assuming we ignore everything that 
foundationalists ever actually said. Some o f the considerations motivating these thinkers 
were understandable and a lot o f what they thought was almost right. Or so I will argue. 
In particular, I will argue that although traditional foundationalists might not have 
explicitly asserted (b) or (c) they did, in effect, think something like that. They thought 
that observation or perception (albeit o f a funny sort) was a source o f justification 
fundamentally distinct from reasoning or inference. There is something importantly right 
about that. Unfortunately in their case other commitments got in the way and prevented 
them from seeing that straight. Under the weight o f these additional commitments that 
idea got perverted and ultimately transposed into something importantly different. 
Nonetheless, the original insight -  the real driving force -  is one that we should hold onto
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and in chapter 3 I’ll show how we can do so without being foundationalists in the 
traditional sense.
What I really want to do in this chapter, then, is to save historical foundationalism from 
itself. I want to show why all the things which traditionally got these thinkers into trouble 
are things they didn’t need to think. And I also want to show why my own position, 
which doesn’t endorse these further claims, still deserves the label ‘foundationalism’. It’s 
not just that the label fits if  you leave aside everything the foundationalists historically 
thought. It fits in a historically meaningful sense since the two positions are ultimately 
driven by the same basic intuition. In both cases that intuition is a good one.
2. Historical Foundationalism
So who are these ‘historical foundationalists’ and what did they actually think? While 
this label is perhaps most famously associated with early twentieth century thinkers such 
as Russell, Lewis, Chisholm, and Ayer, it can also be applied to early figures like Locke. 
They all thought that some o f our beliefs must be non-inferentially justified and they all 
had a distinctive view about what could be justified in this way and why. It’s those views 
which distinguish historical foundationalism from the version o f foundationalism that I’ll 
eventually be arguing we should adopt. Three claims, in particular, stand out. They are all 
part o f the positive account o f the non-inferentially justified or basic beliefs. I am going 
to call them the Subject-Matter, the Source, and the Status, Proposals respectively.
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First, historical foundationalists had a distinctive view about the nature or content of the 
epistemically basic beliefs. They thought that only beliefs about our own psychological 
states could be non-inferentially justified. In particular, they thought that ordinary beliefs 
about non-psychological reality - like the belief that there is a squirrel on the fence - 
could not be non-inferentially justified. For them the foundational knowledge was limited 
to knowledge o f our own minds; any belief about how things are in the world external to 
one’s mind depends for its justification on inferences one can make from beliefs that are 
about one’s own mind. I’m going to call this the Subject-Matter Proposal since it’s a 
claim about the sorts o f things that we can be non-inferentially justified in having beliefs 
about.
Second, historical foundationalists had a distinctive account o f how we are in a position 
to form justified beliefs about our own minds. To claim that such beliefs are 
epistemically basic or non-inferentially justified is merely to say what doesn’t justify 
them; it says that they do not get their justification from their inferential relations to other 
beliefs. But w e’re also owed a positive account o f what does justify these beliefs. The 
traditional answer was ‘observation’. You are in a position to justifiably make judgement 
about your own psychological states because you ‘observe’ or are ‘acquainted’ with or 
are otherwise somehow aware o f those states, and form your beliefs about them on that 
basis. This is why such beliefs are not inferentially justified since observation is not a 
form of inference. It offers a fundamentally different model o f how we can be in a 
position to make judgements. I am going to call this the Source Proposal since it is a
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claim about where the justification for basic beliefs comes from, given that it doesn’t 
come from other justified beliefs.
The third defining feature o f historical foundationalism is an account o f the epistemic 
status o f beliefs about our own psychological states. They had impressive epistemological 
credentials according to the historical foundationalists and were commonly held to be 
both infallible (that is, incapable o f being mistaken) and indefeasible (incapable o f being 
rationally revised). This is what I’m calling the Status Proposal.
These three proposals help to define historical foundationalism. What is the relationship 
between them? In the secondary literature it is common to stress the third proposal 
concerning the epistemic status o f beliefs about our own psychological states (Audi, 
1998, BonJour 1985, Dancy 1985, Lehrer 2000, Pollock & Cruz 1999). Traditional 
foundationalists it is claimed had a particular view about non-inferential justification 
according to which only beliefs that were incapable o f being mistaken or rationally 
revised could be justified in this way. After all, if  a belief could be mistaken it would be 
as much in need o f epistemic support as any other belief and so could hardly provide the 
secure foundations upon which the others rest. Beliefs about non-psychological reality, 
like the belief that there is a squirrel on the fence, can be mistaken. But beliefs about 
psychological reality cannot and it is because these beliefs can’t be mistaken that they can 
provide the secure foundations that we need. Thus Dancy writes:
How is it that beliefs about our present sensory states need no support from 
others, while all other beliefs require such support? The answer comes from the
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third element o f classical foundationalism: this is that our beliefs about our 
present sensory states are infallible. It is because o f this that they can play the role 
ascribed to them in this form of empiricism; beliefs about our present sensory 
states can be our basis -  can stand on their own two feet and support the rest -  
because they are infallible (Dancy 1985: 53-4).
On this reading the overall account is driven by a certain view about non-inferential 
justification and what it would take for any belief to be justified in this way. This view 
explains why beliefs about our own psychological states are epistemically basic, as the 
Subject Matter proposal claims, since it’s only those beliefs which can plausibly be 
thought to enjoy such an exalted status. And it also explains why such beliefs have the 
epistemic source that they do, since observation is the basis upon which these beliefs are 
held on the traditional account. I am therefore going to call this the epistemological route 
to historical foundationalism.
This explanation is probably the right one in some cases.1 It seems to be the picture that 
Russell has -  he has a certain epistemological view about what it would take for any 
belief to be non-inferentially justified and that drives him to look for things which meet 
these requirements. The things he comes up with are so-called sense-data and ourselves. 
We can be mistaken in our beliefs about how things are in the world around us, but it is 
less obvious that we can be mistaken in our belief about the things that Russell picks on. 
The idea that we have privileged access to the self is widespread and not without appeal, 
and it was thought equally hard to make sense o f error in the case o f sense-data since the
1 The precise nature o f  the epistem ological view is open to question. In chapter 4 I will argue that it is 
indefeasibility rather than infallibility, which really drives this account. This is not the standard view  one 
now finds in the literature.
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latter are mind-dependent objects that have exactly the properties they appear to have. 
Such objects were said to be ‘self-intimating’ to the subject upon whom their existence 
depends. According to Russell these are the things with which we are ‘acquainted’. 
Moreover, it is our acquaintance with them that then explains how we are in a position to 
know about them. We are in a position to know or justifiably form beliefs about them 
insofar as we are aware o f them in this special way and believe what we do on that basis. 
So acquaintance or awareness is the source o f our justification, where that is essentially 
observation o f a special sort o f object (Russell 1912).
In other cases, however, this is not the right order o f explanation. In the case o f someone 
like Locke it’s not so much that he has a special view about non-inferential justification, 
which then leads him to look for beliefs which could be justified in this way. Rather, he 
takes it for granted that observation is a source o f justification and just happens to have a 
particular metaphysical view about what it is that we actually observe. This view is 
independently motivated. It claims that we do not perceive objects in the external world, 
at least not directly. We only really perceive our own ideas. For someone like Locke this 
is why it’s only beliefs about the latter that can be non-inferentially justified; we do not 
observe the former and so observation trivially isn’t available to justify our beliefs about 
them. The epistemic status o f basic beliefs then falls out o f this, since the things which 
Locke thinks we actually perceive happen to be such that we cannot be mistaken or 
rationally revise our beliefs about them when we form those beliefs on the basis of 
observation.
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I’m going to call this the metaphysical route to historical foundationalism since it starts 
from a particular metaphysical picture o f what it is that we observe. In both cases beliefs 
about mind-independent objects depend on inferences we can make from beliefs about 
our own psychological states. But in Locke’s case there is no prior commitment to the 
idea that if we did observe such objects, observation still couldn’t non-inferentially 
ground our beliefs about them. He just has other reasons for thinking we don’t observe 
mind-independent objects. The overall account is therefore driven by a metaphysical 
view about what it is that we actually observe, rather than an epistemological view about 
the conditions under which observation, per se, can be a source o f non-inferential 
justification.
These are two different routes to the position that I’m calling historical foundationalism. 
Clearly in the case o f many historical figures one can find elements o f both. I am not 
claiming that these two motives operate entirely independently o f one another, merely 
that in certain cases one is more pronounced than the other.
At first glance historical foundationalism looks more like the position that Williams and 
Sosa describe and which I rejected in the first chapter than what I call foundationalism. In 
fact, however, not even historical foundationalists thought that the class of epistemically 
basic beliefs are ‘theoretically tractable’ as Williams requires. In particular, they did not 
think that there were ‘non-trivially specifically kinds o f beliefs individuated by broad 
aspects o f their content that are fitted to play the role o f terminating points for chains o f 
justification’ (Williams 2005: 203). The emphasis on content is absolutely crucial to the
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orthodox view one finds in the literature, but it is completely foreign to historical 
foundationalism. On the historical account what is important about beliefs about one’s 
own psychological states isn’t some aspect o f their content; it is not that there’s a certain 
subject matter ‘the self and its states’ about which one is guaranteed not to be mistaken. 
These beliefs are special because - and only because - we form them on a certain basis, 
namely on the basis o f acquaintance with (or observation of) those very states.
According to the historical foundationalists, acquaintance or observation consciously 
presents us with the facts that make what we believe true: it makes those facts ‘manifest’ 
to us by consciously revealing them to us and that is why we are in an epistemically 
favourably position to make judgements about them. For the historical foundationalists, 
then, it’s the epistemic source o f beliefs about our own psychological states rather than 
their content that is important in explaining why such beliefs can be justified in a way 
that doesn’t derive from the justification o f other beliefs. The standard view one finds in 
the literature leaves this out altogether.
The easiest way to see why that is so important is to think about cases in which we hold 
beliefs about our own psychological states on non-observational grounds. In such cases 
we won’t get the same explanation o f why the beliefs in question are justified if I am 
right. If it is in virtue o f the circumstances in which one comes to entertain the relevant 
belief that one is in a position justifiably to judge, then we shouldn’t expect beliefs
2 I am not claiming these two things are totally distinct. Clearly it’s because such beliefs are ‘about’ what 
they are about (viz. our own minds) that they can be justified in the way that they are justified, that is, by 
observing our own mind. I f  they were about something else altogether, observation could not justify them. 
Still, it is the latter which explains why they are justified, not some aspect o f  their content.
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formed in different circumstances to be justified in the same way, despite the fact that 
they concern the same topic. In fact, this is exactly what we find.
Consider the following case from Pollock and Cruz:
Consider shadows on snow. Because shadows on white surfaces are normally 
grey, most people think that shadows on snow are grey. But a discovery made 
fairly early by every landscape painter is that they are actually blue. A person 
having the general belief that shadows on snow are grey may, when queried about 
how a particular snow-shadow looks to him, reply that it looks grey, without 
paying any serious attention to his percept. His belief about how it looks is based 
upon his general belief rather than inspection o f his percept, and is accordingly 
wrong. This shows that the belief is not incorrigible.. .Suppose further you’re your 
inductive evidence is faulty and you are unjustified in believing that shadows on 
white surfaces are grey. Then you are unjustified in believing that the snow 
shadow looks grey (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 58-60).3 
Cases are like are often thought to be a problem for the foundationalist; and they would 
be if  the orthodox view were right and the foundationalist really was trying to delineate 
basic beliefs in terms o f their content as Williams and others assume.
3 Here is a different example (also based on an case o f  Pollock’s): suppose I have an alarm clock and I 
notice that every time the alarm goes o ff  a light red light flashes in the lower left hand comer o f  my visual 
field and it appears red to me. A big bee now suddenly com es on the scene and hovers perilously close to 
my nose. Not surprisingly I forget all about the alarm clock and focus on the bee in the middle o f  my visual 
field. But I then hear the alarm go o ff  and that gives me inductive grounds for believing that ‘it appears to 
me as if  there is a red light flashing’ even if, having been so preoccupied with the bee, I fail to notice that is 
how things appear to me.
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I’m going to call that the Propositional Assumption since it claims that the 
foundationalist aims to articulate a set o f propositions that we are non-inferentially 
justified in believing. This assumption goes unchallenged in the literature, but it is not an 
assumption to which the historical foundationalists were committed, as my 
characterisation makes clear.4 They don’t think that any old beliefs about one’s own 
psychological states must be non-inferentially justified. It is only beliefs that one holds on 
the basis o f observing those states, and not all beliefs that are ‘about’ one’s own 
psychological states need to be held on that basis.5
Pollock and Cruz consider that response but duly reject it. They write:
There is a response to this counter-example which has considerable intuitive pull, 
at least initially. This is to agree that not all beliefs about how things appear to us 
are prima facie justified, but those based upon being appeared to in that way are. 
Taken literally, this makes no sense. Prima facie justification is a logical property 
o f propositions. A proposition cannot have such a property at one time and fail to 
have it at another (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 60-1).
In fact this does make sense - provided that one is not committed to the Propositional 
Assumption. If I am right the historical foundationalists were not committed to this
4 Bill Brewer appears to be committed to this assumption, though not in the name o f  foundationalism. 
Brewer claims that in entertaining the content o f  a perceptual state one thereby necessarily recognises its 
truth, and hence has reason to endorse that content. This is how he thinks that our perceptual experiences 
provide reasons for our judgements about the world. (Brewer 1999: esp. 204-6).
How does this relate to what I earlier called the Subject-Matter Proposal? The latter lists the sorts o f  
things we can be non-inferentially in having beliefs about. According to the traditional foundationalists that 
meant our own minds. This is not what the Propositional Assumption claims; it claims we can identify a set 
o f  propositions we are  non-inferentially justified in believing. But whether we are inferentially or non- 
inferentially justified in believing some proposition depends on more than just what basis propositions like 
that can be held; it depends on what basis the proposition in question are held and that requires looking at 
more than the content o f  the beliefs involved.
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assumption; they think exactly what Pollock and Cruz think they cannot think and this is 
possible precisely because they do not aim to articulate a set o f propositions we are non- 
inferentially justified in believing in the way that he assumes.6
This is easy to overlook since we don’t normally hold beliefs about our own minds on 
other grounds. According to the historical foundationalists observation o f one’s own 
mind is the canonical ground for beliefs about it. Not surprisingly therefore observation 
turns out to be the ground upon which these beliefs are in fact always held since there is 
no reason not to hold those beliefs on observational grounds, if  such grounds are 
genuinely available. Still, it is not impossible to hold beliefs about the mind on other 
grounds even on the traditional account and that tells us something important about 
historical foundationalism.
This is a much more attractive account o f the source o f our justification for beliefs about 
the mind, since there is no aspect of their content to which we can plausibly appeal in any 
case. In the literature it is often objected that beliefs about one’s own psychological states 
aren’t ‘self-evident’. Unlike the thought that whoever is tall is tall, say, the mere 
entertaining o f propositions about one’s own psychological states does not put one in a
6 Unfortunately they draw the wrong conclusions about foundationalism from their own examples. This is 
because they falsely assume that foundationalism is a ‘doxastic’ theory. In the passage just quoted they go 
on: “the claim actually being made here is presumably a different one, viz., that when we are appeared to in 
a certain way, that in and o f  itself can make us at least defeasibly justified in believing that we are appeared 
to in that way...later in this book we will endorse a theory providing such a foundation for epistemic 
justification, but notice that such a theory is no longer a doxastic theory. The justifiedness o f  beliefs is no 
longer determined exclusively by what we believe. What percepts we have is also relevant. Thus this is not 
a way o f  saving doxastic foundationalism’ (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 61). I don’t know how they first came to 
the conclusion that foundationalism is a doxastic theory.
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position to know whether or not they are true.7 This is very plausible. However, it is only 
an objection to the foundationalist if  we assume that they must appeal to a subject’s grasp 
o f the content of basic beliefs to explain why such beliefs are justified in a way that 
doesn’t derive from the justification o f other beliefs.8 This is just a mistake. Self-evidence 
isn’t the only alternative to inferential justification. Observation is another and that I 
suggest is precisely what the historical foundationalists did appeal to.
So I have now explained what the historical foundationalists actually thought and why 
what they thought is different from what they are usually portrayed as having thought. 
Broadly speaking, they thought that basic beliefs are beliefs about one’s own 
psychological states; what justifies such beliefs is the fact that one observes or is 
acquainted with one’s own psychological states; and that beliefs held on such a basis are 
epistemically privileged. This makes historical foundationalism a lot more plausible and 
interesting than it is often thought to be. Observation does seem to be a fundamental way 
in which we get in a position to know things. So if it is true that we do observe our own 
mental states this will constitute an appealing account o f what justifies our beliefs about 
them.
7 One could try and argue that the relevant content is only available in the presence o f  its presented subject- 
matter, so that it is im possible even to frame thoughts about one’s own psychological states in other 
circumstances. But that is implausible and it has problematic consequences in other areas; if  the 
foundations are really that limited, it’s even less plausible to suppose they suffice to support everything else 
that we know. Moreover, it’s unclear to what extent this account succeeds in preserving a pure subject- 
matter account. What is special about the particular circumstances in which one com es to entertain these 
thoughts, i f  not the fact that one is consciously presented with the items about which one judges? In that 
case though do we really have anything more than a mere re-labelling o f  a source based account?
8 Some historical figures we often think o f  as foundationalists may have thought that; perhaps Descartes 
did. I don’t think that these thinkers -  that is, those who give no weight to observation -  deserve to be seen 
as foundationalists. If  that means that Descartes does not count as a foundationalist, so much the better. I 
don’t see that there is anything problematic about that.
62
But ‘more plausible’ does not mean ‘plausible’ and in other respects historical 
foundationalism remains distinctly odd. Even if we do observe our own mental states 
they are presumably not the only things that we observe or, indeed, the most obvious. 
Intuitively, we also observe objects and events in the world external to our minds, like 
squirrels sitting on fences. Historical foundationalists deny that this is so and that looks a 
long way from the truth. The next section will look at just far away they got.
3. Revisionary Epistemology
The previous section looked at what the historical foundationalists actually thought. It is 
clear in any event that this is not what they should have thought. This is so for a number 
o f familiar reasons. The most obvious and the most powerful concerns what we are to say 
about the justification o f beliefs that aren’t about our own psychological states. Even if 
traditional foundationalism does provide a satisfactory account o f what justifies beliefs 
that are about our own minds, we have as yet no account o f what justifies beliefs about 
the world external to our minds. Most of our beliefs fall into the latter category, so the 
foundationalist had better have a good answer to this question. The answer they 
traditionally gave was inference: beliefs about the world draw their justification from 
inferences we can make from beliefs about our own minds. This is hardly surprising. 
Foundationalists are committed to the view that all o f our beliefs are either inferentially 
or non-inferentially justified. Beliefs about the world don’t qualify as non-inferentially 
justified on the traditional view, so they must be inferentially justified (if they are 
justified at all), and it is hard to see what else to appeal to as premises other than beliefs 
about one’s own mind.
63
This view is subject to fatal objections. It is implausible as a description o f the 
psychological process by which we form beliefs about the external world. Such beliefs 
don’t appear to be formed on the basis o f any kind o f reasoning or conscious inference; 
they normally seem to be formed directly on the basis o f perception or other’s say-so. 
Further, it is implausible as an account o f the justificatory status o f such beliefs. The 
precise nature o f the problem here will depend on the details of the particular account 
given. On one view, our own mental states (including our ideas and ‘sense-data’) are held 
to be distinct from mind-independent objects in the physical world, and to stand in for or 
represent them. On another view, they partly constitute them.
The latter view, known as ‘phenomenalism’, seems to call into question the existence o f 
genuinely mind-independent objects; while the former, commonly called ‘indirect 
realism’, will have to rely on general bridging principles linking our ideas or sense-data 
with the objects in the world that they are held to represent. In the second case, the 
problem concerns the justification of the bridging principles. One possibility is that they 
are general causal principles stating that ideas or sense-data o f such-and-such a sort are 
reliably correlated with (or caused by) physical objects of such-and-such a sort. Given 
such general principles, one’s own psychological states can serve to indicate how things 
are in the world around one; they can be a sign that they exist for one who knows the 
relevant principles. However, it is a familiar point that our justification for these 
principles appears not to be independent of our justification for beliefs about the world. 
Michael Martin makes this point in the following passage:
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If we inquire into our reasons for believing that certain kinds o f object are 
normally responsible for certain kinds o f experience then we cannot avoid 
appealing to past perceptual beliefs concerning our encounters with particular 
objects o f that kind as part o f our justification for these beliefs. If this is so, it 
suggests that perceptual beliefs about particular objects must ground our general 
beliefs about the causal connections between types of experience and the types o f 
things in the world, which cause them rather than vice-versa (Martin 1995: 42). 
This is a problem assuming that the relevant bridging principles figure as premises in an 
inference to some conclusion about the world. If Martin is right, our justification for these 
premises is not independent o f the conclusion it is meant to establish. This is a possibility 
we earlier rejected in connection with the epistemic regress.
Another possibility, though, is that the relevant inference is abductive: the existence of 
such and such state o f affairs in the world being held to be the best explanation o f our 
enjoying the mental goings-on that we do. Here, the problem is to say why that 
hypothesis - that things in the external world are thus and so - should really be the ‘best’ 
explanation o f the course o f one’s mental life. Ruling out other explanations, like the 
hypothesis of a Berkelian God keeping the perceptible world in existence from one 
moment to the next, is a familiar problem which it unclear how the traditional 
foundationalist can hope to solve.
These questions lack satisfactory answers. The literature documenting why that is so is 
vast and it is not one to which I intend to add. My claim is that even if the traditional
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foundationalists did have a satisfactory account o f what justifies beliefs about our own 
psychological states, they lack a satisfactory account o f what justifies beliefs that aren’t 
about our own psychological states. This makes traditional foundationalism a fairly 
radical form o f scepticism since most of our beliefs fall into the latter category and that is 
a position we have reason to reject.
However, historical foundationalism doesn’t just fail on its own terms. Even if  that 
position could successfully reconstruct our justification for beliefs about the mind- 
independent world using only the resources it permits itself viz. premises about the mind- 
dependent world, the very idea o f such a reconstruction is independently objectionable. It 
is objectionable since it is not as if  we do not ordinarily have views about what actually 
justifies us in such beliefs. These views are wildly at odds with what the historical 
foundationalist says. So that account is an essentially revisionary account. This is another 
reason to reject it unless we have some special reason to suppose our ordinary views are 
mistaken on this score.
To see this, take a case in which I stop you on the street to ask the whereabouts of a shop 
that I am interested in finding. Suppose, being a local, you know and give expression to 
that knowledge, and that I simply take your for word for it and believe the shop to be 
where you have told me. In this case, and others like it, it is very natural to think that 
what justifies me is simply the fact that you have told me where the shop is.9 We could 
try and reconstruct my justification in inferential terms, perhaps using premises about 
what I take it you have said, and the likelihood that you are not lying and so on. But in
9 Or, if  one prefers, my having leamt from you where it is (M cDowell 1998b).
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many cases it is doubtful that we could do so satisfactorily. It is not often that I will have 
much justification for the relevant premises and if I am not justified in believing the 
premises o f my argument then I will not be justified in any conclusion that I infer on their 
basis.10 But even if we could do this, it still wouldn’t change the fact that the natural view 
is that my justification is not inferential. The natural view, and the view we all give in 
these cases, is that my justification derives from your having told me. This is to appeal to 
a non-inferential source o f justification.
The point I am making here is really very simple. We do have intuitions about how our 
beliefs are justified and it is normally pretty easy to get people to acknowledge when 
their justification is tacitly inferential -  even in cases in which it m ightn’t initially seem 
to be so. There is, however, no reason to suppose that this must be so in the present case; 
very often the intuition that my justification derives from having been told, and not from 
the tacit availability o f an inference, is stubborn.
10 In a similar vein M cD ow ell writes “if  we make the ancillary premises seem  strong enough to do the trick, 
it merely becom es dubious that the tourist has them at his disposal; whereas i f  we weaken the premises, the 
doubt attaches to their capacity to transmit, across the argument, the right sort o f  rational acceptability for 
believing its conclusion to amount to knowledge...Let it be the most favourable case we can imagine. Let 
the hearer have all kinds o f  positive evidence that the speaker is speaking his mind: a steady honest-looking 
gaze, a firm dry handclasp, perhaps years o f  mutual reliance. Surely it is always possible for a human being 
to act capriciously, out o f  character? And even if  the speaker is speaking his mind, how firm a hold can the 
hearer possibly have on the premises, needed on this view, that the speaker is not som ehow misinformed 
about the subject matter o f  the conversation? However favourable the case, can the hearer really be said to 
know that his informant can be relied on now, in such a way that his verdict can be used in a non-question- 
begging certification that what he has acquired is an epistem ically satisfactory standing? The supposition 
that the informant is, perhaps uncharacteristically, misleading the hearer or, perhaps surprisingly, 
misinformed about the topic is not like the typical suppositions o f  general sceptical arguments (e.g. ‘Maybe 
you are a brain n a vat”), where, it is at least arguable that no real possibility is expressed. In Simon 
Blackburn’s phrase, mistakes and deceptions by putative informants are ‘kinds o f  things that happen’. It is 
not clear that the approach I am considering can make out the title to count as knowledge o f  any beliefs 
acquired from som eone e lse ’s say-so. And too much overturning o f  intuitions must surely make it 
questionable whether the general account o f  knowledge is a good one’ (M cDow ell 1998b: 418-20).
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This intuition is even more robust in other cases. Consider a case in which I look out of 
the window and see that there’s a squirrel sitting on the back fence. This is the sort of 
thing that most o f us think we are sometimes in the best possible position to judge -  the 
light is good, there is nothing blocking my view, and so on. Again it might be possible to 
reconstruct my justification for believing that the squirrel is sitting there using only 
premises about how things are for me, psychologically speaking, and some general 
principles linking things being that way for me psychologically and the likelihood things 
really are that way in the world external to my mind. This is what the historical 
foundationalist thinks we must do. But even if  we could do that, it still wouldn’t change 
the fact that this is a very strange and baroque account o f what justifies that belief. The 
natural view (and the one that we all actually give when asked) appeals to what we 
perceive. Intuitively, it’s the fact that I can see that the squirrel is sitting on the fence that 
gives me reason for believing as I do, not beliefs which, in all likelihood I don’t actually 
have about the way things look and how that makes it likely things really are so. The 
latter is totally unmotivated. The obvious and simple view o f these matters is just to stick 
with what we actually all say when asked justificatory questions and what we say is 
things like ‘because I can see that squirrel is sitting on the fence’.11
11 When pressed we often retreat to claims about looks. Faced with the question ‘But how do you know that 
it’s really a squirrel you see?’ we will often say something more guarded, like ‘well it at least looks like a 
squirrel’. But the fact that we retreat to claims like this when under attack does not show they are the 
grounds upon which we initially judged. Thus, W illiamson writes “it is a fallacy to assume that retreats in 
the face o f  doubt always reveal a pre-existing structure o f  justification. Som eone may be simultaneously 
disposed to retreat to premises about appearances if  put under pressure by idealists about the external world 
and to retreat to premises about brain scans i f  put under pressure by eliminativists about the mind. In 
responding to a doubt, we look for ground that it does not undermine, but where that ground is depends on 
the doubt. That we can be made to retreat to a place does not show that it s where we started from” 
(Williamson, forthcoming).
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So, even if the historical foundationalists could successfully reconstruct our justification 
for beliefs about the mind-independent world in inferential terms this would still not be a 
reason to think that what they say is actually true; that it accurately describes what, in 
actual fact, justifies those beliefs. Their account is revisionary o f our ordinary views 
about what grounds or justifies those beliefs and that is a reason to reject it all else being 
equal.
I have now given you some reasons why historical foundationalists shouldn’t have 
thought what they actually thought. An obvious question is: did they need to think these 
things? The epistemic regress argument certainly doesn’t commit them to such a 
restrictive view. The regress argument demands that some o f our beliefs be non- 
inferentially justified, but it doesn’t say anything about which beliefs can be justified in 
that way or what it takes for a source to be capable o f furnishing us with such 
justification. The problem with inference is that it is an essentially dependent source of 
epistemic justification; in order for it to furnish us with justification it requires 
antecedently justified beliefs as inputs. So the same had presumably better not be true of 
a non-inferential source; it must furnish us with justification that does not derive from the 
justification we have to believe other things. But observation or ‘acquaintance’ certainly 
looks like it can play that role. The sort of justification it provides us with does not derive 
from other justified beliefs; it offers a different model o f what it is to be in a position to 
know about the world.
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So if the historical foundationalist are right to think that we do observe our own mental 
states, they’ll be right to conclude that our beliefs about them are non-inferentially 
justified. Many philosophers think there is no reason to suppose we do observe our own 
mental states. But there is certainly no reason to think that we only observe our own 
mental states; or that observation is necessarily the only source o f non-inferential 
justification. If not, there is no reason to believe the historical foundationalist when they 
say that only beliefs about our own psychological states can be non-inferentially justified.
Things might be different given a different understanding o f the regress argument. 
Sometimes people think the problem that argument raises is temporal. If  for every belief
that is justified there must be some further belief that one is be justified in believing
12before one can be justified in the first, how could justification ever get started. They 
conclude that there must be some beliefs that can be justified prior to any other beliefs 
being justified; there must be some beliefs that we can in that way start from. The 
problem with beliefs about objects in the world external to our minds is that it doesn’t 
look like a subject can have those beliefs (let alone be justified in them) unless she has 
lots o f other beliefs. I can’t believe that the squirrel is on the fence unless I have the 
concept squirrel and that plausibly requires me to have certain sorts o f beliefs about 
squirrels. I may have to believe that squirrels are animals. This requires I have the 
concept animal and that plausibly requires me to have yet further beliefs. Beliefs about 
objects in the world external to our minds therefore do not look like they can stop the 
regress, if  the regress is understood in temporal terms. They aren’t beliefs that we can in 
that way start from.
12 For a presentation o f  the argument along temporal lines see (Moore 2002: 122-3).
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Traditional foundationalists tended to think that the same was not true o f beliefs about 
our own psychological states (Lewis 1946). They had a certain view o f how our 
psychological concepts get their meaning according to which one could possess them 
without having to have lots o f other beliefs. That meant they could claim that a subject 
didn’t even need to have other justified beliefs in order to be justified in believing things 
on the basis o f acquaintance or observation. One could be justified in believing of the 
red-y brown squirrel-ish shaped sense-data that one currently perceives that that looks 
brown to me irrespective o f what other beliefs one happens to have. This belief would be 
‘semantically free-standing’ as well as epistemically freestanding. Not only would it not 
draw its justification from other beliefs, it wouldn’t even require their existence.
This is what Michael Williams is getting at when he says that according to the traditional 
foundationalists, basic beliefs represent ‘semantically encapsulated items of knowledge’ 
(Williams 2005: 204). I agree with Williams that this is what lots of traditional 
foundationalists thought. I also think it would be a reason to follow them in privileging 
beliefs about the mind if  we had any reason to accept this view o f concepts or this view 
of the regress. But we have no reason to accept this view o f concepts and no reason to 
take the temporal regress seriously. Maybe you can’t be justified in believing anything 
about the world around you until you believe lots o f things about it -  maybe justification, 
to that extent, emerges en masse. So what? In order for there to be any justified beliefs 
there don’t need to be any beliefs that are justified before all the rest. This is just a 
separate issue from the issue of whether or not all your justification could derive from the
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justification you have to believe other things. Your justification can be non-inferential, 
even if it’s not possible to be justified in that way without also being justified in believing 
lots of other things.13 In that case your justification will not derive from other beliefs, 
though it will in a sense depend on them (since it will require their existence). This is not 
a problem though, since it is only the former that we have reason to worry about. It is the 
derivation o f justification that the epistemic regress worries about and we avoid that by 
requiring that your justification not derive from other beliefs (whether or not it depends 
upon them).14
So the further commitments o f historical foundationalism are not needed to deal with the 
epistemic regress problem. What, then, could have lead these thinkers away from the 
obvious view o f these matters just sketched and towards their own peculiar alternative? 
In the previous section I mentioned two possible sources o f motivation for that view -  
one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical route to historical 
foundationalism claims that we don’t actually perceive objects in the world around us. 
Contrary to what we all ordinarily think, we only really perceive things which stand in for 
or represent those objects - mind-dependent objects, commonly called ‘ideas’ or ‘sense- 
data’. This would explain why perception cannot non-inferentially justify our beliefs
13 The following example from James Pryor nicely illustrates this point: “Consider: in order to have the 
concept o f  a unicorn I may need to believe (i) that unicorns have hooves, and (ii) that unicorns have homs. 
Now suppose I acquire evidence that a vims has killed all hoofed creatures. Since I believe unicorns to be 
hoofed creatures, I form the b elie f (iii) that no unicorns currently exist. It is clear that (ii) plays no role in 
justifying this belief. This shows that there can be propositions that you need to believe in order to have 
certain concepts (you need to believe (i) in order to have the concept o f  a unicom) without those 
propositions mediating your justification for every belief involving the concept Now  (iii) is not an 
immediately justified belief. But it serves to make my point. We can see the same phenomenon with beliefs 
that are good candidates to be immediately justified like (iv) If any unicom  exists, it is identical with itself  
(ii) plays no more role in justifying that b elief than it plays in justifying (iii)” (Pryor 2005: 198).
14 Cf. (Burge 2003: 503-48).
72
about non-psychological reality. If perception does not make us aware o f objects in the 
world external to our minds, why should it give us any reason to believe that they are one 
way rather than another? What explanation could we possibly give? An intuitive 
justificatory gap remains, which gap can only be plugged by appeal to general bridging 
principles o f the sort to which proponents o f this view really did appeal.
Despite what proponents o f this view thought, however, there is no good reason to think 
that perception doesn’t put us in touch with the mind-independent objects in the world 
that it seems to, or therefore that we are only ever aware o f mind-dependent replicas.15 
Moreover, even if  perception did work in the way they thought, that still leaves open the 
possibility that there are sources o f non-inferential justification other than perception -  
sources like testimony. As yet, nothing has been said to block that move.
The metaphysical route to historical foundationalism is therefore a non-starter. If we 
really do perceive objects in the world around us, why isn’t perception available to non- 
inferentially justify our beliefs about them, just as it justifies our beliefs about mind- 
dependent objects on the traditional account? For those of us willing to accept that we do 
perceive objects in the world external to our own minds, only the epistemological route to 
historical foundationalism remains.
15 I am not denying that they had arguments for this view. I am denying that they had g o o d  arguments for 
that view. Most o f  the considerations adduced in support appeal to facts about illusions and hallucinations 
and try to generalise something from that case to the normal case; the time-lag argument and the argument 
from illusion are both examples traditionally appealed to in this connection (Ayer 1956 is a prime 
example). For a detailed discussion o f  the argument from illusion in all its forms see Michael Martin’s 
forthcoming book ‘Uncovering Appearances’ (forthcoming, OUP). In contrast, Locke thought that 
introspection revealed that the immediate objects o f  perception were our own ideas. He writes: ‘ What 
Perception is, ever one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, 
etc. or thinks, than by any discourse o f  mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot 
miss it.’ (Locke 1975: 143).
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The epistemological route appeals to a certain view about non-inferential justification and 
what it would take for any belief to be justified in that way. As it is standardly 
reconstructed in the literature the reasoning goes like this: (1) if  a belief can be mistaken, 
it can’t be non-inferentially justified, (2) beliefs about the world can be mistaken. So (3) 
beliefs about the world can’t be non-inferentially justified. According to what I’ll call the 
Simple Reading this is precisely the sort o f reasoning that lead the historical 
foundationalists away from the intuitively appealing idea that perception is available to 
non-inferentially justify beliefs about the external world. This establishes the negative 
part of the traditional thesis: beliefs about the world can’t be basic. The positive claim, 
that beliefs about one’s own psychological states can be basic, then goes through 
provided only that one assumes that the same is not true o f the latter and this is precisely 
what thinkers like Russell and Ayer thought.
The Simple Reading dominates the literature and the view it gives expression has the 
status of orthodoxy. I think that it is mistaken as a reading o f traditional foundationalism. 
Thinkers like Ayer were ultimately more concerned with the conceivability of mistakes, 
than their possibility. Nonetheless, there is clearly some point to the idea that what 
motivates denying that beliefs about non-psychological reality can be non-inferentially 
justified is the thought that non-inferentially justified beliefs would have to be peculiarly 
epistemically privileged. The Simple Reading is just the most popular way o f spelling out 
what these privileges would amount to.
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In chapter 4 I will argue that the relevant privilege is indefeasibility: it’s the fact that 
beliefs about our own psychological states are indefeasible rather than the fact that they 
are infallible which accounts for their special historical status. Properly diffusing the 
epistemological motivation for historical foundationalism will therefore have to wait till 
later. At first glance, however, this line o f thought does little to motivate the move away 
from the obvious sounding thought that perception is available to non-inferentially justify 
beliefs about the world. Why should we accept that the mere fact a belief is capable o f 
being mistaken means that it must be inferentially justified? Even if we were to assume 
that what justifies a belief must rule out the possibility the belief is mistaken, and so 
conclude that (insofar as perception fails to do that) perception fails to justify our beliefs 
all by itself, it still wouldn’t follow that perceptual justification is tacitly inferential. To 
say that a belief is inferentially justified is to make a claim about the nature of the 
positive support it enjoys and where that support comes from; it says that it comes from 
its inferential relations to other justified beliefs. But even if  we had conceded that 
perception cannot justify our beliefs about the world all by itself - so that something else 
must be necessary - it wouldn’t follow that what more is necessary is other justified 
beliefs. Much less that perception itself plays no role at all, and is entirely supplanted by 
beliefs about what one seems to perceive and inferences one can make from these to 
beliefs about the world. This is what would need to be true for one’s justification to be 
inferential. To be inferential one’s justification must derive exclusively from the 
inferential relations one’s belief bears to other justified beliefs. This is where the 
traditionalist foundationalist assumes that one’s justification must come from in this case. 
So far no good argument for that view is in sight.
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We will return to the epistemological roots o f historical foundationalism in chapters 3 
and 4. At this stage I merely hope to have put the traditionalist on the defensive and 
shown that theirs is a position we have good reason to reject all else being equal. Given 
that this is so, someone might well ask: why bother taking it seriously to begin with? This 
is a good question. The short answer is that traditional foundationalism gets something 
fundamentally right. Spelling this out is the aim o f the final section o f this chapter.
4. The Idea of the Empirical
What does historical foundationalism get right? What it gets right, I suggest, is the idea 
that perception or observation is a source o f justification that is genuinely distinct from 
inference. That is to say, that one is in a position to justifiably make judgments about 
things in virtue o f being aware o f them, and that we cannot explain why that is so via any 
sort o f analogy with the inferential case.
But is it true that perception is a source o f justification that is distinct from inference? It 
might be objected that this couldn’t possibly be true because perception itself always 
involves inference and that it follows from this that perceptual justification can’t be 
distinct from inferential justification. In what sense, however, is inference always a 
component o f perception? One possibility is that perception involves conscious inference 
from beliefs, say beliefs about how things appear to one. This really would a threat to the 
claim that there is a sharp distinction between perceptual and inferential justification but
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there is no reason to think that perception always, or even commonly, involves inference 
in this sense.
A different possibility is that perception involves always involves some form of 
unconscious processing or ‘binding’. This is not something that either the historical 
foundationalists or I need to deny. Perception might be ‘inferential’ in that sense, but this 
has little bearing on the intuitive distinction between inferential and non-inferential 
justification. A genuinely inferential justification is one that proceeds from premises that 
the subject doing the inferring believes. There is no suggestion that sub-personal binding 
or information processing proceeds in this way. To describe perceptual justification as 
inferential solely on the basis o f the involvement o f sub-personal processing in perception 
is to deprive the notion o f inference o f its usual connotations. If one is prepared to do that 
then one can o f course insist that there is no real difference between perceptual and 
inferential justification. The problem, however, is that there is a perfectly intuitive 
distinction between these two forms o f justification and that is a good reason not to think 
of what our perceptual systems do as ‘inferring’. When I see that there is a squirrel on the 
fence and I don’t in any interesting sense infer that there is a squirrel on the fence 
inferring is the sort o f thing that one does when one is presented with signs of the
presence o f a squirrel not when one is presented with the squirrel itself.16
The view that perception provides a fundamentally different model o f what it is to 
justifiably make judgements in this sense is very intuitive. Some prominent theories deny 
that is so, but they are very hard to believe. Coherentists think that our only real model of
16 For a different view  see (Harman 1973: esp. Ch. 11).
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epistemic justification is provided by inference, broadly conceived (Davidson 2000: 154- 
163). They think our grasp of what it is to be justified is provided by the thought that 
there exist logical relations within our system of beliefs. Such theories seem incredible 
precisely because there is nothing intuitive about restricting justification in this way or 
ignoring the obvious fact that we do have other models o f justification one of which is 
provided by perception. Any case in favour o f a more restrictive view must therefore rest 
upon philosophical argument. As we will see in the next chapter the arguments just aren’t 
that good and that just leaves the presumption in favour o f perception standing.
This presumption is one to which the historical foundationalist ultimately fails to do 
justice. Still, it remains one to which they try to do justice. As I have characterised 
foundationalism, it is one to which any foundationalist must try to do justice since that is 
just what (b) commits them to. As I characterise it, foundationalism isn’t just a view 
about the structure o f epistemic justification as (a) clams, it is also a view about its 
sources. Specifically, it is the view that perception is a source o f non-inferential 
justification, (a) merely draws a distinction in abstract space -  it claims there is a 
distinction between inferential and non-inferential sources o f justification, (b) says the 
second class is not empty; it says that perception is a non-inferential source of 
justification.
I have claimed that this is an overwhelmingly natural view and that it is as important in 
motivating foundationalism as the regress argument. Indeed in one sense it is simply the 
flip side o f that coin, since it is an account of the source o f the justification that the
78
regress says must exist. Without such an account foundationalism looks half-baked or 
incomplete. That is why in chapter 1 I said that foundationalism is an intuitive view. As I 
characterise it, the desire to acknowledge the seemingly obvious fact that perception is a 
source o f justification distinct from reasoning is essential to foundationalism. I am going 
to call this idea the Idea o f the Empirical.
This idea has shaped epistemological reflection since Aristotle, and it is crucial to 
motivating foundationalism. Yet it is almost universally ignored in the literature. Pollock 
and Cruz are one o f just a handful of commentators to recognise the role it plays in 
motivating foundationalism. They write:
The simple motivation for foundations theories is the psychological observation 
that we have various ways of sensing the world, and that all knowledge comes to 
us via those senses. The foundationalist takes this to mean that our senses provide 
us with what are then identified as epistemologically basic beliefs. We arrive at 
other beliefs by reasoning (construed broadly). Reasoning, it seems, can only 
justify us in holding a belief if  we are already justified n holding the beliefs from 
which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. 
Only perception can do that. We thus acquire the picture o f our beliefs forming a 
kind o f pyramid, with the basic beliefs provided by perception forming the 
foundation, and all other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning that traces 
back ultimately to basic beliefs (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 29).17
17 Notice that in this passage they are also making a stronger point: viz. that perception is the ‘on ly’ source 
that is privileged in this way. This is not a view to which I commit the foundationalist. (c) merely claims 
that perception is ‘a ’ basic source o f  non-inferential justification.
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The most straightforward way to accommodate this insight is to think that perception is a 
source o f non-inferential justification and that what it non-inferentially justifies us in 
believing depends on what we actually perceive. Hence, given that we do perceive mind- 
independent objects in the world around us, perception is available to non-inferentially 
justify our beliefs about them.
I have claimed that the historical foundationalists sort o f saw that but in their case that 
insight was twisted. Under the weight of their extraneous metaphysical and 
epistemological views the original idea was transformed into something importantly 
different and much less plausible. In their case it is not perception as we ordinarily think 
of it that plays the ultimate grounding role; it is a special sort o f perception 
(‘acquaintance’), or the perception o f a special sort o f object (our own ‘ideas’).
Still, even here the centrality and importance of ordinary perception is not completely lost 
sight of. This is straightforwardly so on the metaphysical view, since that is just meant to 
be an account o f ordinary perception, but one can see it even on the more
1R •epistemologically motivated versions of the view. Russell is perhaps the thinker whose 
view is maximally unfavourable to the one that I describe. He certainly eschews talk o f 
‘perception’ in favour o f talk about ‘acquaintance’. But while this ought to be a label for 
a special epistemological relation that one can stand in to a state o f affairs, it is clear that 
Russell effectively models acquaintance upon ordinary perception. The latter provides his
18 Clearly, they also took themselves to be offering an account o f  how one is in a position to know about 
what one believes, say.
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only really worked out picture o f what acquaintance might be.19 Moreover, features of 
ordinary perception play an indispensable role in explaining why it is that acquaintance 
should justify a subject in believing anything whatsoever. It is because acquaintance 
affords us conscious awareness of those states o f affairs it purports to justify us in 
judging about in the way that we naively suppose perception does; and because we form 
our beliefs on that basis, that we are justified in judging as we do. Ordinary perception 
therefore functions as the paradigm upon which these other notions are modelled, even 
for someone like Russell.
This is importantly different from the way in perception may be a ‘paradigm’ for a 
reliabilist or on other non-foundational theories. It may well be true that among the 
reliable belief forming mechanisms that we actually have perception is the one with 
which we are most familiar, or best equipped to understand, or know the most about. It 
may be for that reason that it functions as a ‘paradigm’ in reliabilist theories o f 
knowledge - it is certainly the example most o f them tend to use. However, the reliabilist 
wants to abstract away from features o f perception other than its reliability. Perception is 
only a paradigm because o f what it illustrates about reliability -  other features o f it are 
irrelevant to saying why it should be a source o f justification. This is possible because 
perception does not provide us with our basic picture o f what justification is like for a 
reliabilist. Our basic picture o f justification is furnished by the idea the idea o f a reliable 
belief forming mechanism and that is an entirely general claim (Goldman 1986). It is one
19 Russell also thought that we were acquainted with universals and my analysis is harder to apply to that 
cases since Russell certainly did not think that we perceived universals (Russell 1912: esp. 28). But 
universals are normally thought to be a problem for his view. The fact they sit rather awkwardly may well 
be a reflection o f  the fact that Russell is effectively working with a perceptual model.
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that we could grasp independently o f thinking about perception or any other specific 
source, even if (in the genesis o f understanding), it is one that we only actually come to 
see is true by reflecting upon particular cases.
This is fundamentally different from the role that I suggest perception plays for the 
foundationalist. For the foundationalist, perception is not just illustrating a general moral. 
Its status as a source o f justification is sui generis. That is part of what I mean when I say 
that perception is not just a source of non-inferential justification but a basic source of 
non-inferential justification. This is what (c) claims and that is the third component of the 
position I call foundationalism. Further discussion o f (c) will have to wait until chapter 5. 
The important point at this stage is that we can make sense o f the idea that perception is a 
source o f non-inferential justification (and a potentially basic source at that) even as far 
as the historical foundationalists are concerned.
5. Conclusion
The next chapter will offer a positive account of how perception can be a source of non- 
inferential justification for beliefs about the world external to our minds. You don’t have 
to be a reductionist to think that a foundationalist must say something further about why 
perception should be a source o f justification for beliefs about what we perceive. Here, 
the historical foundationalist may be thought to be at a distinct advantage since on their 
view it is impossible for you to be mistaken in the beliefs that you form on the basis o f 
‘perception’. The same presumably isn’t true if we take perception to involve a relation to 
mind-independent objects. Beliefs about non-psychological reality can be mistaken.
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According to the Simple Reading that is precisely what launches the retreat inwards 
towards beliefs about our own psychological states with all its attendant difficulties. This 
is the orthodox view one finds in the literature. The next chapter will look at what a more 
modest foundationalist can say in response. As we will see, we needn’t be quite as 
modest as the orthodox would have us believe.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL 
CHAPTER 3: THE ARGUMENT FROM FALLIBILITY
1. Introduction
The take home message o f the previous chapter was that there’s a good idea underlying 
traditional foundationalism, but that traditional foundationalism goes about developing 
this idea in the wrong way. The good idea is that perception is a distinctive source of non- 
inferential justification. Where traditional foundationalism goes wrong is in its account o f 
the sorts o f beliefs that perception can justify. Traditional foundationalism has a narrow 
conception o f the scope o f perceptual justification; it claims that perception can only 
justify beliefs about psychological reality -  that is, beliefs about our own ideas or sense- 
data - and this is what ultimately gets that position into all the trouble previously 
discussed.
If it’s a good idea to think that perception is a source justification, but a bad idea to adopt 
a narrow conception o f the scope o f perceptual justification, there’s an obvious way of 
holding onto the good idea without holding onto the bad idea. The obvious way is to 
adopt a broad conception o f the scope o f perceptual justification. The Broad View, as I 
am going to call it, says simply that among the beliefs that perception can non- 
inferentially justify are beliefs about the world around us. When I talk about beliefs about 
the world around us I mean beliefs about non-psychological reality - for example, the
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belief that the squirrel is on the fence, or that the toast is burning.1 Although this seems 
obviously true, it is something lots o f philosophers have denied.
There are two important components o f the Broad View. One is its conception of the 
scope o f perceptual justification, and the other is its insistence that the kind o f perceptual 
justification it is talking about is non-inferential. What I want to do in this chapter is to 
defend both elements o f the Broad View. I want to do that because I think that the Broad 
View is correct. But it’s also worth pointing out some of the other advantages o f that 
view.
One is that it is at least arguably the ordinary or naive view o f perceptual justification. To 
the extent that we ordinarily have views about such matters it would seem that we have 
no difficulty with the idea that among the beliefs that perception can non-inferentially 
justify are ordinary beliefs about the world around us. So we could also call the Broad 
View the ‘naive view’. By that I mean it’s the view that seems most natural and obvious 
to us prior to philosophical reflection. Obviously the fact that it is the naive view is not a 
knock down argument in its favour. However, it does mean that the Broad View is much 
less revisionary than the traditional foundationalist conception o f these things, and that’s 
a good thing.
A further advantage o f the Broad View is that it doesn’t end up positing excessively 
narrow foundations -  that is, foundational beliefs that are so restrictive in their scope as
1 Berkeley also thought that perception was a source o f  justification for beliefs ‘about the world around u s’, 
he just thought that the world around us was mental or psychological (Berkeley 1964). I here mean to rule 
out that possibility.
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to be incapable o f supporting the rest of what we know or justifiably believe. It thereby 
promises to form the core o f a more modest form of foundationalism -  one that doesn’t 
have the sceptical consequences o f traditional foundationalism. Again that is an 
advantage not to be sniffed at.
Having said all o f this, the most important question about the Broad View is whether it is 
actually true, not whether it’s what we ordinarily think anyway. I think that the Broad 
View is correct and I ’m going to explain why I think that in this chapter. But many 
philosophers -  including those who are not foundationalists at all -  have thought that the 
Broad View just can’t be right and that there are decisive philosophical reasons for 
revising what we ordinarily think.
What are these allegedly decisive objections to the Broad View? One is that perception 
only fallibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological reality and that perceptual 
justification therefore can’t be non-inferential. I’m going to call that the Argument from 
Fallibility. Another, is that perception only defeasibly justifies beliefs about non- 
psychological reality, and that perceptual justification therefore cannot be non-inferential. 
I will call this the Argument from Defeasibility. According to these arguments if one 
wants perceptual justification to be both infallible and indefeasible then it had better 
pertain to a very special subject matter. This is just what the traditional foundationalists 
thought, the special subject matter being psychological.
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Given these objections to the Broad View, anyone who wants to defend that view is 
going to have to do several different things. The first thing which needs to be done, and 
which I’ll be doing in the next section, is to explain in what sense perception can non- 
inferentially justify beliefs about the world around us. The second thing that one would 
need to do in order to defend the Broad View is to rebut the philosophical arguments 
against it. In the final part of this chapter I will tackle the Argument from Fallibility 
against the Broad View. One way of tackling this argument is to deny its premise: that is, 
to deny that perceptual justification is fallible, even if its subject matter is non- 
psychological. A more familiar strategy would be to accept its premise but to dispute that 
the conclusion follows; in other words, to argue that perceptual justification can be both 
fallible and non-inferential. I have some sympathy for both these responses to the 
fallibility objection and will explain why later on in this chapter.
The Argument from Defeasibility against the Broad View will be the topic o f the next 
chapter. Again the options are to deny that perceptual justification is defeasible, or to 
deny that it’s being defeasible entails that it’s inferential. In this case, only the second 
option looks plausible. So to recap: the object o f the exercise in this chapter is to spell out 
and defend a broad conception of the scope o f perceptual justification that is different 
both from traditional foundationalism’s narrow conception o f perceptual justification, and 
from non-foundationalist conceptions of perceptual justification, such as those of Donald 
Davidson and Laurence BonJour.
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The plan for this chapter is as follows: in the next section I’ll give a more detailed 
account o f the Broad View and explain the sense in which it delivers non-inferential 
perceptual justification. In the following part I will tackle Davidson and BonJour, and 
show that their conception o f perceptual justification, to the extent that they have one, is 
inferior to mine. Then, in the final part, I will deal with the Argument from Fallibility.
2. Propositional Perception
In the last chapter I claimed that a good, everyday answer to the question of why some 
subject believes as she does, or what justification she has for that belief, will often appeal 
to the fact she can see that things are so. Suppose Ann is doing the washing up and 
glances up to look out o f the back window. When she looks out she sees that there is a 
squirrel sitting on the fence. If Ann believes that there’s a squirrel on the fence, on the 
basis o f what she can see, a perfectly acceptable answer to our justificatory question will 
cite the fact that Ann can see that there is a squirrel on the fence: that is what makes her 
justified in believing that there is a squirrel on the fence. In all likelihood that is the 
answer that Ann herself would give us if  we asked her.2
Seeing that the squirrel is on the fence is a case of what Fred Dretske called ‘epistemic 
seeing’ (Dretske 1969: Ch.3). Epistemic seeing, in turn, is a case o f what we might call 
‘epistemic’ or ‘propositional’ perception.3 One can see that the squirrel is on the fence, 
but one can also hear that Ross is at the party - as when one overhears him talking to the 
host - and similarly for the other three sense modalities: one can fe e l that the dog is wet,
2 The reply, ‘Because, I can see that there’s a squirrel’ is often given in response to what many sees as a 
more demanding epistem ological question, viz. ‘How do you know that there’s squirrel on the fence?’.
3 This label is Cassam’s, not Dretske’s (Cassam 2007: esp. 27-70).
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smell that she is wearing perfume, and taste that the water is salty. Intuitively, just as we 
can explain what justifies Ann in believing that the squirrel is on the fence by citing the 
fact she can see that the squirrel is on the fence, so too can we explain my justification for 
believing that Ross is at the party by appealing to the fact I can hear that he is at the 
party. These sorts o f explanations are completely commonplace. So the naive or ordinary 
view at least, seems to be that epistemic perception in this broad sense, and not just 
epistemic seeing, is a way in which we can have justification for our beliefs about the 
world.
How does that bear on the question o f whether or not perception can be a source o f non- 
inferential justification for beliefs about non-psychological reality as the Broad View 
maintains? Well, pretty directly - since epistemic perception is a form o f perception (even 
if it is not the only form), and the sort o f justification that it provides is non-inferential. 
What makes it non-inferential is that it appeals to the fact that the subject is in a certain 
perceptual state -  a state in which she perceives that something is the case. It does not 
appeal to her beliefs about what sort of state she is in, or inferences she can make from 
those beliefs to a belief about the world. Ann is justified because she can see that the 
squirrel is on the fence, not because she believes she can see that the squirrel is on the 
fence. Indeed, in order to see that the squirrel is on the fence, or, more generally perceive 
that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that one believe that one perceives that p. So 
the sort of justification that seeing that p - and epistemic perception more generally -  
provide is not inferential; it does not derive from the justification the subject has to 
believe other things.
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This is often overlooked in the literature. Two things make that easy to do. One is that 
talk of “the fact that” the subject sees that p sometimes misleads people -  as if that fact 
were somehow different from, or over and above, the subject’s simply seeing that p. It is 
not. The second and more compelling explanation for the oversight appeals to the 
dialectical context in which questions about justification normally get raised. Thus, 
suppose I ask Ann what justification she has for believing that the squirrel is on the fence, 
and she tells me, saying ‘I can see that the squirrel is on the fence’. In making that 
assertion Ann thereby gives expression to one of her beliefs - namely, a belief about what 
she thinks makes it the case that she is justified. This is an inevitable consequence o f 
making sincere assertions, but it leads some people to think that, if  Ann speaks truly, 
what makes her justified isn’t really her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence but rather 
her belief that she can see that the squirrel is on the fence.
Again this is a mistake: if  Ann speaks truly, what justifies her in believing that the 
squirrel is on the fence is the fact she can see that the squirrel is on the fence, not her 
belief that she can see that is so. This is what her explanation actually cites and any 
impression to the contrary is just an artificial product o f the dialectical context. Indeed, if 
this sort o f example were sufficient to show that Ann’s justification derives from her 
beliefs, then all justification would trivially so derive since in responding to justificatory 
challenges and making claims about what justifies one, one trivially gives expression to 
one’s beliefs about what justifies one. If this is the reason for thinking that all justification 
is ‘inferential’ it is not a very interesting one.
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So we shouldn’t be mislead by these facts into supposing that the sort o f justification that 
epistemic perception provides is tacitly inferential. Are there any other grounds for 
doubt? Epistemic perception is conceptual: in order to see that the squirrel is on the fence 
one needs the concepts that figure in the that-clause. One cannot see that the squirrel is on 
the fence if  one lacks the concept squirrel. I am not claiming that all perception is 
conceptual in this way, or even that all perception insofar as it is a source o f justification 
must be conceptual. I am merely claiming that epistemic perception is conceptual and 
that ought to be relatively uncontroversial.4
Does this raise a problem for the idea that epistemic perception can be a source o f non- 
inferential justification? Many have thought that it does. After all, having concepts often 
involves having beliefs. Plausibly, I do not count as possessing the concept squirrel 
unless I have certain kinds o f beliefs about squirrels; I may have to believe that squirrels 
have tails. So if Ann cannot see that the squirrel is on the fence without having the 
concept squirrel, then she cannot see that the squirrel is on the fence without believing 
that squirrels have tails. Any justification that Ann gets for the belief that the squirrel is 
on the fence by seeing that the squirrel is on the fence therefore depends upon the fact
4 Epistemic perception is not necessarily conceptual on all readings o f  ‘conceptual’. I am claiming that it is 
conceptual because you need concepts in order to be in a state in which you perceive that p; I think that is 
pretty uncontroversial. A different reading o f  ‘conceptual’ has it that for a state to be conceptual it must be 
‘com posed’ o f  concepts. I am silent about whether or not epistemic perception is conceptual in that sense. 
On the face o f  it, it is hard to see how it could be. One’s mental state itself is presumably not composed o f  
concepts. A different suggestion is that the mental state that is ‘perceiving that p ’ is an attitude to a 
proposition, and that propositions are composed o f  concepts. In that case what you perceive is composed o f  
concepts, even if  your mental state itself is not. Whether epistemic perception is conceptual in any o f  these 
further senses depends on whether it really is an attitude to a proposition and if  so, whether propositions are 
composed o f  concepts in the relevant sense. These are issues I cannot hope to resolve in this thesis. For 
more on this debate, see (Peacocke 1992).
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that Ann also believes that squirrels have tails. Arm’s justification therefore isn’t 
independent of her beliefs, but depends upon them, at least to this extent.
Lots o f people think this a problem, since they assume it means Ann’s justification must 
be inferential. This is a mistake, but it is an easy one to make given how some people 
define ‘inferential’ and ‘non-inferential’. However, in cases o f inferential justification 
one’s justification doesn’t just depend upon one’s beliefs, it derives from them. When I 
believe that England can no longer win the Ashes because I believe they have already lost 
3 of the 5 tests, my justification for believing they can’t win doesn’t just depend on the 
fact I believe they’ve lost 3 o f the 5 tests; it comes from that belief. The latter belief is the 
source o f my justification -  it is where I inherit, or get, my justification from - and if  it is 
not justified then my belief that they can no longer win will not be justified either.
This is clearly not what is going on in the case in which Ann is justified in believing that 
the squirrel is on the fence because she can see that the squirrel is on the fence. While it 
has to be true that she believes that squirrels have tails this belief plays no role in 
justifying her belief that the squirrel is on the fence; it is not part o f what confers 
justification on that belief. Intuitively, it is no more part o f the source o f Ann’s 
justification than any o f the very many other things that also have to be true for Ann to 
see that the squirrel is on the fence. Ann must exist, she must have properly functioning 
eyes, and a fence must have been erected in the garden at some stage. These are also all 
things which have to be true for Ann to see that the squirrel is on the fence but nobody
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would think that they play any role in justifying her in believing that there is a squirrel on 
the fence. Exactly the same is true of her belief that squirrels have tails.
More generally, we can distinguish between sources of justification (those things which, 
intuitively speaking, confer justification upon a subject), and those things which merely 
have to be true for the subject to be justified, or background conditions as I will call 
them. The latter enable the subject to take advantage of the justification on offer to her, 
without themselves being what is justifying her. In Ann’s case the source of her 
justification is her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence. In the cricket case, the source 
of my justification is my belief about England’s poor performance in the first three tests, 
and the fact it supports a further belief. That is where the subject’s justification comes 
from in these cases; they are its sources. On the other hand, there are all those things 
which merely have to be true for those subjects to be justified; the squirrel must have 
somehow found its way onto the fence and cricket must be a game that England can just 
about play. These aren’t things which confer justification on their beliefs; they aren’t 
sources o f justification, they are mere enabling conditions.5
What cases o f inferential justification make clear is that beliefs can play the first role. 
Beliefs can be one’s source of justification and one can inherit one’s justification from 
them. In contrast, what the present example of Ann makes clear is that beliefs can also 
play the second role: they can be mere background conditions. In that case, there is no 
reason to think the justification involved is tacitly inferential.
5 For further discussion o f  this distinction see (Burge 1993) and (Cassam 2007: esp. 1-50).
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There is nothing tricky about this distinction. I am not trying to pull the wool over 
anyone’s eyes. It is a perfectly obvious and intuitive distinction to draw and one that we 
draw even in cases o f inferential justification. To be justified in believing that England 
have lost 3 o f the 5 tests, I need the concept England. That may require I have certain 
sorts o f beliefs about England; I may have to believe that England is a nation. Still, this 
belief does not justify me in believing that England cannot win the Ashes, it’s my belief 
they’ve lost 3 o f the 5 tests that does that.
So epistemic perception may depend upon beliefs (since it is conceptual and having 
concepts plausibly requires beliefs); but that doesn’t mean that it derives from beliefs, or, 
therefore, that it is inferential. Moreover, there is nothing objectionable about dependence 
per se. As we saw in the first chapter it is the derivation o f justification from one belief to 
the next with which the epistemic regress is concerned. This is what the regress argument 
focuses on since it is only in these cases that we are threatened with a vicious regress of 
justification. If one’s justification for believing p derives from the belief that q, then not 
only must q be justified, but any justification one has for believing q must be antecedent 
to one’s justification for believing p. If it is not, then one’s justification will be vitiatingly 
circular and this is precisely what makes the regress vicious.
The same is not true in cases of mere dependence. Suppose I can’t be justified believing 
that I am in pain unless I also believe that someone is in pain (perhaps, as some have 
claimed, having the latter belief, or being disposed to infer it, is a condition on possession 
of the concepts requisite for believing that I am in pain.) In that case, being justified in
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believing that I am in pain depends upon my believing that someone is in pain. It must be 
true that I have the latter belief. But it is not plausible to require both that this belief be 
justified and that any justification I have for it be antecedent to my justification for 
believing that I am in pain. There is absolutely nothing objectionably circular about 
getting justification for believing that someone is in pain by inferring that is so from 
one’s own case. In that case, unlike in the genuinely inferential case, one’s justification 
will not be vitiatingly circular and the regress will not extend viciously backwards.
So, not only is the sort o f justification that epistemic perception provides not inferential. 
There is no other reason for a foundationalist or anyone else interested in stopping the 
epistemic regress to find it objectionable either.6
Epistemic perception is therefore one source of non-inferential justification for beliefs 
about the world around us, and that is enough for the purposes o f defending the Broad 
View with which this chapter began. It is enough since epistemic perception can be a 
source o f justification for beliefs even where their subject matter is non-psychological. 
As we have seen it can be a source of justification for beliefs about squirrels, and people 
at parties, and other objects and events in the world around us.
This is one way in which to defend a broad view o f the scope o f perceptual justification. 
This view, in turn, promises to constitute the core o f a more modest form of
6 1 am not suggesting that this is an obvious mistake or one that no one has ever made. On the contrary, this 
is undoubtedly one o f  the reasons traditional foundationalists wanted to privilege beliefs about our own 
psychological states. They thought they had to appeal to semantically encapsulated items o f  knowledge 
since any sort o f  dependence upon beliefs would be problematic. I am merely claiming that is a mistake. It 
is certainly not essential to foundationalism.
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foundationalism. It is not obvious though that this is the only way in which to defend the 
Broad View. In the next section I’m going to consider an alternative strategy by 
considering an objection to the present line o f thought. The objection, which derives from 
an argument o f Davidson’s, is that the present line of thought is still too concessive to 
views on which all justification is inferential.
3. Non-Propositional Perception
Davidson famously once claimed that only a belief can justify another belief. Writing in 
defence o f that theory he claims:
What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count 
as a reason for holding a belief except another belief. Its partisan rejects as 
unintelligible the request for a ground or source o f justification o f another ilk 
(Davidson 2000:156)
What Davidson is saying here is that all justification is doxastic -  it all derives from 
beliefs. On a strict reading o f what he is saying, I have already refuted his view. Seeing 
that the squirrel is on the fence is not a belief, but it can still justify Ann in believing that 
the squirrel is on the fence. So what Davidson says is false: not all justification does 
derive from beliefs.
There is, however, a more charitable reading of what Davidson is saying. On this more 
charitable reading what he is saying is that justification is a relation that can only obtain 
between mental states with propositional content. Propositions can stand in what he calls 
‘logical relations’ to one another -  that is, inferential relations like entailment and
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probabilification. On this more charitable reading of Davidson’s view, justification is all 
still inferential, since it all derives from the inferential relations between propositions. It 
is just that it needn’t all be doxastic since it needn’t necessarily all derive from relations 
between propositions that are believed.
This is what Davidson is saying on the more charitable reading o f his position. In fact 
other remarks make it clear this really was his view, despite the provocative and oft- 
quoted slogan with which we began. An obvious worry about my position therefore is 
that although what I say is inconsistent with Davidson’s view on a strict reading, it is not 
inconsistent with what he says on the more charitable reading. So Davidson could just 
accept everything that I have so far said about epistemic perception and its being a source 
of justification, but still insist that that’s consistent with thinking that all justification is 
inferential, contra the Broad View.
I think that this is not a genuine worry about my position. There are at least three reasons 
why it is not. First, when I say that perceptual justification is a source o f non-inferential 
justification I do not mean that it is not a relation between mental states with 
propositional content. What I mean when I say that perceptual justification is non- 
inferential is that it is not a relation between propositions believed and that it doesn’t 
have the form of a move from premises to conclusion. This can be true even if epistemic 
perception is a mental state with propositional content.
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On my view it is not the proposition that Ann sees that the squirrel is on the fence which 
makes her justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence. Further, seeing that the 
squirrel is on the fence is not a premise in an argument giving Ann justification. It is the 
experience itself which makes her justified - whether or not this experience is a mental 
state with propositional content. O f course, someone else reporting Ann’s epistemic 
position would have to use a proposition to specify Ann’s epistemic predicament and 
what it is that she thus sees. They could point out that what Ann’s sees in this sense 
entails what she believes since what she sees is what she believes viz. that the squirrel is 
on the fence. But when Aim sees that the squirrel is on the fence she does not make a 
transition o f that sort, from a premise about what she sees to a conclusion about the 
world. It is the perception itself -  her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence - and not 
some description o f it, which justifies her in believing that the squirrel is on the fence.7
In the sense in which Davidson can agree with me, then, that is not a threat to the claim 
that perception is a source of non-inferential justification - as I understand it. Moreover, it 
is only as I would have us understand that claim that we have any reason to think not all 
justification can be inferential and that some of it must be non-inferential. This is what 
the regress argument teaches. There is no parallel reason to think that all justification 
cannot be inferential in Davidson’s sense. So this is not a possibility we need to rule out.
7 Any philosophical explanation o f  why seeing should be a source o f  justification will presumably appeal to 
facts about seeing, and these can be expressed using propositions and arranged in the form o f  a 
philosophical argument like the one I am now giving. This is true o f  anything that might be said to justify a 
subject (whether or not it is itself propositional) provided only that some minimal philosophical explanation 
is possible. This is not a reason for thinking that all justification is propositional in any interesting sense.
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Second, there is in any case a more obvious thing to say about all this. I don’t think it is 
obviously correct to think that epistemic perception is propositional. Still, if  it is 
propositional the sense in which that’s so is very different from the sense in which belief 
is propositional. The real point of Davidson’s picture though, is to assimilate them; to 
represent perceiving that p as relevantly similar to believing that p from an 
epistemological point o f view. On my view they are really very different. So it is a 
mistake to think that our two pictures are fundamentally alike.
What I mean is this: beliefs represent the world as being a certain way and they are 
capable of conferring justification insofar as we have some reason to believe that the 
world is as our beliefs represent as being. The world might not be the way our beliefs 
represent it, after all, and that is precisely why reasons are required. Nonetheless, 
representing the world in one way will entail or make it probable the world is a whole 
host of other ways. If I believe that Ross will be out of surgery before 1pm, what I 
believe entails that Ross will be out o f surgery before 2pm. So if I have reason to believe 
the world is as I initially represent it to be, I will also have reason to believe it is those 
further ways it can truly be described as being. This is how beliefs extend the reach of 
what we are justified in believing.
But epistemic perception is not a source of justification because it represents the world as 
being a certain way, or represents it in anything like the way that beliefs do. Intuitively, 
perception is a source o f justification because it actually puts us in touch with the objects 
about which we judge -  it presents them to consciousness in a way that mere thought or
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imagination fail to do. So it is no good trying to understand why perception is a source of 
justification along the lines that we have for beliefs, even if  they are both mental states 
with propositional content.
In fact, when you start thinking about the differences between, say, seeing that the 
squirrel is on the fence and believing that the squirrel is on the fence, even the idea that 
the former is a mental state with propositional content starts to come under pressure. 
Seeing that p is often described as a ‘propositional attitude’; where other examples of 
such attitudes are: hoping that p, fearing that p, and o f course, believing that p. 
Presumably, the point o f  describing seeing in these terms is to capture the idea that what 
you see can (in some sense) be the same as what you believe. This is certainly true in the 
following sense: we can often describe what is seen using a proposition that could equally 
well express what is believed, hoped, or feared. You see that the squirrel is on the fence 
and that can also be something that you believe, hope, or fear. In another sense, though, 
what you see is not at all the same as what you believe. What you see is the squirrel on 
the fence -  that is, some concrete 3-D scene in the physical world around you - and that is 
not in any obvious or natural sense ‘what’ you believe.
I am not denying that epistemic perception is propositional in any sense; I am just 
claiming that the sense in which that is so is very different from the sense in which the 
more canonical attitudes like belief are propositional. Given these differences it is hardly 
surprising that there is an epistemological difference between them. This is enough to 
mark a significant difference between my picture and the Davidsonian picture, since his
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picture is essentially an assimiliationist one: he wants to assimilate perception and belief. 
On my view, that is a mistake. They are really very different - so much so in fact, that 
even lumping them together under the single heading ‘propositional attitudes’ is 
somewhat suspect.
This is the second reason not to worry about whether or not what Davidson and I say is 
consistent. Lastly, and most obviously, when I say that perception is a source o f 
justification I don’t just mean that epistemic perception is a source of justification. On my 
view there is nothing wrong with thinking that non-epistemic perception is a source of 
justification. And this kind o f perception is not propositional, whatever we say about the 
epistemic case.
What I mean is this: Ann can be justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence 
because she sees that the squirrel is on the face, but she can also be justified in believing 
that the squirrel is on the fence because she sees the squirrel on the fence. Seeing the 
squirrel on the fence does not merely cause her to believe the squirrel is on the fence -  it 
gives her justification for believing that the squirrel is on the fence. But seeing the 
squirrel on the fence is not a mental state with propositional content; it is not an attitude 
canonically ascribed by means of a that-clause. I ascribe it just by saying ‘and Ann 
sees/saw/is about to see, the squirrel on the fence’. So Davidson is wrong to think that 
justification is always a relation between mental states with propositional content. It is 
not and seeing is a counterexample.
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O f course, seeing will not always justify a subject in her beliefs about what she sees. If 
Ann sees a squirrel on the fence this will only justify Ann in believing that there is a 
squirrel on the fence if  certain other things are true. Ann must be able to recognise 
squirrels when she sees them and she must be such that she could not easily have gone 
wrong in believing what she sees to be a squirrel. So seeing will only justify a subject in 
her beliefs in the right circumstances. This does not mean that the obtaining of these 
circumstances is what is really doing the justifying. These further things are certainly 
enabling conditions but what this means is that they help spell out the conditions under 
which seeing will justify Ann. If that is true, then it remains true that what is doing the 
justifying is her seeing and this - to repeat - is not a mental state with propositional 
content.
Thus, it is not just that I reject the assumption that only beliefs can justify other beliefs as 
the strict reading o f Davidson claims. I am also rejecting the idea that justification is a 
relation that can only obtain between mental states with propositional content. This is 
what the charitable reading says Davidson says. So even if you read Davidson charitably 
my position is still inconsistent with his.
Someone wanting to defend Davidson has basically got three options available to them. 
The first option is to deny that non-epistemic perception can be a source of justification. 
The prospects for this response look pretty bleak since the idea that it is, is one with 
which we are ordinarily perfectly happy. It is as natural to appeal to the fact that Ann sees 
the squirrel on the fence, as it is to appeal to the fact she sees that the squirrel is on the
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fence. Anyone wanting to reject the first o f these options had therefore better have some 
pretty good arguments.
Are there any such arguments? Here is what Davidson has to say in defence:
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations 
are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The 
answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs 
and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation 
o f a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified (Davidson 2000:157) 
This is not an argument. Davidson just denies that non-propositionally structured items 
like sensations, can stand in justificatory relations to beliefs; he doesn’t refute that view. 
Moreover the embedded suggestion - that we cannot really make sense o f the idea such 
items might justify beliefs (also implicit in the earlier quote where he claims that idea is 
“unintelligible”) is wholly unconvincing. The idea that Ann is justified in believing the 
squirrel is on the fence because she sees it on the fence is not one that most people 
struggle to understand, and there is no evidence we secretly translate that explanation into 
one that appeals to something propositional in form.
O f course when philosophers try and explain to Ann why she is justified -  when I give 
her chapter 3 o f this thesis, say, and she reads all about non-epistemic perception and 
how it gives us reasons for our beliefs about non-psychological reality because it puts us 
in touch with the objects about which we judge and so on - my explanation is 
propositional in form; it has the form of premises and conclusions (I hope). All
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explanations have that form. So if that is all Davidson is saying then what he is saying is 
unobjectionable. But this is not a good reason for thinking that what justifies Ann is itself 
something propositional - any more than the fact that Gordon Ramsay can explain to me 
what makes something taste delicious by saying something propositional in form means 
that what makes it taste delicious it itself something propositional in form.
So Davidson is either saying something true but completely unremarkable or he is saying 
something philosophically interesting and substantive but false.
Williamson offers a different defence o f the same basic idea. He claims that some o f the 
central functions o f what he calls ‘evidence’ can only be sub-served by things which are 
propositional in form. He writes:
Only propositions which we grasp serve the central evidential functions of 
inference to the best explanation, probabilistic confirmation, and the ruling out o f 
hypotheses (Williamson 2000: 196-7).
Suppose this is true and we assume that what Williamson means by ‘evidence’ lines up 
with what I am calling ‘justification’. Still, it is unclear why everything that can be 
evidence must be able to play all the roles that evidence is capable o f playing -  even all 
its central roles. A central function o f games is to promote team spirit and a sense o f 
collective endeavour. This is a function that cricket sub-serves well, though it is not one 
that chess, let alone solitaire, do much to promote. This does not mean that chess and 
solitaire are not games or that we have any great difficulty in understanding how they can 
be games. On the face of it exactly the same is true in the case o f evidence or
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justification: something can be among the central functions of evidence without its being 
the case that actually fulfilling that function is essential to something’s being evidence in 
the first place.8
I am not claiming that nothing could lead us rationally to revise the view that non- 
propositional perception can be a source of justification, merely that we had better have 
good reasons for doing so, given the presumption in its favour. That restriction is, after 
all, not one that we ordinarily feel compelled to make. My point is just that so far the 
reasons offered aren’t that good.
The second option for someone wanting to defend Davidson is to accept that non- 
epistemic perception is a source o f justification, but to insist that is only because it is 
epistemic perception in disguise. O f course, even if that is true it is not a threat to my 
position for the reasons I went into earlier in the discussion o f epistemic perception. But 
it is not true in any case; there is no good reason to think non-epistemic perception is only 
a source of justification because it is un-obviously epistemic. For all that has been said so 
far, the circumstances in which the two confer perceptual justification need not even 
coincide. However, even if they did, the conclusion still would not follow. On the 
contrary, we might as well just argue the converse: why isn’t all talk of ‘perceiving that 
something is the case’ merely elliptical for talk o f perceiving in certain circumstances? If 
so then perceptual justification is never a relation between mental states with 
propositional content since perceiving is not such a state.
8 Matters would be different if  ‘central function’ meant ‘essential function’. In that case all the 
philosophical work remains to be done in showing that the selected functions really are essential. That now  
looks as hard to defend as the original claim that simple seeing cannot be a source o f  justification.
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If anything, that is the more plausible line to take. As we saw earlier there is something 
independently odd about thinking that even epistemic perception is propositional. Unlike 
the more canonical propositional attitudes, seeing seems much too passive for talk o f its 
being an ‘attitude’ to seem at all natural. Intuitively, seeing that the squirrel is on the 
fence is not a stance that I actively adopt towards the squirrel’s being on the fence in the 
way in which believing or even hoping that the squirrel is on the fence are. It is simply 
something that I take in. Moreover while epistemic seeing is relational, what it relates us 
to is intuitively not something abstract like a proposition. When one sees that the squirrel 
is on the fence what one is related to is a concrete state o f affairs in the physical world 
that is literally made up o f the squirrel, and the fence, and their relation. As we saw 
earlier, this is not in any obvious sense ‘what’ one believes.
Finally, epistemic constructions describe a specific way in which the world is perceived: 
one sees that the squirrel is on the fence. Yet it is natural to think that one and the same 
episode o f seeing can justify an indefinite range o f beliefs. Normally when I see the 
squirrel on the fence I take in more than just the squirrel’s being on the fence and what I 
see may accordingly justify me in a range o f further beliefs -  that is, beliefs other than 
that the squirrel is on the fence. When I see that the squirrel on the fence that very 
episode may also justify me in believing that Mr Squirrel Nutkins is on the fence, 
assuming I am sufficiently familiar with Mr Nutkins, the family pet. If so, it seems to be 
the non-epistemic construction - talk of seeing and the circumstances in which we see -
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which ground attributions of the epistemic, and not vice versa. Again this makes it natural 
to think of the former locution as the more basic o f the two.
So the second strategy, which says that non-epistemic perception is only a source of 
justification because it is un-obviously epistemic, is also no good. Only the third option 
remains for someone wanting to defend Davidson. This option agrees that simple 
perception isn’t epistemic perception in disguise and so agrees that non-epistemic 
perception isn’t a source o f propositional justification. Nevertheless, it insists that non- 
epistemic perception cannot justify our beliefs about the world all by itself. According to 
this response, non-epistemic perception merely functions as a sign which, in the presence 
o f other justified beliefs, the subject can use to infer a belief about the world, in much the 
same way that if  I am at sea and see a lighthouse flashing, I can infer that the surrounding 
water is shallow - provided I know that flashing lights indicate shallow water.
In the lighthouse case, what I see does not justify my belief about the depth of the water 
all by itself. It merely functions as a sign which, in the context o f my knowledge or 
justified belief that flashing lights mean shallow water, I can use to establish that the 
water is shallow. According to the final response this is precisely how non-epistemic 
perception works and it is therefore not the autonomous source o f justification that I 
claim.
What I mean is that the sort of justification it provides isn’t genuinely independent of 
beliefs. This is easy to see in the lighthouse case. In this case, it is true that my
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justification does not derive exclusively from what I believe (the fact I see the lighthouse 
flashing is also meant to be relevant, and this is not a belief); but it is not as if  my belief 
that flashing lights means shallow water is a mere enabling condition or that it plays no 
role in justifying me in believing that the water is shallow. On the contrary, this belief is 
playing a justificatory role. My justification seems to partly derive from it, even if it 
doesn’t play that role by figuring as a premise in an argument from which the conclusion 
follows.9
While this sort o f dependence is not inferential in the traditional sense, it seems to be 
objectionable in much the same way that regular inferential justification is 
objectionable.10 So it would be worrying if non-epistemic perception worked like that. 
This is precisely what the third response alleges.
Non-epistemic perception does not work like that though and the lighthouse analogy is a 
bad one. It’s a bad analogy since there is nothing in the case in which I believe that there 
is a squirrel sitting on the fence when I see the squirrel sitting on it that plays a role
9 This shows that there is a gap between whether or not a justification is ‘inferential’ in the traditional sense 
(i.e. exclusively belief-based) and whether or not it partly derives from beliefs. In the lighthouse case my 
justification isn’t inferential in the traditional sense: I do not infer that the water is shallow from my belief 
that I see that the lights flashing and that flashing lights mean shallow water; part o f  my justification comes 
from the fact that I actually see the lights flashing, and seeing the lights flashing is not it a belief. Still, my 
justification is also partly belief-based. This seems to be more widespread than is normally recognised. 
Take a standard case o f  enumerative induction: having observed the sun rising ‘n ’ number o f  times I 
conclude it will rise tomorrow. As it is normally reconstructed, I reason from beliefs about what I have 
observed to a conclusion about the world. But why must we reconstruct my reasoning in this way? The 
natural view, surely, is that, in this case, as in the lighthouse case, part o f  my justification comes from my 
observations themselves, not from beliefs about what I have observed. This suggests we may need to 
modify the notion o f  ‘inference’ and what it is from which we can ‘infer’.
10 As we saw previously, if  my justification partly derives from the belief that flashing lights means shallow  
water, then that belief had better be justified and justified in a way that is independent o f  the belief it is 
meant to justify. Otherwise my justification will be vitiatingly circular in the very same way that it would 
be in more traditional cases o f  inferential justification.
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analogous to the role that seeing the lighthouse plays. Seeing the lighthouse flashing is a 
‘sign’ that the water is shallow and if I know that it is a sign I can be justified in believing 
that the water is shallow when I see the lighthouse flashing. This is something I can 
conclude given what I see. But seeing the squirrel on the fence is not a sign that there is a 
squirrel on the fence; it is not something I am permitted to conclude on the basis o f what I 
see. This is just a misuse of what we mean by something’s being a sign.
It would be appropriate to talk of signs if  I saw a pile o f nut husks, or some bristly red 
hairs caught in the slates o f the fence. In that case I might be justified in concluding that a 
squirrel had been sitting on the fence - they would be ‘signs’ that a squirrel had been 
about for one who knows a bit about squirrels. But it would be bizarre to say the same in 
the case in which I literally see the squirrel sitting there. Similarly, I might look at the 
toaster and see smoke pouring out. That might be a sign that the toast is burning. But if  I 
look at a piece o f toast in flames, carbonizing before my very eyes, I do not see 
something that is a sign that the toast is burning: I literally see the burning toast.11 This is 
quite unlike the lighthouse case: in this case I needn’t even be looking at the water, and 
even if I do see the water, I needn’t see its shallowness. This may just not be something I 
can see from where I stand. This is why it is plausible to think that the fact that the 
lighthouse is flashing does function as a genuine sign and that my beliefs about what 
flashing means do play a justificatory role. This is how I have access to the fact that the 
water is shallow. In the squirrel case though, it is not; I have access to the fact that the 
squirrel is on the fence because I actually see it sitting there.
11 For a line o f  thought which I think is similar in some respects to this one, see (Travis 2004).
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I have claimed that in the case in which I see the squirrel sitting on the fence it also has to 
be true that I have certain recognitional capacities and beliefs. If I didn’t have them, the 
fact I see the squirrel on the fence would not make me justified in believing the squirrel is 
on the fence. But it doesn’t follow from this that it’s my possession of those capacities 
that is doing the justifying or that those beliefs and capacities are playing anything more 
than a mere enabling role as I have claimed.
I think that this is the most intuitive thing to say in these cases and if  that is right there is 
no reason for a foundationalist, or anyone else interested in stopping the epistemic 
regress, to find non-epistemic perception any more problematic in principle than its 
epistemic analogue.
To sum up: in this section I have argued that my picture o f perceptual justification is 
fundamentally different from Davidson’s both because my conception of how epistemic 
perception can be a source o f justification is fundamentally different from his and 
because I allow that non-epistemic perception, that’s to say non-propositional perception, 
can be a source o f justification. This is not something Davidson could say even on a 
charitable reading o f his position. In the next section I am going to consider another 
influential challenge to my view. This time the challenge comes from Laurence BonJour.
4. Having Reasons
I have claimed that perceiving is a way of acquiring justification for our beliefs about the 
world that is fundamentally distinct from inference or reasoning. Crudely, BonJour’s
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view is that there is no such thing as distinctively perceptual justification in this sense. 
Like Davidson he thinks that our only real model o f what it is for a subject to have 
justification for one o f her beliefs -  in his terms, for her to be ‘in cognitive possession of 
a reason’ (BonJour 1985: 31) -  is for her to believe the premises o f an argument from 
which it follows that what she believes is (or is likely) to be true. This is very clear in his 
central anti-foundationalist argument.
Here is how BonJour formulates that argument (and here I quote):
(1) Suppose that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is empirical beliefs (a) 
which are epistemically justified, and (b) whose justification does not 
depend on that o f any further empirical beliefs
(2) For a belief to be epistemically justified requires that there be a reason 
why it is likely to be true.
(3) For a belief to be epistemically justified for a particular person requires 
that this person be himself in cognitive possession o f such a reason.
(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession of such a reason is to believe 
with justification the premises from which it follows that this belief is 
likely to be true.
(5) The premises of such a justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot 
be entirely apriori; at least one such premise must be empirical.
Therefore, the justification for a supposed basic empirical belief must depend on
the justification o f at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); it follows
that there can be no basic empirical beliefs (BonJour 1985: 32).
I l l
Here BonJour just assumes that the only way in which a subject can have a reason for 
what she believes is by possessing ‘a justificatory argument’ in its favour (Premise 4). If 
she lacks such an argument, or fails to believe its premises, the belief won’t be justified 
for her. That is why BonJour thinks that no belief could be ‘epistemically basic’ since to 
be epistemically basic a belief would have to be both justified and such that the subject’s 
justification for it does not consist in her possession of a justificatory argument.
This is just to deny what I have so far claimed. I have claimed that perception provides a 
fundamentally different model o f what it is for a subject to have reason or justification for 
her beliefs. Ann has reason for believing that there is a squirrel on the fence because she 
sees or sees that there is a squirrel sitting on the fence. This is not a matter o f Ann’s 
believing the premises o f some argument from which it follows that there is a squirrel 
sitting on the fence. It cannot be reduced to that or explained in those terms. If that is 
right then it is false that we can only have reason or justification for our beliefs by 
possessing a justificatory argument o f the sort BonJour describes. Perceiving something 
(in the context o f certain abilities and environmental facts) or perceiving that something 
is the case is another way in which we can be justified.
In other words I am claiming that we should be permissive when it comes to justification. 
I am not just claiming that we have two different models of the way in which perception 
can be a source o f justification. I am claiming that we have two different models o f what 
it is to be justified at all -  that is, two different models of what, at the most basic level, it 
is to have reasons for one’s beliefs. This is to deny what BonJour assumes. On this view
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inference does not furnish us with our only understanding o f justification; perception 
provides another model. Moreover, just as inferential justification does not demand 
supplementation via perception in order to be intelligible as a source o f justification on 
BonJour’s view, the same is true of perception on mine. Perception does not demand the 
support of what Locke called ‘concurrent reasons’ though we frequently have such 
reasons (Ayers 1991: 166-72); and it is not secretly constituted by such reasons in the 
way that BonJour assumes.
This is what I mean when I say that perception offers a fundamentally different model of 
what it is to have reasons for one’s beliefs. An obvious question therefore is this: why 
should these both be models of what it is to have reasons or justification? If inference and 
perception are as different as I have claimed, how can we make sense o f them both being 
models of the same underlying thing? This is an important question and it is one that I 
will return to in chapter 5.12 My point at this stage is that we do succeed in making sense 
o f them as such, whatever the difficulties o f doing so may be. So it must be possible to do 
so, whatever people like BonJour say. In actual fact, o f course, we have no more trouble 
with the idea that there is more than one way in which to acquire justification than we do 
with the idea that there is more than one way to play a game. It might be difficult to say 
exactly why different games -  games perhaps as diverse as cricket and chess -  both count 
as games, but it is not as if  there is any doubt about whether or not they do. I think
12 It might be thought that a Davidsonian - who countenances only epistemic perception - has less trouble 
on this score since he can appeal to the fact that all justification is ‘inferential’ (in some suitably broad 
sense) in accounting for the unity o f  the concept. It would be a mistake to think this makes things any 
easier. It would merely shift the problem to inferential justification: what makes that a concept with any 
significant internal unity, given than variety o f cases that it covers?
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exactly the same is true in the case of justification. In both cases, it is the philosophical 
project of describing our practice that is difficult, not the practice itself.
I have claimed that this insight -  that is to say, the idea that perception does furnish us 
with a distinctive model of justification -  is central to foundationalism. This is partly why 
it is so odd to think o f Descartes as a foundationalist, since he did not think o f perception 
in this way. For Descartes, it is just as true as for BonJour, that ‘the senses’ per se lack 
independent authority. They are useful signs for one who has concurrent reasons, but they 
have no intrinsic epistemic authority (Descartes 1996: Sixth Meditation). This is 
fundamentally opposed to what the foundationalist thinks on my account of 
foundationalism.13 O f course, Descartes may count as a foundationalist because o f the 
structural similarities his view bears to more traditional forms o f foundationalism, or 
because of his quasi-perceptual view o f the source of apriori justification; so perhaps he 
is a foundationalist o f sorts. But he certainly shouldn’t be seen as a paradigm 
foundationalist. This is not the reductio of my characterisation that some may suspect. 
Descartes is hard to classify as a historical thinker in more respects than one and we
13 It might be argued that Locke ought not to count as a foundationalist on that basis either since there is 
some sense in which the senses also function as mere signs for claims about the world on his view too. But 
that had more to do with Locke’s metaphysical picture o f  the objects o f  perception than any 
epistemological qualms about perception per se. Unlike Descartes, Locke thought that the direct objects o f  
perception were our own ideas and he certainly didn’t think that the senses were mere signs for beliefs 
about them. Moreover, it’s not obvious Locke did think the senses functioned as ‘signs’ for beliefs about 
the world. He certainly did not on the whole think we needed concurrent reasons for believing they were a 
reliable or accurate guide to reality. On the contrary, he thought the status o f  so-called ‘sensitive 
knowledge’ was sui generis. This may not be sustainable, given Locke’s overall metaphysical picture. But 
it is a sign o f  the pressure that he evidently felt, and that Descartes did not, to do justice to the idea that the 
senses are a source o f  knowledge or justification for our beliefs about the world, unaided by reason. This 
view simply struggled to receive its full and proper expression under the weight o f  his other metaphysical 
commitments.
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should no more balk at refusing to call him a foundationalist, than we should at refusing 
to think of him as a so-called Cartesian about the mind.14
I have claimed that a foundationalist is someone who thinks that perception is a genuine 
source o f justification and that is what BonJour denies. He claims we cannot really make 
sense o f that idea and that is very hard to believe. Again I am not claiming nothing could 
lead us to rationally revise that view, merely that we had better have good reasons for 
doing so given the presumption in its favour. This is what BonJour has so far failed to 
provide and that just leaves him denying the seemingly obvious.
In fact, BonJour does have one argument for thinking we can’t make sense o f a non- 
inferential model o f justification. This is what I will call the argument from clairvoyance. 
BonJour asks us to imagine Norman, who:
...under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds o f subject matter. He possesses no 
evidence or reasons o f any kind for or against the general possibility o f such a 
cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his clairvoyant power under circumstances in which it is completely reliable 
(BonJour 1985: 41).
The argument from clairvoyance claims that in this case Norman does not have any 
reasons for the beliefs he forms on the basis of his clairvoyant powers. If Norman had
14 Cassam argues for the latter view  in (Cassam, forthcoming).
115
such reasons they would be genuinely non-inferential, but he does not. So clairvoyance 
isn’t a source of non-inferential justification.
This is meant to be an argument against the possibility o f non-inferential justification 
more generally, on the assumption that any picture o f what the source o f such 
justification would be, or what such reasons would be like, would have to be relevantly 
like clairvoyance, and hence (given our assumptions) not a source of justification at all. 
Although BonJour does not make that assumption explicit it is clearly his view.
One familiar response to this argument is to question the opening assumption -  the 
assumption that Norman does not have any reason or justification for the beliefs he forms 
on the basis o f his clairvoyant powers. So called ‘externalists’ about justification often 
complain that in denying Norman has justification BonJour merely parades his own 
opposing intuitions and in doing so simply begs the question against their externalist 
alternative. A more concessive externalist response is to accept that Norman does lack 
reasons or justification for his clairvoyant beliefs, but to deny that ‘reasons’ or 
‘justification’ are required for knowledge. According to this line o f thought, ‘reasons’ in 
the sense in which BonJour is interested in them, are of little epistemological interest to 
the rest o f us.
Clearly, the second response is only more effective as a strategy if our intuitions that 
Norman knows are any less congenial to BonJour than our intuitions that Norman has 
reasons or justification. I doubt whether that is so. Either way, neither of these two
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externalist options is an entirely cost-free strategy and both leave us having to deny 
something seemingly intuitive.
A much more obvious response is to agree with BonJour that Norman lacks reasons or 
justification for the beliefs he forms with his clairvoyant powers, but to deny that that 
shows anything about the possibility of non-inferential justification in general. It doesn’t 
show any such thing because clairvoyance is a just bad picture o f what the alternative 
must look like. BonJour’s whole analogy therefore fails to get off the ground and the 
spreading step fails.
This is surely especially plausible in the present context, where we are talking about 
perception and whether it can furnish us with an alternative model o f justification. 
Perception is nothing like clairvoyance. When one perceives an object or state of affairs 
one is related to it in a very special way -  a way that mere thought or imagination do not 
provide, let alone clairvoyance. In perception, one is made consciously aware o f the 
objects and events in the world around one that one perceives and their properties: it is 
that very squirrel with which one is presented and of which one is aware. This simply has 
no analogue in the case o f clairvoyance; our best gloss on what clairvoyance is like is that 
it involves a strong hunch.
This is why it is so hard to believe that clairvoyance is a way in which to acquire 
justification for our beliefs.15 But we can agree with BonJour that clairvoyance isn’t a
151 mean a source o f  «on-inferential justification. Clearly, we could have excellent reason for thinking that 
clairvoyance is reliable, in which case ‘it’ may very well give us reasons for the beliefs about the world that
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source o f justification and agree that seems genuinely intuitive, contra the externalist. Yet 
still insist that shows anything about whether there could be other sources o f non- 
inferential justification - in particular, whether perception could be one o f them.
I think that this is a much more plausible line to take. How plausible it is in the final 
analysis will no doubt depend on how we think about perception. On certain ways of 
thinking about perception, it is much less readily intelligible why it should be a source of 
justification or provide a truly distinctive or basic model of what it is to have reasons. 
Against those views, BonJour’s complaints have more force.
Consider what James Pryor has to say about the epistemological role o f perception:
My view is that our perceptual experiences have the epistemic powers the 
dogmatist says they have because of what the phenomenology o f perception is 
like. I think there’s a distinctive phenomenology: the feeling of seeing to ascertain 
that a proposition is true. This is present when the way a mental episode 
represents its content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can 
thereby just tell that that content obtains. We find this phenomenology in 
perception...W hen you have a perceptual experience of your hands, that 
experience makes it feel as though you can just see that hands are present. It feels 
as those hands are being shown or revealed to you. This phenomenology may be 
present in other mental episodes too...My view is that our perceptual justification 
comes from that phenomenology. Having the phenomenology o f seeming to
we form on its basis. In that case, however, our justification will not be non-inferential; it will derive at 
least in part from the b elie f that clairvoyance is reliable.
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ascertain P is what makes us have prima facie justification to believe P (Pryor 
2004: 356-7).
I think that this view is incredible. Here, BonJour’s complaints really do seem to have 
force. Why should states in which you merely ‘seem to ascertain’ that a proposition is 
true give you any reason to believe that things actually are so? That seems a perfectly 
legitimate question to my ear.
I am not denying that we couldn’t have a model like Pryor’s, or that we couldn’t try and 
explain why perception is a source o f justification in these terms. Faced with BonJour, 
Pryor should say precisely the sort o f thing that I say; namely, there is nothing more to be 
said about why states in which you ‘seem to ascertain that a proposition is true’ are 
reason-giving. He should just insist that those sorts of states provide one of our most 
fundamental grips on what it is to have reason. FULL STOP. But it is striking just how 
implausible this sounds. Intuitively, BonJour’s question really does get a grip; it’s just not 
at all obvious or natural to say that these sorts of states just are cases in which you have 
reason. End of story. On the contrary, that fact cries out for further explanation.
The view that I defend does better in that respect. My view appeals to the fact that the 
subject perceives or perceives that things are a certain way in explaining what justifies 
her beliefs. These states consciously relate the subject to the objects and events in the 
world that her beliefs concern and make her consciously aware o f their properties; it is 
the very squirrel that Ann believes is on the fence which she actually sees sitting there. 
And it is surely no great mystery how that can put Ann in a position to know something
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about the squirrel. Intuitively, that just is what it is to have a reason for believing 
something about the world.
This view is so natural that even Pryor eventually falls back on it. This is effectively what 
he appeals to when it comes to explaining why the phenomenology o f perception should 
be reason giving. According to Pryor, it is because “that experience makes it feel as 
though you can just see that hands are present. It feels as those hands are being shown or 
revealed to you as he claims” (Pryor, ibid.). On my view, those hands really are being 
shown or revealed to you and that is precisely why you have reason for judging. So 
Pryor’s explanation is ultimately parasitic on mine.16
Pryor is a so-called ‘common-factor’ theorist about perception. Does this therefore make 
me a ‘disjunctivist’ about perception? Some will suspect that it does and some will want 
to reject my view on those grounds. Even those who don’t object to disjunctivism, per se, 
may find it hard to believe that our common sense views about the epistemological role 
of perception could commit us to such substantive claims about its underlying 
metaphysical nature.
I agree. But I am not committed to disjunctivism. I am claiming that perceiving or 
perceiving that something is the case is a source of justification for our beliefs about the
161 think that is significant given how intuitive Pryor-style views are often thought to be. This assumption 
places a crucial role in framing the contemporary debate. It is used to put pressure on views like mine and 
suggest that somehow the burden o f  proof in this area really lies with me -  my view  is the counter-intuitive 
view and so I am the one that need to provide all the reasons. I think that gets things exactly the wrong way 
round. What I hope to have brought out above is how very counter-intuitive the Pryor style view is at the 
most fundamental level. That should help us redress the dialectical balance.
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things we perceive and that perception does that by consciously relating us to those very 
things; when one sees the squirrel on the fence, it is that very squirrel of which one is 
aware. It should be relatively uncontroversial that that very state (your seeing) couldn’t 
exist unless the squirrel existed and you were related to it in that very way.
This is not what disjunctivists claim; even people as opposed to disjunctivism as Searle or 
Davidson or Pryor could agree with that. What they dispute is whether a mental state of 
the same fundamental kind could occur in the absence of the squirrel. They think it could 
and indeed would occur if you were hallucinating. That is what the disjunctivist denies. 
He denies that there is some ‘narrow’ psychological state in common between cases of 
illusion and hallucination and cases of veridical perception in virtue o f which these three 
states count as being the fundamental kind of psychological states that they are (Snowdon 
1981, 2005; Martin 2002).
My view is simply silent about this. It might be true, it might not, and what I say is 
compatible with either since even if there is a common factor of the sort just described it 
does not follow that whether or not one is justified is a function solely of the presence or 
absence of that factor. Indeed, even if a subject’s justification is just a function of what 
mental or psychological states she is in, it may be function of more than what 
‘fundamental’ kind o f psychological state she is in. This is especially plausible when we 
consider the grounds upon which philosophers of perception tend to individuate the 
mental or carve out its fundamental kinds. They think that what fundamental kind of 
psychological state a subject is in is fixed by how things seem to the subject of that state:
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by that state’s ‘phenomenal character’ (Martin 2002; Soteriou 2005). There is no obvious 
reason to think that what is epistemically important -  that is, what confers justification - 
is just a factor of how things seem to the subject in this sense.
Having said that all that, it may turn out that disjunctivism is ultimately the best way of 
holding onto the view that I defend. Perhaps once we concede the existence of a common 
factor between the case in which one perceives and merely seems to perceive, it would be 
impossible to believe that factor wouldn’t also fix the epistemological facts or leave any 
genuine explanatory work for perceiving to do; or perhaps it’s implausible to suppose 
that what is epistemically significant isn’t determined by how things seem to the subject 
in the sense in which philosophers of perception are interested.17 If so, we will have to 
adopt a disjunctive view o f the phenomenal character o f perceiving and seeming to 
perceive in order to hold onto the view that perceiving the world is, as I maintain, a 
genuinely distinctive source o f justification for our beliefs about it.
However, establishing any o f these claims would require lots more work, and all go far 
beyond what I am claiming. I am merely claiming that perceiving is a source of 
justification for beliefs about the world and that is so because it consciously relates us to 
the objects and events in the world about which we judge. On the face of it, that is 
compatible with lots o f different views about what it is to be related to an object in this 
way and whether that state has anything significant in common with a state in which one 
merely seems to be related to the world.
17 Williamson argues against a parallel claim in the case o f  knowledge and belief (W illiamson 2000: esp. 
2.4).
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So if you don’t like the idea that perceiving is a source o f justification in this sense, you 
should go ahead and reject my view. But don’t reject it because you think it commits you 
to disjunctivism.
To sum up: in this chapter I have claimed both that perception is a source of justification, 
genuinely distinct from inference, contra BonJour; and that the most natural and 
straightforward explanation of this fact appeals to the relational nature o f perceiving, 
contra Pryor - the fact that perception, unlike clairvoyance, say, consciously relates us to 
objects and events in the world around us about which we form beliefs. I have claimed 
that states in which we perceive and perceive that things are the case are states in which 
we are actually in touch (sometimes literally) with the things in the world that our beliefs 
concern; we are made aware o f those very objects and their properties. Given that this is 
so, it is no mystery why perception is a source o f justification for our beliefs about them.
That is what I have claimed. As we have seen, not everyone agrees. I have already 
discussed BonJour’s view. In the final section I will look at what people like Pryor have 
to say. Unlike BonJour, Pryor’s view is not completely lacking in all motivation. Pryor 
and others like him want to do justice to that idea that a subject unknowingly suffering an 
illusion or hallucination has the same justification as one who is perceiving the world 
around her. On the face of it, this is an idea to which my view will struggle to do justice. 
If one is justified because one actually perceives that things are a certain way, why should 
one be justified when one does not, and merely seems to be, related to the objects and
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properties in the world about which one endeavours to judge? Many philosophers claim
1 ftto find that counter-intuitive and opt for a Pryor-style view on these grounds. This 
further challenge to my view is one I will address in the next and final part o f this 
chapter.
5. The Argument from Fallibility
I have explained what the Broad View of perceptual justification is and why that is a 
pretty plausible, commonsensical thing to think. It solves the epistemic regress problem 
and it doesn’t have the restrictive consequences of traditional foundationalism. So why is 
it that philosophers haven’t on the whole seen this? Historically, two main arguments 
have prevented them taking that view sufficiently seriously. The Argument from 
Fallibility claims that perception only fallibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological 
reality and that it therefore cannot non-inferentially justify them, contra the Broad View. 
The Argument from Defeasibility claims that perception only defeasibly justifies beliefs 
about non-psychological reality and that it therefore cannot non-inferentially justify them, 
contra the BroadV. Unlike the views discussed so far these are actual arguments; they 
don’t just deny that perception could non-inferentially justify beliefs about the world, 
they give concrete philosophical reasons for thinking that this can’t be so. Moreover these 
are reasons that many philosophers have been moved by. According to what I earlier 
called the ‘Simple Reading’, it is precisely because beliefs about non-psychological
18 These are not the only options in this area. Tyler Burge has a view that is intermediate between Pryor’s 
and mine in many respects. He wants to allow that subjects can be justified when they suffer certain sorts o f  
perceptual illusions provided that perception is in general reliably veridical. This might be thought less 
implausible: maybe it is more readily intelligible that a source o f  representations, which is reliably 
veridical, should be a source o f reasons for beliefs about what is represented. For more on Burge’s view, 
see (Burge 2003).
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reality can be mistaken that traditional foundationalists were lead to privilege beliefs 
about our own minds. So these are the arguments we really need to engage with. In the 
rest of this chapter I’ll tackle the Argument from Fallibility, defeasibility will then be the 
topic of the next.
The Argument from Fallibility claims that it follows from the fact that perception only 
fallibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological reality that it must inferentially justify 
them. Faced with that argument there are two basic moves available to those of us 
wanting to hold onto the Broad View: we can either deny that perception does only 
fallibly justify beliefs about non-psychological reality; or we can deny that the conclusion 
follows, that is, deny that it follows from the fact that perceptual justification is fallible 
that it must be inferential. I’m going to start off by looking at the second response 
questioning the argument’s validity. This will strike many as the more obvious o f the two 
responses and it leads very naturally into questions that the first response addresses. As 
we are about to see, in thinking about why validity might be a problem, it will emerge 
that the argument’s premise is much less straightforward than most people assume.
Why should anyone think that it follows from the fact that perceptual justification is 
fallible that it is inferential?19 Let’s agree straight off that there are fallibly justified 
beliefs and that some o f those beliefs are also inferentially justified -  inductively justified
19 There is something slightly odd about concluding that ‘perceptual’ justification is inferential. In that case, 
what makes the justification perceptual? To call a justification perceptual is to make a claim about the 
epistemic source o f  that justification; not just it’s causal origin or the causal origin o f  the beliefs it is 
claimed to justify. Thus, in the event this argument succeeds in showing that perceptual justification cannot 
be non-inferential. I think it would be more natural to conclude that there is no such thing as properly 
perceptual justification. On this view, the epistemic role that I claim perception plays is instead played by 
beliefs about what we perceive and how that makes it likely the world is arranged in such and such ways.
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beliefs seem to be a case in point. If my justification for believing that Captain Molski 
will win derives from the fact I believe that she is the fastest dog on the track and that this 
makes it probable she will win, then my justification for believing she will win is 
inferential. It is also fallible; intuitively, I may be justified in believing that Captain 
Molski will win on those grounds and yet, for all that, she does not.
However, it is not enough for a defender of the Argument from Fallibility merely to point 
out that there are fallibly justified beliefs that are also inferentially justified. She needs to 
show us that there is some connection between these two things -  that it somehow 
follows from the fact that a belief is only fallibly justified that it is inferentially justified, 
or that it is inferentially justified in virtue o f being fallible.
So the question remains: what has fallibility got to do with inference in this sense? To see 
the intuitive connection here, think again about the inductive case. In this case what it 
means to say that my belief that Captain Molski will win is only ‘fallibly’ justified is that 
my justification for that belief leaves open the possibility that I am mistaken. I can be 
justified in believing that she will win and it still be false that she does win. If that is 
possible though, am I really justified in believing that she will win? I might still be 
justified in believing that she will probably win in those circumstances, but I surely can’t 
be justified in believing that she will actually win if my grounds leave open the
J Opossibility that she will not. Intuitively, to be justified in taking this further step and
20 This is an intuition M cDowell claims to be moved by (M cDowell 1998a, 1998b). It is certainly not 
without appeal, though it is hard to see how to reconcile it with the equally intuitive idea that induction is a 
genuine source o f  knowledge. See fn. 25.
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believing that she really will win I need to exclude the possibility that she will not and I
9 1can only do that by inferring that is so from other justified beliefs.
I think that is the intuitive thought connecting inference and fallibility. In the case of 
induction, however, I cannot rule out the possibility of mistake -  that is precisely makes 
my inductive reasons ‘inductive’ rather than ‘deductive’. What someone who wants to 
press this worry really ends up calling into question is how there can be such a thing as 
inductively justified beliefs -  that is, how inductive reasons can be genuine reasons given
99that they leave open the possibility o f mistake. If so, this argument isn’t really an 
argument for thinking that fallible justification must be inferential. Really, it is an 
argument for thinking that there is no such thing as fallible justification, since the only 
grounds for thinking that fallible justification must be inferential turn out to be grounds 
for thinking that there is something funny about fallible justification. What started out as 
an argument for a pretty commonsensical thought has therefore ended up as an argument 
for ‘infallibilism’.
21 Presumably even that is no good if  those beliefs in turn leave open the possibility o f  mistake. Why should 
it be acceptable to allow that one’s grounds for ruling out the possibility o f  mistake, do not themselves rule 
out the possibility o f  mistake, when it is not acceptable to claim that is so in the original case? Thus this 
line o f  thought is immediately regressive. It could only be stopped by appealing to infallibly justified  
beliefs.
22 This line o f  thought is familiar from Hume (Hume 1975: esp. sec. IV). I am assuming that induction 
needn’t be grounded in metaphysical necessities and hence that there is genuinely room for the possibility 
o f mistake on a intuitive understanding o f  what one’s grounds are in the inductive case. Perhaps some will 
deny that. They need to give us a different understanding o f  the distinction between ‘inductive’ and 
‘deductive’ reasons, and a different account o f  what exactly one’s grounds are in the inductive case. None 
o f this is to deny that good inductive arguments rule out the possibility I could easily have been wrong. 
That is a different matter to the issue o f  whether or not they logically exclude the possibility o f  error.
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In that case, maybe a better question is whether the premise o f the Argument from
9 1Fallibility is true, not whether the argument is valid. So far I’ve assumed that perception 
does only fallibly justify beliefs about non-psychological reality. This is the standard 
view in the literature, but is it true? Not on the face o f it. What justifies Ann in believing 
that there is a squirrel on the fence is the fact Ann sees or sees that there is a squirrel on 
the fence. Those grounds do not leave open the possibility that Ann is mistaken: Ann 
cannot see a squirrel on the fence unless it is true that there is a squirrel on the fence and 
she cannot see that there is a squirrel on the fence if  she could be mistaken in believing 
that there is a squirrel on the fence. ‘See’ is a ‘success’ verb: one cannot see the squirrel 
on the fence unless the squirrel on the fence exists. Similarly, ‘sees that’ is ‘factive’: one 
cannot see that the squirrel is on the fence unless the squirrel is on the fence. So if that is 
what justifies Ann in believing that there is a squirrel on the fence, and I claim it is, then 
Ann’s justification is not fallible.
Exactly the same is true o f perception more generally -  I cannot perceive ‘a ’ unless ‘a ’ 
exists and I cannot perceive that ‘a is F ’ unless a is F. So the justification that perception 
more generally provides is not such as to leave open the possibility o f mistake. If this is 
right then the Argument from Fallibility is unsound and we can reject it on those grounds, 
quite aside from any worries we might have about its validity.
23 Notice, I am not endorsing this line o f thought or suggesting that the argument is valid. One could as 
easily claim that this line o f  thought has therefore failed to establish any link between inference and 
fallibility since the only grounds for thinking that fallible justification must be inferential turn out to be 
grounds for thinking there is no such thing as fallible justification. And there is such a thing as fallible 
justification. So, the argument is no good. In that case we can allow perceptual justification is both fallible 
and non-inferential. This is the response Pollock and Cruz favour (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 43-44). On this 
model, perceptual reasons need not be inductive reasons. They simply figure alongside such reasons, as 
equally basic constituents o f  our ratiocentive framework.
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This response claims that perception is a source of infallible justification, and that the 
beliefs that it infallibly justifies are or include beliefs about non-psychological reality, 
like the belief that the squirrel is on the fence. On this view -  which I have also claimed 
is the naive view -  ordinary perceptual beliefs about the world around us count as 
infallible, and not just beliefs about our own psychological states as the traditional 
foundationalists maintained. This will strike many philosophers as so obviously 
incredible that I had better say a bit more.
Perhaps the first thing I should say is this: I am not claming that what you believe when 
you believe something about the world around you on the basis o f perception -  that is, 
the proposition believed -  is incapable of being false or mistaken. What Ann believes is 
that the squirrel is on the fence and clearly it could be false that the squirrel is on the 
fence. It is a contingent truth, after all, that the squirrel is anywhere near the fence. So 
ordinary perceptual beliefs are not infallible or incapable or being mistaken in that sense. 
This is how some philosophers characterise the notion of infallibility. Bernard Williams 
is a case in point. He claims that the belief that p is ‘incorrigible’ (in his terms) iff S 
believes that p, entails p (Williams 1978: 306). As we have just seen, that is a test that 
ordinary perceptual beliefs do not pass.
However, this is not the relevant notion o f infallibility. What I mean by this is that people 
who traditionally appealed to the notion of infallibility wanted it to be epistemically 
relevant. The fact that a belief is infallible was meant to figure in the explanation of why 
that belief was justified. This is certainly what the traditional foundationalists were after.
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But the mere fact that a belief is infallible in Williams’s sense tells us nothing about how 
or whether the subject is justified in that belief. If I believe any necessary truth my belief 
will be infallible in his sense, but I can certainly be unjustified in believing a necessary 
truth.
Williams’s characterisation therefore doesn’t serve the epistemological function that 
infallibility was historically designed to serve. This has lead most contemporary 
philosophers to jettison the notion o f infallibility altogether. This is a mistake. The 
problem is that infallibility is a modal notion: to say one believes p infallibly is to say one 
cannot be mistaken in believing p. The problem with Williams’s formulation is that the 
modality attaches to the wrong thing; on his formulation it attaches to the proposition 
believed. Intuitively, though, we want the modality to attach to the subject. We want her 
to be such that whatever she believes, what she believes cannot be mistaken. Unlike 
Williams’s notion this is not a test that all necessary truths pass, and it does seem to be 
genuinely epistemic relevant. So it is a mistake to dismiss the whole notion of infallibility 
-  we just need to understand it in the right way.
This is how the notion o f infallibility was traditionally understood. Moreover, this is the 
sense in which I am claiming that ordinary perceptual beliefs are infallible: Ann’s belief 
that the squirrel is on the fence is infallible because Ann is such that whatever she 
believes on that score what she believes cannot be mistaken. That is what I am claiming 
at least, but I can already see that some will require more convincing.
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Perhaps it will help to start by saying something about how any subject could be 
infallible in this sense. One possibility is that the subject’s belief concerns a special 
subject matter: perhaps, as with Descartes’ cogito, what the subject believes is such that 
merely entertaining the thought it expresses is sufficient for the subject to determine 
whether or not what she believes is true. This is what many philosophers have been 
tempted about so-called self-evident truths, like whoever is tall is tall. I am going to call 
that the Subject-Matter Reading.24
Another possibility is that the subject’s belief has a certain source and that that explains 
why she cannot go wrong. If the Pope believes that p because God has told him that p, 
then the Pope is equally such that what he believes cannot be mistaken. That is not due to 
some special feature o f the content of his beliefs: the Pope might know that the end is 
nigh because God has told him, but it is not a self-evident truth that the end is nigh. If he 
knows that the end is nigh, it is because (and only because) his belief has a special 
source. I am therefore going to call that the Source Reading.
We now have two different explanations of how a subject’s beliefs could be infallible in 
the sense that I have claimed is relevant to our discussion. Both have played a role in the 
history of philosophy: Descartes favoured the first, and traditional foundationalists the 
second. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it is in the second sense that I think that our
24 This is somewhat closer to the Williams characterisation, since it at least appeals to an aspect o f  the 
proposition believed. Even so, it is not identical with that characterisation. Necessary truths all pass 
W illiam s’s test but most o f  them are not self-evident in this sense (mathematics would be a lot easier if  they 
were). Conversely, many things which are self-evident are not necessarily true. Unless you are Timothy 
Williamson you probably will not think that ‘I exist’ is a necessary truth, but many philosophers think it is 
a self-evident truth.
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ordinary, perceptually justified beliefs are infallible. Ann’s belief that there is a squirrel 
on the fence is infallible not because it is self-evident that there is a squirrel on the fence, 
but because her belief has a certain source, namely her seeing or seeing that there is a 
squirrel on the fence. Those grounds exclude the possibility that what Ann believes is 
mistaken and they are the grounds upon which she judges.
That is what I am claiming. I hope it now seems less obviously false than before, but it is 
still not trivial. I have not made it true at the expense of its philosophical interest. Not 
everyone will agree that our perceptual beliefs are infallible in even this sense, since not 
everyone will agree that these are the grounds upon which we are justified in holding 
those beliefs. We saw earlier that people like James Pryor think that what justifies Ann in 
believing that the squirrel is on the fence is the fact she is in a state in which ‘she seems 
to ascertain’ that it is true that there is a squirrel on the fence. Those grounds do not rule 
out the possibility o f mistake; Ann can seem to ascertain that the squirrel is on the fence 
and yet fail to actually ascertain that the squirrel is on the fence since the squirrel is 
elsewhere. In that case Ann will be justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence 
even though it is false that the squirrel is on the fence. So Ann’s belief is at best fallibly 
justified.
I have not rejected that view because I think that the Argument from Fallibility is valid 
and that this view would make perceptual justification inferential, given that all fallible 
justification must be inferential if  that Argument is valid. I have rejected it because I 
think it is a very strange and baroque account o f what actually justifies our perceptual
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beliefs. I think there is no good philosophical reason for abandoning the naive view that 
what justifies our perceptual beliefs is the fact that we are in states that consciously relate 
us to the things about which we judge. Those states are flatly incompatible with things 
not being as we judge.
So I am not arguing for a generalised ‘infallibilism’. I am not saying that any justification 
worth its salt must exclude the possibility of mistake. There is certainly something 
intuitive about that, but it is hard to reconcile with the equally intuitive idea that induction 
can be a genuine source of knowledge or justification despite the fact it does not thus 
exclude the possibility o f mistake.25 You do not have to be an infallibilist in any more 
general sense to accept my story. I am merely claiming that it is an interesting fact about 
our perceptually justified beliefs that what actually justifies those beliefs does, in fact, 
rule out the possibility o f mistake - quite aside from whether or not if  it didn’t that 
justification would still be worth the name.
Of course even on my view having such grounds doesn’t rule out every way in which the 
subject could go wrong. Suppose Ann sees the squirrel on the fence but believes
25 McDowell claims otherwise. He writes: “induction can have a confusing effect here: it can seem to be a 
counter-example to the principle. But demanding that an argument be conclusive is not the same as 
demanding that it be deductive.” (M cDowell 1998b: 421). That is certainly true on some readings o f  
‘conclusive’. (It is true on Dretske’s theory o f  conclusive reasons. Indeed, this is the whole point o f his 
theory, see (Dretske 2000b)). But it doesn’t look like a live option on M cD ow ell’s own reading. The 
principle he appeals to says, (and here I quote) “the argument would need to be conclusive. If you know  
something, you cannot be wrong about it” (ibid.). Only deductive arguments ensure that you cannot be 
mistaken; inductive arguments do not. Whether or not I will be mistaken is a different matter; good 
inductive arguments may certainly rule that out but even the highest common factor theorist whom  
M cDowell claims to being opposing can require that our epistemic standings rule out the possibility we will 
be mistaken or that we could  easily be mistaken. O f course, M cDowell might just be making the point that 
if  you know, you cannot be mistaken (whether or not your grounds make it the case that you couldn’t be 
mistaken). This is certainly true; but trivially so. Anyone can agree with that. Indeed, anyone must agree 
with that since knowledge is ‘factive’: there is a deductive argument from S knows that p, to p. At best, 
then, what M cDowell says here is highly misleading.
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irrationally that there is no squirrel on the fence or that squirrels do not exist. Or suppose 
she is careless and forms the belief that there is a cat on the fence, rather than the squirrel 
that she quite plainly sees. In those cases, what Ann believes may well be mistaken. 
Clearly these are logical possibilities; seeing the squirrel on the fence does not exclude 
the possibility that Ann’s belief could be mistaken for these reasons. But this sort o f error 
is not peculiar to perceptual beliefs. If Ann is negligent in forming her beliefs, doesn’t 
properly attend to what she perceives, or if  her beliefs are not appropriately related to 
what it is that she perceives, then Ann’s beliefs may very well be mistaken. But all beliefs 
are subject to mistakes o f these kinds and no notion of infallibility could reasonably be 
expected to exclude them. Even so-called self-evident truths are not infallible in this 
sense and nor are beliefs about one’s own psychological states. One can believe 
irrationally that it does not follow from the fact that if  A is taller than B, and B taller than 
C, that A is taller than C; and if I do not properly attend to my sensations I may mistake a 
tickle for an itch. These are not reasons for thinking that beliefs about our own 
psychological states are not infallible or that belief in self-evident truths is not infallible -  
at least not when one properly attends, is not being irrational, and one’s beliefs are 
appropriately related to one’s grounds. Why can’t exactly the same caveat be allowed to 
apply in the perceptual case?
Perceptual beliefs are vulnerable to a certain sort of mistake to which the others are often 
thought to be immune. Ann might believe that the squirrel is on the fence because she 
seems to see a squirrel on the fence but where, because she is hallucinating, there is really 
no squirrel there to be seen. In that case, if  Ann believes that there is a squirrel on the
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fence her belief will be mistaken. However, this is not a case in which Ann is justified in 
believing that the squirrel is on the fence because she sees that there is a squirrel on the 
fence and in which her belief is mistaken.26 In this case Ann does not see the squirrel on 
the fence. So this fact has no power to show that Ann’s belief that there is a squirrel on 
the fence is not infallible in the sense in which I claim it is. That belief is infallible
• • 27because of its source and in this case the source is different.
Exactly the same is true of any belief that is infallible because o f its source. If I believe 
that I am depressed because of what my analyst tells me, or that I am in pain because that 
is what the doctor has told me I will feel when the needle goes in -  then my belief may 
also be mistaken.28 Beliefs about one’s own psychological states are therefore no more 
immune from error in this sense than more ordinary beliefs about non-psychological 
reality. If they seem different it is only because we typically form beliefs about 
psychological reality on a certain basis, namely on the basis o f being presented with the 
facts these beliefs concern. What normally justifies me in believing that I am in pain is 
the fact that I feel my own pain and believe I am in pain on that basis.29 In that case it
26 I am not even committed to thinking this is a case in which Ann is ju stified  in believing that the squirrel 
is on the fence. After all she doesn’t see the squirrel, she merely seems to see one. For all that has been said 
so far Ann therefore has no reason at all to believe that there is a squirrel on the fence. O f course, she might 
have inductive grounds for believing that things which look like squirrels normally are squirrels, but that is 
a different matter altogether.
27 One might try a similar move in the case o f  induction, though it would be a lot harder to pull off. In that 
case it’s much harder to come up with a plausible alternative for one’s grounds, in such a way that they do 
not leave open the possibility o f  mistake.
28 Some philosophers think it is sufficient for one to be in pain that one sincerely believe that one is in pain. 
I think this is mistake. It may be that we never believe that we are in pain unless we are in pain. That 
doesn’t show that the b elief that one’s in pain is sufficient for one to be in the pain. It may just be that we 
never form the b elief that we are in pain other than because we feel our own pain.
29 At least, that is the sort o f  thing that people in the literature say. As a statistical claim it is surely false. 
Indeed, it gets things precisely the wrong way round. I think it is very common to form beliefs about one’s 
own psychological states on others grounds -  I normally form them on the basis o f  others say-so. In
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remains true that I cannot be mistaken. But there is no more guarantee in this case than in 
the perceptual case that if I believe that I am in pain on some other basis my belief will be 
similarly immune from mistake. Beliefs about non-psychological reality therefore have at 
least as good a claim to be infallible as beliefs about psychological reality, contra the 
traditional foundationalist.30
This is what I am claiming, at least. Having said that I don’t want to go to the stake for 
the view that beliefs about psychological reality really are infallible. Perhaps if  you really 
press matters we cannot isolate a subset of mistakes as those that involve purely ‘verbal 
slips’ or that result from irrationality, insufficient attention, or that are not properly
grounded in what it is that one perceives. Maybe these mistakes are all substantive, as
 ^1Austin liked to claim (Austin 1962: 112-13). What I do want to go to the stake for is the 
claim that beliefs about non-psychological reality have as good a claim to be infallible as
contrast, for those o f  us who didn’t ground up in the 1960’s, it is very rare that we ever form beliefs about 
the world on the basis o f  hallucinations.
30 O f course one can be ignorant o f  the layout o f  non-psychological reality in a way in which many think 
one cannot be with respect to psychological reality. But ignorance is not a form o f  error. If Ann refuses to 
believe anything when presented with the squirrel on the fence she is not in error; she merely fails to know  
something she might otherwise have known. That is not a reason to think that ordinary perceptual beliefs 
aren’t incapable o f  being mistaken.
31 Austin poured scorn on the idea that such mistakes involve merely ‘verbal slips’ He writes: “Ayer tries, 
as it were to laugh this o ff  as a quite trivial qualification; he evidently thinks that he is conceding here only 
the possibility o f  slips o f  the tongue, purely ‘verbal’ slips (or o f  course o f  lying). But this is not so. There 
are more ways than these o f  bringing out the wrong word. I may say ‘M agenta’ wrongly either by a mere 
slip, having meant to say ‘Vermilion’; or because I don’t quite know what ‘magenta’ means, what shade o f  
colour is called magenta; or again, because I was unable to, or perhaps just didn’t really notice or attend to 
or properly size up the colour before me. Thus, there is always the possibility, not only that I may be 
brought to admit that ‘magenta’ wasn’t the right word to pick on for the colour before me, but also that I 
may be brought to see, or perhaps remember, that the colour before me w asn’t magenta. And this hold for 
the case in which I say, “It seems, to me personally, here and now, as if  I were seeing something magenta’, 
just as much as for the case in which I say, ‘That is magenta.’ The first formula may be more cautious, but 
it isn’t incorrigible.” (Austin 1962: 112-113)
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beliefs about psychological reality. That is not something most philosophers think is true,
T9let alone trivially so.
I think this view does most justice to our ordinary view of perceptual justification. I also 
think it does something at the philosophical level to explain why it is that it should be a 
‘justification’ that perception affords one. What I mean is that this view makes the 
connection to truth -  the connection that any justification has to secure -  perfectly 
straightforward. Perception consciously presents us with the very things about which we 
judge and makes their nature manifest. In believing what we do on those grounds, we 
cannot go wrong. That is why it is no mystery that it is the source o f justification we so 
readily take it to be. The same cannot be said for the fallibilist view o f Pryor, considered 
earlier. Not only is it odd to appeal to states in which we merely seem to perceive that 
things are a certain way, it also leaves a big gap at the level o f explanation -  that of 
saying why seeming to perceive is a source of reasons. This is another good reason for 
preferring my view.
So I have now defended what I will call an Infallibilist view of perceptual justification. 
This represents a further respect in which my position is continuous with more traditional 
forms of foundationalism. But my view enables us to hold onto what is gripping about 
traditional foundationalism without committing us to its less plausible features. If I am
32 Traditional foundationalists might claim it is not the mere availability o f  other methods that makes for 
difficulties. The problem only arises where we cannot keep track o f which method we are using. In the case 
o f psychological reality that is meant to be unproblematic: it is easy to determine when we believe 
something on the basis o f  ‘inner perception’ as opposed to others say-so. The same is not true in the 
perceptual case: we are not always in a position to know when we are perceiving as opposed to merely 
seeming to perceive and can we rationally be employing the latter ‘method’ without noticing. I will be 
exploring these issues in the next chapter.
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right the beliefs that perception infallibly justifies include beliefs about non- 
psychological reality.
I think this is the view which strikes us as most plausible prior to philosophical reflection, 
but is not one that many philosophers have been drawn to in the last 100 years. So why is 
that? Why has ‘fallibilism’ suddenly come to seem inevitable, when previously 
infallibilism seem so natural?
6. Conclusion
I want to conclude this chapter with a speculation about why that is so, though I hope 
what I say will not be o f mere sociological interest. The basic reason I suggest is this: 
philosophers are very impressed by the idea that subjects unknowingly suffering an 
illusion or hallucination have the same justification as those who are veridically 
perceiving the world around them. This intuition now has its very own argument. 
Commonly referred to as ‘the new evil-demon problem’, it is basically just an updated 
version of Descartes’ malicious demon argument (Descartes 1996: First Meditation). It 
claims that my ‘tw in’ and me have exactly the same justification for our beliefs about the 
perceivable world, despite the fact that my twin is the victim of an elaborate deception 
and merely seems to perceive the world around him (Sosa 1991: 281). If this is right, it’s 
hard to see how perceptual justification can be a function o f something that is only 
present in the case o f veridical perception as I claim viz. contact with the world. Rather, it 
must derive from something that cases of veridical perception have in common with the
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others -  perhaps, as Pryor suggests, from the phenomenology o f perception and the fact 
that in having a perceptual experience one seems to ascertain that a proposition is true.
I have already said that I think that view is perverse. It is also unmotivated, since there is 
nothing so very intuitive or commonsensical to recommend the idea that subjects in such 
circumstances really do have the same justification as those actually perceiving the world 
around them. So while I started off by saying that philosophers are ‘very impressed’ by 
the idea that such subjects have the same justification as their more fortunate 
counterparts, what I really mean is that they are overly impressed by that idea; I think 
they have simply forgotten what a strange view it really is.
Of course, there is something to the idea that subjects who form beliefs about the world 
when unknowingly suffering from hallucinations cannot be ‘blamed’ for the beliefs that 
they form on that basis. As Williamson points out they have “a cast iron excuse” for 
having formed those beliefs (Williamson, forthcoming). That is how things seemed to 
them and that makes it perfectly intelligible why they believe what they do. Moreover, 
they needn’t be irrational in these beliefs - they needn’t have any special reason to 
suspect that they are hallucinating. The important question is why we should we think it 
follows from this that they have any reason for the beliefs they form on this basis? If I 
jump out o f a window while under the misapprehension that the building is on fire it is 
perfectly explicable why I act as I do and I certainly needn’t be irrational in jumping. It 
may even be a perfectly ‘reasonable’ thing for me to do in some sense of ‘reasonable’. 
Still, from a commonsense point o f view it remains true that I don’t actually have any
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reason for acting as I do. I certainly seem to have a reason and that explains why I act as I 
do. But I don’t actually have any reason. That is precisely why we say to people who 
jump out of windows when there is no fire: oh dear, you really shouldn’t have jum ped...
I think that this is the most intuitive thing to say in this case, as it is in the epistemic 
case.33 This is a way of making the point that we are naturally realists about reasons -  at 
least until philosophy gets hold of us. We think that in the realm of reason there is a 
distinction to be drawn between how things seem and how they really are -  between what 
one seems to have justification for believing and what one really has justification for 
believing. What I am claiming is that there are no good philosophical reasons for revising 
this view. In the case o f perceptual justification, we should remain the realists about 
reasons that we naturally all are.34
33 Indeed it’s arguably even more plausible in the epistemic case. In the cases sceptics focus on at least, the 
beliefs that we form result from deception  (I am the victim o f  an evil dem on.. .etc. etc.). This needn’t be so 
in the practical sphere.
34 None o f  this is to say that how things seem to us perceptually (e.g. how they look) is irrelevant. It’s by 
looking the way they do that objects consciously reveal themselves to us. Moreover, when pressed we often 
retreat to claims about how things look. M y point is just that this doesn’t show that ‘looks’ are all that is 
important, or that they are the grounds upon which we must have been judging all along.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL 
CHAPTER 4: THE ARGUMENT FROM DEFEASIBILITY
1. Introduction
At the end o f the last chapter I argued that perceptual justification is in fact infallible. My 
question in this chapter is whether it is also indefeasible. I’m going to argue that it is not. 
So I will be arguing that the infallibility of perceptual justification does not entail its 
indefeasibility as many have thought. What, then, is the significance o f the fact that, as I 
am going to argue, perceptual justification is defeasible? The significance is that the 
defeasibility o f perceptual justification might be thought to create problems for my view 
on at least two different fronts. On the one hand it might be thought to imply that 
perceptual justification is inferential. This is what I have been calling the Argument from 
Defeasibility against the view that perceptual justification is non-inferential. On the other 
hand the defeasibility o f perceptual justification might be thought to call into question the 
idea that perception really puts us in touch with non-psychological reality in such a way 
as to make its layout manifest to us.
I’m going to argue that both these claims about the alleged consequences o f perceptual 
defeasibility are unfounded. I think it does not follow from the fact that perceptual 
justification is defeasible that it is inferential or that it fails to put us in touch with reality 
in the way in which I have been maintaining in this thesis. So perceptual defeasibility 
therefore poses no threat at all to my view.
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The plan in this chapter is this: in the next section I’m going to defend the claim that 
perceptual justification is defeasible, despite being infallible. I’m going to distinguish 
between several different senses of ‘defeat’ and argue that perceptual justification is 
defeasible in each of these senses. Then, I’m going to address the Argument from 
Defeasibility. I will show that this argument fails since, although it is sound, it is invalid; 
perceptual justification can be defeasible without being inferential. In the following 
section I will tackle the other big worry about accepting perceptual defeasibility -  that is, 
the worry about manifestation -  and explain why that worry is also unfounded. In the 
final section o f the chapter I will draw attention to an important structural difference 
between my position and traditional foundationalism with respect to defeasibility. I will 
argue that once we see how perceptual justification can be defeasible, we will also see 
that traditional foundationalists were wrong to think that we have indefeasible access to 
psychological reality.
2. Perceptual Defeasibility
I have said that I will be arguing that perceptual justification is defeasible. To say that a 
given justification is ‘defeasible’ is to say that it is capable o f being defeated. But what 
does that mean and why should we think that it is true of perceptual justification? In the 
literature there is more than one way of understanding the notion of defeat and it’s not 
always obvious what they all have in common. As a rough, first stab we might say that in 
cases o f defeat the subject is deprived of knowledge she might otherwise have had. 
Perceptual justification is therefore defeasible insofar as the knowledge it grounds is
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capable of being defeated in this way. This is not completely useless, but it’s not that 
helpful either. If I shoot you in the head I deprive you of knowledge you might otherwise 
have had, but it would be wrong to call my shooting you a ‘defeater’ in the sense in 
which we are interested.
We can get a clearer fix on what is at issue by looking at some concrete examples of 
perceptual defeat. Goldman’s famous bam example is often thought to be a classic case 
in which a perceptual justification is defeated (Goldman 1992: 86). Seeing a bam in good 
light and from a reasonable distance is normally a basis on which I can come to know 
that what I see is a bam. But suppose, as in Goldman’s example, that the bam I see in 
good light and from a reasonable distance is the only real bam in an environment full o f 
fake bam facades - indistinguishable in good light and from a reasonable distance from 
the real bam that I actually see. In that case, I do not acquire knowledge that there is a 
bam in front o f me despite the fact that I would know that it’s a bam if  I were seeing it in 
more favourable circumstances.
So the justification that seeing a bam (in good light and from a reasonable distance) 
provides for believing that something is a bam is capable o f being defeated; while it will 
sometimes enable one to acquire knowledge that what one sees is a bam, it will not 
always do so. The presence of the fakes can prevent one acquiring knowledge that one
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might otherwise have had and it’s in that sense in which their presence is said to ‘defeat’ 
one’s justification.1 Let’s call this case BARN.
BARN is an example in which I never actually have the knowledge I might otherwise 
have had. But it is easy to imagine cases in which I am deprived o f perceptual knowledge 
I intuitively did once have. Suppose I am looking at the real bam at tl  and all is normal; 
intuitively I know that there is a bam in front of me. But what if, while I am looking, a 
series o f fakes is constructed around me. At t2, when the constmction is finished I do not 
know that there is a bam in front of me since at t2 I am in precisely the same situation 
that I was in in BARN and we have already conceded that I do not know the truth o f the 
proposition in that case. So while I knew that I was facing a bam when I first started 
looking, that is something I no longer know. So I am deprived o f perceptual knowledge I 
did once have.
These are both examples in which I am deprived of perceptual knowledge by facts about 
the situation o f which I am unaware; I don’t know anything about the fakes, but they still 
prevent me acquiring knowledge. There are also cases of perceptual defeat in which I am 
deprived of knowledge by evidence that I do possess. Consider the following example 
from Michael Martin:
Suppose you know that I have a system capable o f causing perfect hallucinations 
o f oranges in subjects, and that I regularly mn tests where I alternate the actual 
viewing o f an orange with a perfect hallucination of one. You subject yourself to
1 At this stage we can leave it open whether or you one would still be justified in believing that there is a 
bam in front o f  you. That depends on whether you still sees that there is a bam n front o f  you. This is an 
issue to which I return below.
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my machine. Unknown to you the machine has developed a serious fault and is 
incapable o f causing hallucinations: if  it looks to you as if  there is an orange there, 
then that could only have been because you are seeing one. Nonetheless, you have 
information which seems sufficient to make rational a doubt on your part as to 
whether there really is an orange before you when it looks to you as if  that is what 
is there...you have reason sufficient to undermine the warrant that experience 
provides for judgement (Martin 2001: 444-5).
Let’s call this case ORANGE. ORANGE fits in better with some of the characterisations 
of defeat that one now finds in the literature. Thus Williamson claims that:
Define a way o f having warrant to assert p to be defeasible just in case one can 
have warrant to assert p in that way and then cease to have warrant to assert p in 
that p merely in virtue o f gaining new evidence (Williamson 2000: 265).
This fits in better with ORANGE, since in ORNAGE I presumably would have known 
that there is an orange before me had I looked before having heard anything about the 
hallucination machine. But when I am told, I then cease to know in virtue of the evidence 
that I gain.2 As we saw earlier, though, not all cases o f defeat work in this way. We can 
also be deprived o f perceptual knowledge by evidence that we do not possess.
Despite this difference, these two cases do have something important in common. In both 
cases I am deprived o f perceptual knowledge by certain epistemological facts about the 
situation that obtain independently of what I happen to believe and that operate
2 This is intuitively quite unlike BARN since in that case the presence o f  the fakes deprives me o f  
knowledge whether or not evidence they exist is ever in my possession. For more on defeat via evidence 
one does not possess, see (Harman 1973: Ch. 9).
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irrespective of these beliefs. I am therefore going to call these epistemological defeaters 
since they represent genuine epistemological obstacles to perceptual knowledge.
Notice, the fact that perceptual justification is capable o f being defeated in this way is 
perfectly compatible with my claim that perceptual justification is infallible. In these 
cases it is still true that I cannot be mistaken in believing there is an bam or an orange 
when I judge that there is a bam or an orange because I see that there is a bam or an 
orange before me. It is just that in these cases I could easily have formed that belief on a 
different basis (e.g. by looking at a fake bam fagade) and in which case I would have 
been mistaken. However, it’s unclear that one really sees that there is a bam or an orange 
before one in these cases and if I do not see that those things are so, I will not be justified 
in believing that they are so. We saw earlier that to have perceptual justification, I have to 
be in the right circumstances and these facts (that is, the presence o f the fakes and the 
hallucination machine) may make it the case I am not in such circumstances. If that is 
right then the presence o f the fakes and the hallucination machine don’t just deprive me 
of perceptual knowledge I might otherwise have had. They deprive me of perceptual 
justification I might otherwise have had; in turn, this may be what explains why I lack the 
knowledge I might otherwise have had.
So in cases o f epistemological defeat I am deprived of perceptual knowledge by the 
existence of some genuine epistemological obstacle. There are also cases o f defeat in 
which I am deprived of knowledge by the presence of an obstacle that is purely 
psychological. In these cases I do not know simply because I do not believe, not because
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there is any genuine epistemological obstacle to believing. In these cases I deprive myself 
o f knowledge and I do that by refusing to believe what I do in fact have the best possible 
grounds for believing. I am therefore going to call these cases o f psychological defeat 
since they function by bring about a certain psychological result, viz. lack of belief.
Cases o f psychological defeat are also clearly possible where perceptual knowledge is 
concerned. Suppose you ask me why I believe that I have hands and I answer by citing 
the fact that I can see that I have hands; this is what makes it the case I am justified in 
believing I have hands. Now imagine you have been busy reading Vogel’s paper ‘Are 
there any Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?’ (Vogel 1990) over the weekend 
and you point out to me that knowing that I have hands entails I also know I am not a 
handless brain in a vat being artificially feed all my experiences, including the experience 
I now have o f seeming to see that I have hands. So, you pointedly ask: am I really 
claiming to know that I have hands? All o f a sudden I feel terribly flustered -  somehow 
you always manage to get the better of me in these sorts of arguments. So I conclude that 
I don’t really know that I have hands, since I don’t really know that I am not a handless 
brain in a vat and cease to believe that I have hands on that basis; agnosticism, I think, is 
the safest policy for me.
Let’s call this case HANDS. Clearly we could elaborate HANDS in such a way that it is 
just an example o f epistemological defeat. Conceivably, you might give me excellent 
reasons for supposing that I am a handless brain in a vat. We might live in a world very 
unlike the actual world in which 1/5 people are in fact secretly envatted and you might
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point out how relatively high the probability is that I am too and how, if I were, things 
would seem just the same to me as they now seem. Or, you might coolly remark that you 
only asked as the experiment is now drawing to a close and all vats are to be unplugged, 
before manipulating the course of my experience in such a way as to make it extremely 
plausible that you are the mad scientist who has cruelly envatted me. Clearly, these are 
both ways in which we could have developed HANDS and in both of these cases it would 
have been plausible that I do not know that I have hands. However, these are not cases of 
psychological defeat. In these cases I don’t just fail to know because I fail to believe. In 
these cases I fail to know because there is a genuine epistemological obstacle to my 
knowledge.
I have deliberately not elaborated HANDS in this way. In HANDS as I describe it, you 
merely raise the possibility that I could be a brain in a vat and I am so moved by this 
speculation -  so overly moved -  that I conclude I do not know that I have hands, and so 
refrain from believing that I have any. I am assuming, in other words, that not any old 
consideration in favour o f p counts as a genuine reason to believe p. In this case I am also 
deprived of perceptual knowledge I might otherwise have had: my justification is 
defeated. But that is because, and only because, I no longer believe that I have hands, not 
because there is any genuine reason for me to believe that.3
3 Martin’s case is therefore not a case o f psychological defeat as I am employing that label. In the passage 
from which the quote is taken, he does stress the fact that the subject refrains from believing that there is an 
orange before her and it is clear he thinks that is relevant to whether or not she has knowledge. He writes 
(in the section I omitted above) “Given that doubt, you do not endorse appearances, and despite the fact 
that it looks to you as if  that (the thing before you) is a certain way (the way an orange can look), you 
refrain from making any judgement about the matter. So, the experience you have is independent o f  your 
beliefs -  it can look to you as if  something is that particular way without you so believing it to be. And your 
failure to believe is a reflection o f the defeasibility o f  perceptual justification -y o u  have reason sufficient to 
undermine the warrant that experience provides for judgement.” (Martin, ibid.) As the last line makes clear,
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Cases of psychological defeat are even more obviously compatible with the fact that, as I 
have claimed, perceptual justification is infallible. In these cases I don’t believe anything 
so there is no question of my belief being mistaken. I merely refrain from believing 
something I might otherwise have believed, but ignorance is not a form of error. 
Moreover, what I might otherwise have believed is that I have hands and that is not a 
belief that could have been mistaken in any case, given that I really do see that I have 
hands. Your speculation does not interfere with that. Unlike epistemological defeat 
psychological defeat needn’t necessarily deprive me of perceptual justification; I still see 
that I have hands, and so still have justification for believing that I have hands. It is just 
that I fail to believe that I have hands and so trivially lack knowledge that I have hands.
So we now have two sorts o f perceptual defeat -  epistemological and psychological. 
Some people will probably want to question whether the examples that I have given are 
all cases of actual defeat. Whether that’s so, depends on whether the subjects actually 
lack perceptual knowledge in these cases, and here opinions may differ. One might think 
that I do know that there is a bam in front of me in BARN. Maybe I am lucky, but 
knowledge does not exclude every kind of luck imaginable.4 I think that is not completely 
implausible.5 Conversely, hard-core ‘externalists’ will probably maintain that the mere 
fact that it would be unreasonable for me to believe there is an orange before me, once
you have reason sufficient to undermine the warrant that experience provides for judgement. If so, there is 
a genuine epistemological obstacle to your knowledge; the obstacle being that you lack perceptual 
justification. Whether this is a plausible description o f  the case he gives is a separate question.
4 For some nice examples see (Sainsbury 1997).
5 Clearly, intuitions are heavily effected by the vagaries o f  description. For instance, the fact that bams are 
actually pretty big objects seems to make a difference. Lots o f  people’s intuition that you know the coin 
you have just picked out o f  your pocket is a real 50p, despite the overwhelming preponderance o f  fakes, is 
much less robust.
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you’ve told me about your hallucination machine, is not enough to deprive me of 
knowledge if I persist in believing that there is an orange before me despite you. This 
looks less plausible to me, though still clearly possible. Still others will reject the way 
that I have described HANDS. They will insist the mere fact that I no longer believe that 
I have hands does not prevent me knowing that I have hands, since belief is not a 
condition for knowledge.6 How plausible that is will depend on how firmly entrenched is 
the link between knowledge and belief. Philosophers have tended to assume it is pretty 
deep, though the old adage ‘I knew it! I just didn’t believe my eyes’ suggests it may be 
less so.7 Finally, even those who don’t deny that these particular cases are all cases of 
actual perceptual defeat may disagree about the sort of defeat they represent and whether 
it is properly regarded as epistemological or psychological in nature.
These are all things someone could say by way o f response. I do not intend to take issue 
with such an opponent here. My point isn’t that these particular cases must be cases of 
perceptual defeat and my aim is not to give you a long list o f considerations that really do
Q
defeat a given perceptual justification. My point is just that there are cases are which 
perceptual justification is defeated, whether or not these cases are among them. There 
really are cases in which we are deprived of perceptual knowledge that we intuitively
6 There are also cases where I persist in believing p, despite believing I do not know p. For instance, I 
might claim not to know  that my car is parked where I left it since I don’t know that it hasn’t just been 
stolen, yet still believe  it is parked where I left it. In that case I won’t know that I know since I don’t believe 
that I know, but I will still know where my car is parked.
7 There are also the famous Radford examples (Radford 1966). For more recent discussion, see Williamson 
(Williamson 2000: esp. C h.l).
8 Giving such a list may not even be possible -  at least not in any kind o f  general way. Perhaps we can only 
sort cases by reference to our intuition to count them as cases o f  knowledge. For helpful comparison, see 
(Austin 1962: esp. Lecture X).
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might otherwise have had. This weaker claim is much harder to reject and it is enough to 
show that perceptual justification is capable o f being defeated.9
3. The Argument from Defeasibility
What unwelcome consequences can we draw from the fact that, as I have just argued, 
perceptual justification is defeasible? According to the Argument from Defeasibility it 
follows from the fact that perception only defeasibly justifies beliefs about non- 
psychological reality that it can only inferentially justify them. This is a direct thereat to 
the Broad View o f perceptual justification that I have defended. According to the Broad 
View, the beliefs that perception non-inferentially justifies include beliefs about non- 
psychological reality. So what should we make o f this challenge?
Unlike the Argument from Fallibility, we cannot claim the Argument from Defeasibility 
is unsound; as we have just seen, perceptual justification is defeasible. But is the 
argument valid? That is, does it really follow from the fact that perception only 
defeasibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological reality that perceptual justification 
must be inferential? Notice that, as in the fallibility case, it is not enough for a defender 
of this argument merely to point out that there are justifications that are both defeasible 
and inferential. Once again, induction seems to be a case in point. I can be justified in 
believing that Captain Molski will win because I am justified in believing that she is the 
fastest dog on the track. Here my justification is inferential, but it is also capable o f being
9 There are further distinctions one can draw here. One that is relevant to our purposes is between ‘rebutting 
defeat’ and ‘undercutting defeat’ -  that is, between cases in which defeat gives you reason to believe p is 
false and cases where it gives you reason to suppose that the belief that p is inadequately grounded. I will 
focus largely on the latter in what follows. For helpful further discussion, see (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 36-
8)
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defeated: if I acquire good reason to believe that Captain Molski has been doped I will no 
longer be justified in believing that she will win, even if (as it turns out) she does. So 
there certainly are examples of justifications which are both defeasible and inferential. 
That doesn’t show that there is any connection between these two things though or that 
such justifications are inferential in virtue o f being defeasible.
This is what the Argument from Defeasibility needs to establish. How might this be 
done? I can think o f only two strategies. To see the first, take a case in which perceptual 
justification isn’t defeated. Suppose I’m looking at the bam in good light and from a 
reasonable distance and that there are no fakes in the vicinity. In these circumstances I 
will ordinarily come to know that there is a bam in front o f me. But I will not know this 
(even in those circumstances) if I happen to believe that I am in fake bam country 
surrounded by facades that I cannot distinguish from the real thing. If I believe that, then 
it would surely be irrational for me to persist in believing that I am confronted by a bam. 
Similarly, if I believe that there are excellent reasons for thinking I am currently 
hallucinating, since you’ve just told me all about your marvellous machine, it would 
normally be irrational for me to persist in believing that there is an orange before me 
when that it how things look to me. And I will not acquire knowledge if it would be 
irrational for me to persist in that belief.10
We can put the point here very simply: we can be deprived o f knowledge because we 
believe that we are in circumstances that really would deprive us of knowledge. In other
10 Not everyone accepts even that much is true. For a powerful defence o f  such a view, see (Ayers 1991: 
170-1)
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words the belief that we are in such circumstances (or what I will henceforth call 
‘defeating circumstances’) is itself a defeater. This belief can also prevent us acquiring 
perceptual knowledge we might otherwise have had.11 Given that that’s so, someone 
might argue that defeasible justification therefore cannot be non-inferential since it 
depends upon the fact the subject believes that she is not in defeating circusmantnces.
This is the first strategy for someone wanting to show that defeasible justification must be 
inferential. It looks distinctly unpromising. At best it threatens to show that my
knowledge that I ’m confronted by a bam depends upon the fact that I also believe that I
1 0am not surrounded by indiscrim inate bam facades. It doesn’t show that my 
justification for that belief derives from the belief that I am not surrounded by fakes or 
therefore that my justification is inferential. No doubt it would strike us as odd if most 
subjects who believe that there is a bam didn’t also believe that they aren’t in fake bam 
country. This doesn’t show their justification for the former derives from the latter any 
more than the fact it would be odd for me to believe that I am in pain without also 
believing that someone is in pain shows that part of my justification for believing that I 
am in pain derives from the belief that someone is in pain. So the most this line of 
thought promises to show that it is a normal concomitant of a subject’s knowing such
11 This is not a psychological defeater, it is an epistemological defeater since it represents an 
epistemological obstacle to knowledge viz. irrationality. In other respects though the case is more similar to 
cases o f  psychological defeat. The obstacle is consequent upon something psychological and to remove it 
one just needs to refrain from believing
12 Clearly, it only shows that in cases where it would be irrational for me to persist in the belief that I am 
confronted by a bam. That needn’t always be so; it won’t be in a case in which I know I am looking at the 
only real bam and all the others are fakes. In that case I can rationally believe both that I am confronted by 
a bam and that I’m surrounded by visually indistinguishable bam facades.
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things as that there is a bam in front of them, that they also believe they are not in fake 
bam country.13 This has no power to show their justification is tacitly inferential.
However, it is doubtful this line of thought even succeeds in showing that much. The 
starting point, recall, was the observation that it would be irrational for a subject both to 
believe that they are confronted by a bam and that they are in defeating circumstances. 
Why should that show the subject must believe that she is not in defeating circumstances? 
If the obstacle to her knowing is just the belief that she is in such circumstances, we 
remove that obstacle by removing that belief. In other words, it must be the case that the 
subject does not believe that she is in such circumstances. That does not entail she must 
believe she is not in such circumstances. Beliefs admit o f both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 
negation (Evans 1982: 226 n. 36). Only the latter, that is, the absence o f the belief that 
one is in defeating circumstances, appears necessary.
Once again it would no doubt strike us as strange if conceptually competent subjects 
didn’t believe that they were not in fake bam country whenever they believe themselves 
to be confronted by a bam. But it cannot be a requirement for knowledge that they have 
that belief. We are not irrational in failing to grasp every entailment of what we believe 
or draw all the conclusions we are committed to, even comparatively obvious ones.14 It is 
even harder to see why that requirement should hold in the case of less conceptually
13 That may be less plausible on a more demanding conception o f what b elief involves. I am trying to be 
maximally favourable to my opponent at this point. If belief just involves the disposition to sincerely assent 
when prompted (not having been put o ff by being asked so obvious a question etc.) it would be pretty 
unusual to find someone who has one o f  these beliefs without the other.
14 Sometimes pointing out an entailment to a subject will lead the subject to suspend her original belief. I 
might suspend my belief that my car is parked where I left it, when you point out this entails it hasn’t been 
stolen in the last 5 minutes. Clearly, there is nothing irrational in combining that with the belief that one is 
in defeating circumstances.
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sophisticated subjects -  that is, subjects who lack the concepts necessary to frame 
thoughts about fake bams or grasp their rational bearing on one’s ability to spot a bam 
when one sees one. We surely do not want to prevent these subjects having ordinary 
perceptual knowledge just on the grounds that it would be irrational for them to lack a 
belief they aren’t even capable o f framing. Further, the mere fact they lack those concepts 
is not an objection in its own right. To claim otherwise would be incredible, especially 
when we consider the number and variety o f different circumstances that would defeat 
any given perceptual justification. We presumably don’t want to require that we all 
believe with respect to each and every one o f those circumstances that it does not obtain; 
but it seems equally implausible to attribute to us all the more general belief that 
defeating circusmantnces do not obtain since that belief is composed o f concepts that 
even philosophers struggle to articulate.15
So we have as yet no reason to think that perceptual knowledge depends on anything 
more than the fact that the subject lacks the belief that she is in defeating circumstances 
obtain.16 Strictly speaking, o f course, this is not enough; lacking that belief also has to be 
epistemically appropriate for the subject. We cannot acquire perceptual knowledge just
15 Harman opts for the latter strategy: “it is very likely that there is an infinite number o f  different ways a 
particular inference might be undermined by misleading evidence one does not possess. If there must be a 
separate essential conclusion ruling out each o f  these ways, inference would have to be infinitely inclusive- 
and that is implausible. Therefore it would seem  that the relevant inferences must rule out undermining 
evidence one does not possess by means o f  a single conclusion, essential to the inference, that characterises 
all such evidence. It is not at all clear what distinguishes evidence that does undermine from evidence that 
does not...since I am unable to formulate criteria that would distinguish among these cases, I will simply 
label cases o f  the first kind “undermining evidence one does not possess” (Harman 1973: 150). The 
objection raised here obviously has less force on less demanding conceptions o f  what is required for one to 
count as believing things like defeating circumstances do not obtain. M y main point still stands though; 
even if  you do need to have this belief, it is not part o f  the source o f  the justification for one’s ordinary 
perceptual beliefs. It therefore has no tendency to show on e’s justification is tacitly inferential, contra the 
Argument from Defeasibility.
16 To lack the belief that p one doesn’t need the concepts that figure in the b elie f that p. So there is no 
parallel worry about hyper-intellectualisation on this account.
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by stubbornly refusing to believe that things are amiss when we have excellent reason for 
thinking otherwise. In the ordinary case, though, what makes one’s lack o f belief 
reasonable is just one’s lack o f grounds. I normally have no reason to believe that I am 
hallucinating and that is what makes it acceptable for me to lack the belief that I am. I do 
not need to have acquired any special reasons for thinking that I am not, or anything 
therefore which suggests that perceptual justification isn’t a perfectly good stopping point 
in the regress o f justification.
This highlights an important asymmetry between beliefs and their absence. It would not 
be epistemically appropriate for me to believe that defeating circumstances do not obtain 
just because I lack reasons for thinking that they do. Beliefs are not justified by ‘default’ 
or until and unless reasons transpire to the contrary. They require positive support, which 
the mere fact a belief is true does not provide; it is something I must actively go out and 
acquire. The same is not true o f the absence o f belief. It can be epistemically appropriate 
for me to lack the belief that defeating circumstances obtain just in virtue o f the fact I 
lack reasons for believing that they do; I needn’t have any special reason for believing 
that they do not.
In this respect, it is the belief that not-p that is the true contrary o f the belief that p. This is 
hardly surprising since only the former is an attitude. The absence o f belief is not a stand 
one actively adopts on the world; it is just the absence o f one. My point is that while we 
are required to have reasons for the stands that we do take, whether pro or anti, we are not 
required to take a stand on every issue. Sometimes agnosticism is acceptable and unlike
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positive stances, mere agnosticism -  that is, the lack o f belief either way -  does not call 
for reasons in the very same way.
This undermines the first strategy for showing that defeasible justification must be 
inferential. The second strategy appeals to the sort o f explanation we can give of why 
subjects lack knowledge in cases o f defeat. The thought here is very simple. Suppose we 
did think that in cases o f  defeasible justification part o f the subject’s justification came 
from the belief that defeating circumstances do not obtain. This would make the subject’s 
justification inferential and it would also offer a neat explanation o f why the subject 
doesn’t acquire knowledge in cases o f defeat. In these cases the belief that such 
circumstances do not obtain is false and it is a widely accepted principle about knowledge 
that subjects can’t acquire knowledge where what they believe rests essentially upon a 
false belief. The ‘No False Lemma’s Requirement’ as Harman calls it, is a principle about 
knowledge that we have independent reason to accept. So this explanation is 
parsimonious and that is an explanatory virtue.17
This is an idea that many philosophers have been moved by. The assumption that defeat 
is to be explained in these terms informs all the early work in this area; this is why Lehrer 
and Paxson begin their seminal paper by assuming that defeat can only operate in cases 
o f ‘non-basic’ knowledge: that is, cases where:
a man knows that a statement is true because there is some other statement that 
justifies his belief (Lehrer & Paxson 2000: 31).
17 This is obviously a more general version o f  the strategy pursued in relation to Gettier’s original 
examples, which claimed they involve inferences resting essentially upon false beliefs. For a 
comprehensive survey o f  response to the Gettier examples, see (Shope 1983).
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Later on, recognising that defeat also applied in the perceptual sphere, Harman claimed:
I shall argue that we cannot easily account for perceptual Gettier examples unless 
we assume that even simple perceptual knowledge is based on inference. In that 
case, the perceiver can be assumed to infer that the explanation o f there seeming 
to be a candle ahead is that he is seeing a candle there. He comes to know that 
there is a candle there only if he is right about why it seems to him that there is a 
candle there (Harman 1973: 23).
So the idea that defeat is to be explained in terms involving beliefs is one with an 
illustrious history.
Nevertheless, it is not the only explanation of why subjects lack knowledge in cases of 
defeat, or indeed the best explanation. As we are about to see there are other explanations 
that do not involve appealing to beliefs at all. Consider BARN: why should seeing a bam 
in fake bam country not be a way o f acquiring knowledge that there is bam before you? 
The obvious explanation, surely, is that you could easily have gone wrong in believing
I 8there is a bam in front o f you. This explanation does not appeal to beliefs, so it will not 
make the subject’s justification inferential. Yet it appeals to a principle about knowledge 
that we have quite as much independent reason to accept as the No False Lemmas 
requirement viz. the principle that subjects cannot acquire knowledge where what they 
believe could easily have been false (Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000).
18 When we change the example so that the subject could not easily have gone wrong (e.g. suppose she has 
a guide who know the area and that he wouldn’t have brought her to see a fake bam) the intuition that she 
no longer knows is correspondingly less robust.
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The ‘Safety Requirement’ as it is called can also explain why some (if not all) o f the 
cases in which evidence we do possess deprives us o f knowledge. Consider ORANGE: if 
the hallucination machine very rarely fails to function properly, I could easily have gone 
wrong in believing that there is an orange before me and ignoring the evidence to the 
contrary.
However, perhaps not all o f the relevant cases can be handled in this way. As Martin 
describes ORANGE it is meant to be a case in which I couldn’t easily have gone wrong 
in believing that there is an orange before me, but in which I still lack knowledge. As he 
sets things up:
...the machine has developed a serious fault and is incapable o f causing 
hallucinations: if  it looks to you as if  there is an orange there, then that could only 
have been because you are seeing one (Martin, ibid.).
If cases like this are genuinely possible -  and I here leave it open whether or not they are 
- then we need another explanation o f why they aren’t cases o f knowledge.19 But even 
here alternatives aren’t impossible to find. So at worst w e’ll be left without a unitary 
account o f why all the different cases count as cases o f defeat count as such. This is not 
an objection.
19 What I mean is this: something might not qualify as a ‘genuine’ reason to not to believe-p, unless itis true 
that in believing p you could easily go wrong. Whether that’s so depends on how we finesse the idea that 
one could easily have gone wrong. We could just fix it in such a way that it automatically covers all these 
cases and so insist that i f  we lack knowledge it must be because we could easily have gone wrong. But 
what would that prove? In any event, Martin’s case might still represent a case o f  purely psychological 
defeat.
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A different explanation might appeal to the fact that there are certain canons o f reason or 
rationality, and that knowledge is not compatible with the violation o f these canons. If 
you tell me you have a machine capable o f causing perfect hallucinations o f oranges and 
we have a long and trusting relationship on the basis o f which I know you are very likely 
to be well-informed about the topic at hand, it would not normally be reasonable for me 
to simply disregard what you have said and persist in believing what I would otherwise 
have believed. On the face o f it what other people tell us, particularly those we trust, can 
be a genuine reason for us to believe what they say, despite the fact that in ignoring them 
we might not easily have gone wrong. This may be enough to explain why we lack 
knowledge.20
This explanation isn’t the same as one which appeals to the Safety Requirement, but it 
doesn’t essentially appeal to beliefs either. What makes it the case that I lack knowledge 
in these cases is the fact it would be unreasonable for me to believe the proposition in 
question and there need be no further explanation o f why that is so in terms o f some other 
requirement. The idea that certain things run counter to reason in this way is just as basic 
a part o f our thought about knowledge as any. There need be no force to the demand we 
explain that it in other terms, let alone, terms that involve beliefs.
:o What those canons dictate will presumably be different in the case o f  different subjects. Information it is 
unreasonable for me to ignore might not be unreasonable for you to ignore. For instance, even if  I cannot 
rationally ignore the possibility I am hallucinating in ORANGE, it is hard to believe the same is true o f  
subjects who do not grasp the rational bearing o f  hallucination-machine’s on on e’s ability to know an 
orange when one sees them. I here leave undone the difficulty job o f  spelling out these conditions in any 
kind o f  general way (assuming such specification is even possible).
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This explains epistemological defeat. Only psychological defeat now remains. But 
psychological defeat is easy to explain since in cases like HANDS the reason one lacks 
knowledge is simply that one lacks belief and belief is I am assuming an essential 
component o f knowledge. Clearly, this explanation does appeal to a fact about what the 
subject believes (or fails to believe): to know that I have hands I must believe I have 
hands. So if  I do not believe that I have hands, I will not know that I have hands either. 
However, this can hardly be thought to render my justification inferential. The belief that 
I have hands is not part o f what gives me justification for believing that I have hands on 
anyone’s view.
So I have now explained why in all three cases of perceptual defeat the subject lacks 
knowledge she might otherwise have had. In none o f those cases does the explanation 
appeal to the fact the subject’s justification derives ineliminably from what she believes. 
So in none of these cases does it follow from the fact that perceptual justification is 
defeasible, that it is inferential. This disposes of the Argument from Defeasibility. Unlike 
the Argument from Fallibility, the Argument from Defeasibility has true premises; but 
like the Argument from Fallibility, it is invalid.
4. The World Made Manifest
I have now shown that it does not follow from the fact that perceptual justification is 
defeasible that it is inferential. Perhaps, however, perceptual defeasibility poses a 
different sort o f threat to my view. I have claimed that perception is a source of 
justification because it puts us in touch with the objects and events in the world about
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which we judge. On my view, perception brings the world to consciousness and in doing 
so makes the layout o f reality manifest. How can that be if, as I have argued, perceptual 
justification is defeasible?
The second challenge that I’ll be looking at under the heading o f defeasibility claims that 
these two features o f perceptual justification are incompatible: if  a subject can rationally 
refrain from judging that she has hands even when she sees that she has hands, then what 
she sees cannot really make it manifest to her that she has hands. So my view of 
perceptual justification which attempts to combine these two features is incoherent.
In response to this challenge I am going to argue for a version o f what I will call 
‘compatibilism’. I will argue there is nothing incoherent in thinking both that perception 
does make the layout o f reality manifest, and that the justification it provides is capable 
o f being defeated. The reason they are compatible is very simple. What perception makes 
manifest is the world, but it is not always manifest to us whether or not we are 
perceiving. There are states subjectively indiscrim inate from genuine perceptions (cases 
o f hallucination, say) in which the world is not made manifest though it seems to be. If 
one were in such a state, one would have no reason at all forjudging. On my view, unlike 
some of the views discussed previously, to have reason to believe that you have hands 
you must see that you have hands; it must be those very hands, right there in front o f you, 
o f which you are aware and merely seeming to see that you have hands does not give you 
that.21 Thus, to think that you are in such a state (that is, a state in which you merely seem
I’m obviously not claiming that this is the only way a subject can have reason to believe she has hands. 
Blind people have also reasons for thinking that they have hands but their reasons do not come from visual
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to see that you have hands) is to think you are in a state in which you would have no 
reason at all for judging that you have hands. Clearly, a rational subject who thinks that 
will refrain from judging that she has hands. Rational subjects, after all, will not judge 
where they take those judgements to be unfounded.22
In a case like HANDS the subject is wrong to think that she does not see that she has 
hands. Still, this needn’t make her irrational. It is just a fact about the nature of 
rationality, as opposed to justification, that we can be moved by doubts that we have no 
genuine reason to be moved by and do so without being irrational. This, in turn, can make 
it rational for us to believe things for which we have no genuine justification.
This explains how it is possible for a subject rationally to refrain from judging that she 
has hands even though she plainly sees that she has hands. She can rationally refrain 
since she can see that she has hands without knowing that she sees that she has hands. If 
she does not know that she sees that she has hands, any doubt about whether or not she 
sees may rationally lead her not to believe that she has hands, despite the fact that is 
something perception puts her in a position to know.
perception. My point is that you do not have any reason to believe you have hands merely in virtue o f  
seem ing to see you have hands.
22 The same is not so obviously true if  we substitute ‘could’ for ‘is ’: I may have reasons for thinking that I 
could be hallucinating (I might think that is a logical possibility, however remote), but that doesn’t 
automatically mean that I have any reason to think that I am hallucinating or therefore that I cannot 
rationally judge that I have hands. We can rationally judge where we think our judgements could  be 
unfounded even if  (in those circumstances) we can also rationally refrain.
23 This is not a problem vis-a-vis the regress since that argument is concerned with the conditions under 
which one’s beliefs are justified. The regress assumes that justification is a positive epistemic status. In 
contrast, a b elie f might be ‘rational’ (or not irrational) just as long as it doesn’t conflict with other things 
you believe.
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This is all perfectly compatible with my view. It is no part o f my view that perception 
makes it manifest to us whether or not we are perceiving; it is the world, not our 
epistemic access to it, which perception makes manifest.
This does not mean that we must know that we are perceiving in order to acquire 
perceptual knowledge. Clearly, this would be a threat to my view that perception 
genuinely makes knowledge of the world available. But it’s simply not true. Even in 
HANDS, the subject need but abandon the unfounded suspicion she is hallucinating and 
believe that she has hands in order to know that he has hands. Nothing more is required 
and that is precisely why the knowledge is genuinely available to her.24
O f course, people who suspect they are hallucinating often require more convincing. This 
does not mean that they are right to demand more, or that the rest o f us who do not, and 
who persist in our ordinary perceptual beliefs are somehow in the wrong or being 
wantonly irresponsible. The ‘high’ standards o f the epistemically cautious do not make 
them any more principled, than do the ‘high’ standards o f the person who refuses ever to 
cross the road. In neither case are we rationally obliged to be so cautious; so in neither 
case can we be faulted in failing to be.25
'4 Strictly speaking, I suppose perception might be accused o f  failing to make the world ‘m anifest’ on these 
grounds: one has got to lack the belief that one isn’t perceiving. If that is right, I can’t think o f  any good 
reason for thinking perception must make the world manifest in this demanding sense.
25 It is just a mistake to think having extra assurance always makes on e’s original grounds better. If I know  
I locked the front door it doesn’t matter how many times I go back and check. Double-checking may put 
my mind at rest but it doesn’t make me ‘know’ any better. O f course, I may be in a better position to defend 
my b elie f that it is locked when you ask me. But that is just reflection o f  the fact one is better placed in 
arguing with an opponent the broader the range o f  considerations one can adduce in on e’s defence. That 
way one is more likely to find common ground. That does show anything interesting about what it is to 
have justification; it just tells us something about what makes for success in arguments.
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This is not to deny that there is any sense in which we are ‘lucky’. We are lucky we are 
not so risk averse, but there is nothing objectionable about that. Being lucky enough not 
to be moved by certain unfounded doubts and not to suspend one’s ordinary perceptual 
beliefs in their face is not an epistemic vice. It is an epistemic virtue since the beliefs one 
otherwise abandons are ones for which one has the best possible justification. This is not 
like running out into the middle o f the road, eyes-closed; it is like crossing having looked 
left, right, and left again. Since this is all we are required to do, we cannot be blamed for 
having done more.
At the same time, though, as the possibility o f psychological defeat makes clear we are 
not rationally obliged to be bold and to persist in our beliefs in the face o f doubt. It is an 
epistemic virtue, no doubt, to persist in the beliefs that one has justification for believing 
since that way lies knowledge. At the same time, however, to fail to be bold -  that is, to 
fail to believe all that one has justification for believing -  does not necessarily make one 
irrational.26 Extreme caution is an epistemic vice in some sense, but it is not a vice o f 
reason. It is more like being stuck on the wrong side o f the street when the shop one 
wants to get to is on the other side; we do not have to cross, it’s just a bit annoying.
I have claimed this is what makes room for the possibility o f subjects -  rational subjects -  
whose extreme caution prevents them knowing everything they might otherwise have 
known. The world is as manifest to them as it is to us. They simply choose not to take 
advantage o f it. This is not something perception can force them to do though. So our 
theory cannot be blamed for failing to do so. Given that is so, perceptual defeasibility
-6 If one persisted indefinitely o f  course, eyebrow might start to be raised.
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poses no threat at all to the view that perception genuinely makes the world manifest to
us.
I have now explained the sense in which perceptual justification is defeasible and 
explained why that is not a threat to my view. It does not make perceptual justification 
inferential, contra the Argument from Defeasibility. And it does not mean that perception 
isn’t a way in which the world is made manifest. So we can accept that perceptual 
justification is defeasible. This is something traditional foundationalists were much more 
reluctant to accept. In the rest o f this chapter I want to try and explain why that is so: how 
is it that something which I claim is perfectly acceptable could once have seemed so very 
unacceptable?
5. Historical Foundationalism Reconsidered
In the previous section I claimed that the world could be manifest to us in perception 
without our access to the world being similarly manifest, and that we could in 
consequence fail to know things about non-psychological reality that perception put us in 
a position to know. Traditionally, the same was thought not to be true o f psychological 
reality. Historical foundationalists, in particular, thought that the layout o f psychological 
reality could not rationally remain a mystery to us did we but properly attend to it. This is 
what Hume was getting at when he writes:
For since all actions and sensations o f the mind are known to us by consciousness, 
they must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they 
appear. Every thing that enters the mind, being in reality a perception, ‘tis
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impossible any thing shou’d to feeling appear different. This were to suppose, that 
even where we are most intimately conscious we might be mistaken. (Hume 
1978:190)
There is certainly something philosophically gripping about the idea that psychological 
reality is self-intimating in this way. Unlike the case o f non-psychological reality where 
we can appeal to the possibility of hallucination, say, there is no obvious explanation o f 
how the mental can ultimately remain hidden from view.
Suppose this is right. If  so, there is a difference between beliefs about psychological 
reality and beliefs about non-psychological reality after all, and a difference between 
traditional foundationalism and the more modest form o f foundationalism that I have 
defended. But the difference is not in whether or not the foundational beliefs are infallible 
as the Simple Reading would have us think. I have also claimed that the foundational 
beliefs are infallible, since beliefs about non-psychological reality are infallible where 
those beliefs are justified by perception. The difference is that traditional foundationalists 
thought that the foundational beliefs are indefeasible. They thought that these beliefs are 
incapable o f being rationally revised and unlike beliefs about non-psychological reality, 
only beliefs about psychological reality can plausibly be though enjoy that privilege.
I have already shown that traditional foundationalists were wrong to think that the 
foundational beliefs have to be indefeasible because I have already shown that beliefs 
about non-psychological reality can be both defeasible and non-inferential: such beliefs 
can provide acceptable stopping points in the regress of justification, despite the fact that
167
they are capable of being defeated. The interesting question is why these thinkers were so 
keen on indefeasibility in the first place. There are lots o f bad reasons for thinking that it 
matters -  the Argument from Defeasibility being one. But are there any good reasons for 
thinking that indefeasibility matters?
One reason is that we desire knowledge - that is, the freedom from ignorance and not just 
the freedom from error. The latter is easy: believe nothing and you certainly won’t be 
mistaken. But you w on’t know anything either and it is not an appealing epistemic policy 
for precisely that reason. As epistemic agents, we want our ignorance removed. It is a 
consequence o f my view, however, that we can fail to know things that perception 
genuinely puts us in a position to know. We can rationally remain ignorant of certain 
facts about non-psychological reality.
This is not a live option with indefeasibly justified beliefs. If the historical 
foundationalists are right there are no ‘ringers’ for inner perception to which we can 
plausibly appeal in making sense o f the possibility we might fail to know all that we are 
in a position to know. In the case of our own minds mistakes aren’t just impossible, they 
are inconceivable and any failure to believe must be a failure o f reason.
So it is clear why indefeasibility would be nice: it buys us a special sort o f security that I 
have claimed perception genuinely does not secure. Still, this is not a good reason for 
thinking that foundational beliefs must be indefeasible or for privileging beliefs about our 
own minds at the expense o f all others as the traditional foundationalists were lead to do.
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The price o f our absolute knowledge o f psychological reality turns out to be ignorance of 
non-psychological reality. This ought not to constitute a good bargain by anyone’s lights.
Moreover, while it might be desirable to know what we are in a position to know it is not 
an obligation: nice does not mean necessary, and sometimes all is not equal. I might be in 
a position to know that the pain in my leg is more like an itch than it is like a tickle. But 
there are more important things than that to worry about in epistemic life. In failing to 
know that, and focusing my attention on more important matters, I don’t do anything 
wrong from an epistemic point of view; I do something right.
A second reason for cleaving to a picture o f indefeasible foundations springs from 
‘intemalism’ o f a certain familiar sort. As we have seen it is a consequence of my view 
that I can see that I have hands without thereby knowing that I see that I have hands. So I 
can be in a position to know that I have hands, without knowing that I am in a position to 
know that I have hands. The world can be evident to me without my epistemic access to 
the world also being evident.
This strikes many philosophers as uncomfortably close to denying the so-called KK 
Principle that defines a familiar sort o f intemalism. The KK Principle says that if one 
knows that p, then one knows that one knows that p. But this principle is false: I can 
know that there are no typographical errors in my thesis because, having checked each 
page individually, I know of each that it contains no errors and so infer that the thesis as a 
whole contains no errors. Valid deductive reasoning from known premises is normally a
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way in which to extend our knowledge and there is no reason why this case should be an 
exception. So I can know that my thesis contains no errors. Still, I do not know that I 
know that it contains no errors. The fact that most documents that long do contain 
typographical errors may make it the case I do not believe that I know that it contains no 
errors; if  you were to ask me whether or not that is something I know I would in all 
likelihood deny that is so. Nonetheless, I might still believe it contains no errors and so 
might still know that it does. Much of our knowledge has this status -  this is how we 
establish that there are exceptions to rules we once thought were universal and it is hard 
to see how science could get by if that were not so.
Although the KK Principle is false it has residual philosophical appeal. Part o f that appeal 
derives from our tendency to over-assimilate the case o f beliefs and procedures or 
methods for arriving at beliefs. As we have seen beliefs require reasons. This is just the 
moral o f the regress argument: beliefs do not justify themselves. It is tempting to think 
the same must be true o f procedures or methods; to think that unless we have some 
positive assurance that we are correctly employing a given procedure we cannot acquire 
justification by relying on it, just as in the parallel case o f beliefs, they do not assume any 
positive epistemic standing merely in virtue o f being held or employed.
Some philosophers think that this is obviously true: Crispin Wright is a case in point. He 
writes of an analogous principle, which he calls the ‘Proper Execution Principle’ that “it 
is apt to impress as barely more than a platitude” (Wright 1991: 99). This principle claims 
that:
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If the acquisition o f warrant to believe a proposition depends on the proper 
execution o f some procedure, then executing the procedure cannot give you any 
stronger a warrant to believe the proposition in question than you have 
independently for believing that you have executed the procedure properly 
(Wright 1991: 99).
From this perspective defeasibly justified beliefs pose a problem. In the case of beliefs 
justified by perception we have seen that we do not automatically have any assurance that 
we are perceiving the world -  that we really do see that we have hands and do not merely 
seem to see them. How, then, can it be that one acquires justification for believing that 
one has hands? This can look like the merest good fortune -  a reckless, irresponsible 
gamble o f a sort we normally think incompatible with knowledge.
This is no doubt where the appeal of indefeasibility lies. If  a belief is indefeasibly 
justified we cannot rationally doubt whether or not it is well founded. In such case it isn’t 
just the world which is evident to us, so too is our epistemic access to the world. From the 
‘intemalistic’ perspective now being considered this alone can seem to provide the sort o f 
assurance that a properly responsible epistemic subject would demand.
But while this is where the appeal o f indefeasibility lies, it is also clear where the blame 
should lie. Though tempting, intemalism in this sense is hopeless and the analogy from 
which it springs a bad one. It is a bad analogy since beliefs aren’t in the final analysis 
anything like methods for forming them, any more than they are like their own absence. 
This is so because o f all the obvious differences between them: what is puzzling are not
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the differences, but how anyone could think otherwise.27 Beliefs are unusual in more 
respects than one and there is simply no good reason to think they are central in the way 
this line o f thought suggests or that they provide a useful paradigm upon which other 
epistemological categories can all be modelled.
One difference concerns the need for prior vindication. In the case o f a ‘procedure’ like 
perception we do not require independent reasons to believe that we are perceiving before 
we can acquire the knowledge that perception vouchsafes for us. This fact is just as basic 
a fact about justification as they get. The same need not apply equally or without 
qualification to all methods. Perhaps clairvoyance or wishful thinking (could we but 
regard them as procedures for finding out about the world) would require such 
certification in order for the beliefs they deliver to be ones for which we have good 
reasons. However, this has less to do with ‘procedures’ in general and more to do with 
the specific nature o f clairvoyance or wishful thinking and the fact that it is not really 
intelligible that the justification they deliver is anything other than inferential. 
Clairvoyance only gives us reasons insofar as we have some independent assurance that 
our clairvoyant powers are reliable or are properly functioning -  that is how we make 
sense o f it as a way o f finding out about the world at all.
This is fundamentally different from what I have claimed is true o f perception. If I am 
right, perception offers us a fundamentally different model o f what it is - at the most
27 Most obviously, only belief is an attitude. I am certainly not claiming one can be justified in believing  
one can rely on a method in the absence o f  reasons. I am merely claim ing that one can rely on it in the 
absence o f  such reasons.
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basic level - to have reasons for one’s beliefs. And if we have reasons for our perceptual 
beliefs what more could we possibly require?
This is not to deny that we ever want more, or even that more is impossible to get. We 
can and sometimes do have reasons for believing that we are not being deceived in 
certain ways. My point is merely that such assurance is not an indispensable part of what 
it is to have perceptual justification in the first place: it is additional assurance. Moreover, 
where we do know that we are not being deceived, that knowledge is not basic 
knowledge: if  we know that we are not hallucinating, it is not because it is evident to us 
that we are not hallucinating in the way in which my hands are evident to me when I see 
them. If we know that w e’re not hallucinating or being deceived it is on the basis o f other 
things that we know.
A foundationalist can hardly object to that. The starting point for that position was the 
idea that there are two fundamentally different sources o f knowledge or justification: 
there is what we know because o f what we are presented with via sources such as 
perception; and there is what we know via inferences from that knowledge - things 
which, while not themselves evident, are knowable on the basis o f what is evident. My 
view places the knowledge that we are perceiving -  that is, knowledge about our 
epistemic access to the world -  at the second level. It does not place it out o f reach 
altogether.
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This makes room for the possibility o f a certain sort o f self-vindication as far as 
perception goes. If you do not need independent reasons to believe that you are not 
hallucinating in order to acquire the perceptual knowledge that there is a hand before you 
then you can establish that you are not hallucinating by inferring that you are not 
hallucinating from what you know on the basis o f perception, since you can reason that 
‘if that is a hand, then I cannot be hallucinating, and that is a hand; so, I cannot be 
hallucinating’. This gives us a different way of holding onto the KK principle latterly 
rejected since this argument (or one just like it) is, in principle, available to anyone in 
possession o f ordinary perceptual knowledge. Thus, even if we do not always have 
independent assurance that we are not hallucinating (as proponents o f this principle 
presumably always wanted) assurance is in a sense always available.
Many philosophers reject the idea that any source o f knowledge can vindicate itself in 
this way. It is certainly not something we leave room for in the case o f beliefs and there 
is, admittedly, something artificial about such arguments. It misrepresents the situation 
we are in to suppose the first time that any of us comes to know such things as that we are 
perceiving (or that ‘the external world exists’) is when, as philosophy undergraduates, we 
run through ‘M oorean’ arguments such as these. But if  what I have said is right, the 
possibility o f self-vindication is one that we must learn to live -  at least in the case o f 
perception. Indeed, if  what I have said is right, it is what makes room for the possibility 
of any sort o f vindication at all. Those philosophers who reject it and cling to KK are
7 Otherefore hankering after something they simply cannot have.
:8 1 am not denying that my opponent has arguments in favour o f  the alternative view; I am denying that he 
has good arguments. For Wright’s own response to the problem he raises, see (Wright: 1991; and
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6. Indefeasibility and the Mental
Up until now I have pretended to go along with the traditional foundationalist and have 
assumed that there is a significant asymmetry between beliefs about psychological reality 
and beliefs about non-psychological reality with respect to their defeasibility. I have 
conceded that indefeasibility would be nice if  we could get it, but claimed there is no 
reason to think the fact that we can’t has the unfortunate epistemic consequences the 
traditional foundationalists suspected. Perceptual justification is defeasible, but it is still 
non-inferential and perception is still a way in which the layout o f reality is made 
manifest. This should be enough. Indeed it is enough for our purposes. But there will 
always be those greedy souls who think we should be able to have our cake and eat it -  
every last crumb. So I want to end by encouraging a little optimism among the 
avaricious.
To see why optimism might be warranted on this front recall that the basis o f my claim 
that perceptual justification is defeasible was the idea that we cannot always tell whether 
or not w'e are perceiving. I can see that I have hands and yet rationally refrain from 
believing that I have hands, since it is not evident to me that I see that I have hands. But 
whether or not I see that I have hands is arguably part o f psychological reality. Seeing 
that I have hands is a psychological state I may or may not be in. So if I cannot, by 
introspection alone, determine whether or not I am in it, I cannot determine by 
introspection alone all there is to know about the layout o f psychological reality. I can
previously 1985). For a more recent response, in some ways similar to Wright’s, see (Zalabardo, 
forthcoming).
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rationally refrain from believing something that is true about psychological reality, and 
hence that reality cannot force itself upon the rational subject in the way that Hume and 
others thought. In principle we can remain as ignorant o f certain aspects o f our own 
minds as we can o f the world outside our minds.29
This suggests a more radical conclusion since in HANDS I am not merely ignorant o f a 
fact about psychological reality that I am genuinely in a position to know via 
introspection. I don’t just refrain from judging something I have introspective reasons for 
judging. In this case I cannot know by introspection alone whether I genuinely do see that 
p, or just seem to see that p. So if that is a psychological fact about me, then introspection 
alone is not in a position to tell me all the psychological facts, even in the most 
favourable circumstances -  let alone, as traditional foundationalists supposed, all the 
facts tout court.30
Ironically, then, the mental may turn out to be much more hidden from view than the rest 
o f reality. And for any o f  us who have ever tried ‘introspecting’ that, I suggest, ought not 
to come as much o f a surprise.31
O f course there might be other reasons to doubt that beliefs about psychological reality are indefeasible. 
It is hard to put limits on which beliefs philosophical reflection can lead us rationally to revise: perhaps a 
clever article in Mind persuades me that the mental is not luminous, and I revise some o f  my psychological 
self-ascriptions on that grounds.
'° Clearly, a traditional foundationalist may question whether that is a psychological fact about me. That 
introduces difficult issues about the scope o f  the mental which I cannot here hope to resolve.
31 This is compatible with the idea there are some facts about the mind which we cannot doubt; pain is often 
brought forward in this regard. In contrast, all o f  our beliefs about non-psychological beliefs may be 
thought to be revisable in principle. My claim is merely that some claims about our own minds are also 
rationally revisable. So even if  there is an asymmetry, it is not the one the traditional foundationalists 
insisted upon.
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7. Conclusion
According to the literature, traditional foundationalists were driven by the desire to find 
foundations for our knowledge that are infallible. I have found such foundations but not 
in the place the traditional foundationalists locates them. Unlike the existing literature 
though, I have argued that traditional foundationalists were ultimately motivated by a 
different ideal -  an ideal that perception genuinely does not secure. This is the ideal of 
total transparency -  that is, transparency both in the world and in our epistemic access to 
it -  or what, following Williamson we might call the ideal o f luminosity (Williamson 
2000: esp. Ch. 4). This idea has deep roots in the history of philosophy and it is an idea 
with continuing appeal. Given what I have been arguing in this chapter though, it is not 
an ideal that we can or should seek out at the expense o f all others. If  what I have been 
saying is right, our access to the world is often much more straightforward and 
unproblematic than our access to our access to the world. If that were not so, 
epistemology would be as easy as deciding whether or not we have hands.
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL 
CHAPTER 5: THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION
1. Introduction
In this thesis I have claimed that a foundationalist is someone who thinks that (a) some of 
our beliefs must be non-inferentially justified; (b) perception is a distinctive source o f 
non-inferential justification; and (c) perception is a basic source o f such justification. In 
chapter 1 I defended (a) and in chapters 2, 3, and 4 , 1 defended (b). What about (c)? What 
does it even mean to say that perception is a ‘basic’ source o f epistemic justification and 
why should anyone think that this is true?
In this chapter I am going to give you an account o f the sense in which it is true. I will 
argue that perception is basic in exactly the sense in which a foundationalist must think 
that it’s basic. In other words, I’m going to argue that the things you have to think to be a 
foundationalist are the things that are actually true.
A different question is why (c) matters. I think it matters for two reasons. The first is 
historical. I have claimed that foundationalism is a label with a partly historical basis. 
Doing justice to that position means trying to do justice to what particular thinkers 
actually thought, and it is undeniable that foundationalists have always thought that 
perception is a special source of justification with a privileged role in yielding us 
knowledge o f the world.
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(c) also matters because it is part o f what make foundationalism a philosophically 
interesting position and distinguishes it from its rivals. Clearly (a) and (b) also do 
important work on this front; a coherentist can perhaps agree that some o f our beliefs are 
non-inferentially justified as (a) claims, but coherentists do not think that perception is a 
source o f non-inferential justification. They think that all justification derives from the 
fact one’s beliefs belong to a coherent set o f beliefs. This is not a view on which there is 
such a thing as distinctively perceptual justification as (b) claims. On my account 
coherentism therefore does not qualify as a version o f foundationalism and that is at it 
should be.
While (a) and (b) rule out some philosophical alternatives to foundationalism, they do not 
exclude them all. Consider reliabilism: someone like Goldman could certainly accept 
both (a) and (b). But do we really want to say that reliabilism is a form of 
foundationalism? No doubt this is less obviously objectionable than suggesting that 
Davidson is a foundationalist, but it is still somewhat unsatisfying. Reliabilism 
fundamentally has little in common with those positions historically called 
foundationalist and it is hard to believe that w e’re not losing sight o f something important 
by obscuring these differences. This is also part o f the point o f (c).
Ideally, then, (c) will enable us to hold onto what is distinctive about foundationalism in 
contrast to positions like reliabilism and preserve what is true about it in contrast to its 
rivals. Showing how we can achieve both o f these aims is the purpose o f this chapter.
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So far I’ve claimed that (c) perception is a basic source o f justification. What I mean by 
this is that the knowledge it grounds is special in relation to other kinds o f knowledge. 
For this reason I’ll sometimes refer to (c) as the view that perception is a ‘basic source of 
knowledge’ or an ‘epistemically basic’ source, but nothing important turns upon these 
differences. However, there are different ways o f understanding the idea that perception 
is ‘basic’ in any o f these senses and important things do turn on these differences.
Some people take that claim in an incredibly strong way. They think that what it means to 
say that perception is ‘basic’ is that perception is privileged in relation to all other 
sources. To this end, perception is held to be: (i) the only source o f concepts; (ii) the only 
source o f non-inferential justification; or (iii) the only generative epistemic source.
The first thing to notice about each of these claims is that they are not very plausible. 
There are non-perceptual sources o f concepts, there are non-perceptual sources o f non- 
inferential justification, and there are even non-perceptual epistemic sources that are 
generative; sources like ‘reason’ and introspection come to mind in this connection. The 
second thing to notice about these uniqueness claims is that they are unnecessarily strong. 
For a start, they are not claims to which the traditional foundationalists were committed. 
Further, they are not claims to which I am committed. I have only claimed that perception 
is a basic source, and this does not commit me to the view that it is ‘the’ basic source, or 
privileged in relation to all others. This is not to deny that the stronger claim has in each
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case had exponents, but in this chapter I will argue that these claims are not defensible. 
Perception isn’t basic in any o f the senses described by (i), (ii), and (iii).
Although this is not a problem for the foundationalist it does raise the following 
important question: in what sense is perception basic? In this chapter I will suggest that 
the fundamental contrast is not between perception and all other epistemic sources, but 
between perception on the one hand, and memory and testimony on the other hand. When 
philosophers talk about where empirical knowledge o f the world comes from these are 
the three sources they typically identify. So what I am saying, and what I think 
foundationalists are saying when they say that perception is ‘basic’, is that these three 
sources are not all on a par and that perception is privileged in relation to the other two. 
These are the sources I will be focusing on in this chapter, and when I talk about 
perception as a basic source what I mean, unless otherwise stated, is that it is basic in 
relation to memory and testimony.
Even if we confine our attention to these three sources it is still not plausible that 
perception is the only source o f concepts, or the only source o f non-inferential 
justification. I will argue that memory and testimony are not secondary in these respects. 
But what is plausible is that perception is the only one o f these three sources that is truly 
generative. This is the reading o f (c) that I am going to defend. I think that’s a very 
intuitive view. It is one that seemed obvious to traditional foundationalists. However, it 
has seemed far from obvious to some recent commentators. In a series o f influential
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articles Jennifer Lackey has argued that memory and testimony are also generative. One 
thing that I will be doing in this chapter is showing why Lackey is mistaken.
Showing that perception is special relative to memory and testimony is a way of showing 
that perception is a basic epistemic source and that is all I’ve taken foundationalists to be 
saying. It might be tempting to go on to claim that perception is the only generative 
epistemic source and that it is therefore not just a basic source but the basic generative 
source. I don’t want to go that far. Like the traditional foundationalists I don’t want to 
rule out the possibility that reason and introspection are also generative sources. Nor do I 
want to say that reason and introspection are just forms o f perception as some empiricists 
have claimed.
This is why my claim is only that perception is ‘a’ basic source. It’s worth noticing, 
however, that while reason and introspection might be generative sources, the knowledge 
that they generate is in the one case ‘a priori’ knowledge, and in the other case ‘self- 
knowledge’. So if  you were interested in arguing for a uniqueness thesis you could 
maintain that perception is the only generative source o f non-inferential empirical 
knowledge of non-psychological reality. I am perfectly happy with this claim, though it is 
a bit o f a mouthful. My point is merely that we shouldn’t abbreviate it by saying that 
perception is the only generative epistemic source, period. This would be to ignore a 
priori knowledge and self-knowledge and so is either false or, at best, misleading.
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Since my official formulation o f  (c) is that perception is a basic source o f non-inferential 
knowledge or justification, a real threat to my position would be one that identifies 
another source (i.e. a source other than perception, memory or testimony) that is also a 
generative source o f non-inferential empirical knowledge o f non-psychological reality. In 
this thesis I have taken it that there are no such sources. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption. Barry Stroud makes a similar point in the following passage.
W hat happens in the case o f the external world is that we want to understand how 
any propositions about an independent world are known to be true by anyone. But 
we must explain that knowledge in the light o f other facts about human beings 
which we feel we cannot deny: in particular, that human beings get their 
knowledge o f  the world somehow from sense perception - ‘either from the senses 
or thorough the senses’, as Descartes put it. No divine messages from on high, no 
extra-sensory access to things around us, are to be assumed to be at work. So far, 
that is sim ply a very general ‘anthropological’ fact about the human condition. 
The question is how knowledge of the world is possible in the light o f that fact 
(Stroud 2000:128-9).
Notice, like Stroud, I am not claiming that there couldn’t be other sources relevantly like 
perception in their ability to generate knowledge. When presented with putative examples 
like extra sensory perception, clairvoyance, or telepathy, the foundationalist has to think 
as hard as anyone else about what to say about them. But foundationalism also has 
descriptive aims; it aims to describe the structure and sources o f human knowledge as we 
know it. If that is right then it is simply irrelevant adverting to sources that do not exist.
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This all concerns the reading o f (c) which I want to defend. Before we get that far we 
need to know why the other readings are no good.
2. Concept Empiricism
The first thesis that I am going to discuss claims that perception is privileged because of 
the special role that it plays in furnishing us with concepts. What sort o f role is that? One 
reading has it that perception is special because it is a source o f concepts. This is 
undoubtedly true, and without concepts we couldn’t so much as frame the thoughts 
necessary for knowing. So this thesis bears an intelligible relation to the idea that 
perception is a basic source o f knowledge. Yet it’s hard to believe this is what the 
foundationalist has in mind in claiming that perception is basic. This reading leaves it 
open that there are lots o f other sources o f concepts and that sits oddly next to the 
traditional idea that perception enjoys a special privilege in relation to the rest. Moreover, 
it’s hard to find people who disagree with the very weak claim that perception is a source 
of concepts; so it is hard to see it as a distinctively foundationalist commitment.
A stronger reading would claim that perception is the only source o f concepts. Locke and 
the 18th century British Empiricists were famous for thinking that ‘experience’ was the 
source o f all concepts, and they were certainly foundationalists.1 While this reading has 
more bite, it suffers from the defect of being false. It is not true that for a subject to have 
acquired the concept o f an F, she must have previously perceived F’s. She may have
1 Strictly speaking, that is not equivalent to my claim that ‘perception’ is the source o f  all concepts, since 
by ‘experience’ Locke meant to include both sensation and reflection. Nonetheless, reflection was held to 
be a form o f  ‘inner perception’ - in all respects just like ‘external sense’ but directed inwards at the mind’s 
own ideas and operations (Locke 1975: Bk. 2 Ch. 1).
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acquired that concept from someone else and that does not in general require her to have 
perceived instances o f the concept.2 This is how a great many o f our concepts are in fact 
acquired: I acquired the concept electron in science lessons, not by perceiving electrons.
We might try claiming that, even so, the person from whom I acquired the concept must 
have perceived instances of the concept, so that perception explains how the concept 
came into being, even if  not the history o f  any given individual’s acquisition of it. Or we 
might try claiming that the concept electron is a ‘complex’ concept composed o f simpler 
concepts which are ultimately derived from perception, as the empiricists themselves 
claimed.3 But even if  we revise the original thesis in this way and thereby render it more 
plausible (and that seems doubtful in the electron case) it would not in the end help save 
it as a gloss on what is distinctive about foundationalism.
The reason is that the thesis that perception, broadly conceived, is the only source of 
concepts is the defining thesis o f concept empiricism. Yet concept empiricism and 
foundationalism are not the same thing; foundationalism is a thesis about knowledge or 
justification, not about the origin o f concepts. Concept empiricism may or may not be 
true, but one can be a concept empiricist without being a foundationalist, and one can be
" 1 am assuming that similar objections could be raised against proposals that do not require the subject to 
have previously perceived an instance o f  the relevant concept, but under which she has still acquired the 
concept by means o f  perception. That may not hold true if  one is sufficiently liberal about what it is to have 
acquired a concept ‘by means o f  perception. But then the proposal ceases to be interesting since it is one 
that most people will endorse.
1 Empiricists like Locke and Hume thought there could be complex ideas which were not directly derived
from perception. Nonetheless, these ideas had to be composed o f  simple ideas which were derived from 
perception: in H um e’s terms, simple ideas are ‘copies o f  im pressions’ (Hume 1978: Bk. 1 Part 1 sec. 1).
It’s not obvious that electron is a complex concept in this sense. And simple ideas needn’t be copies o f  
impressions in any case: that is the point o f  Hum e ‘missing shade o f  b lue’ (Hume 1975: 16).
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a foundationalist without being a concept empiricist, regardless of how many 
foundationalists may, in fact, have been concept empiricists 4
Moreover, concept empiricism only promises to show that perception is an enabling 
condition for knowledge. If perception is the source o f all concepts, and there can be no 
knowledge without concepts, then there can be no knowledge without perception. This 
does not show that perception is a basic source o f knowledge or justification. Indeed, it 
does not show that perception is the source o f any o f our knowledge. This is surely not 
what foundationalists are trying to capture when they claim that perception is basic.
I will come back to the distinction between sources and enabling conditions later; we will 
see that it is significant.5 The important point to take from the discussion at this stage is 
that concept empiricism simply casts too wide a net to be useful in delineating the 
essential nature o f  foundationalism.
3. Basic Knowledge
The second thesis that I will be discussing claims that perception is basic because only 
perception is capable o f giving us non-inferential justification. It is basic because it alone 
gives us so-called ‘basic knowledge’. Is that true and do you need to think it’s true to be a 
foundationalist? I will argue that it is false and that perception is not the only source of 
non-inferential justification. It’s a good job therefore that you don’t need to think this in
4 •Empiricism’ is often used as a label for both doctrines so the confusion is perhaps not surprising. The 
important point is that foundationalism is distinct from empiricism - conceived o f  as a doctrine about 
concepts. In fact, it is perfectly compatible with so-called ‘nativism’ about concepts.
5 For a good discussion o f  this distinction see (Cassam 2007: 16-22)
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order to be a foundationalist. You would think it was necessary given a commitment to 
certain prior assumptions, but those are assumptions that we have no good reason to 
accept. Or so I will now argue.
I just said it is false that perception is the only source of non-inferential justification. Why 
is that? The obvious answer is that there are counter-examples to that claim. Consider 
remembering that you had toast for breakfast this morning. This can justify you in 
believing that you had toast for breakfast this morning. Yet remembering that you had 
toast for breakfast this morning is not a belief and nor is it something which needs to be 
believed to do its justifying work. So remembering that you had toast for breakfast this 
morning can be a source o f non-inferential justification; it can justify you in believing 
that you had toast for breakfast, without that beliefs necessarily drawing its justification 
from other justified beliefs. This is a counter-example to the claim that perception is the 
only source o f such justification, since remembering that you had toast for breakfast this 
morning is not the same as perceiving that you had toast for breakfast this morning.
Here is another counter-example: suppose I believe that it is 3pm because you have told 
me that it is 3pm. Your having told me that it is 3pm can be what justifies me in believing 
that its 3pm, despite the fact that your having told me that it is 3pm is not a belief. So 
testimony is another source o f non-inferential justification. Again, we see that it is false 
that perception is the only source o f non-inferential justification.
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These remarks are not intended to foreclose all debate. Some will insist that memory and 
testimony are not really capable of giving us non-inferential grounds for believing things 
-  not if  we look closer.6 That may be so. My point is merely that it’s prima facie plausible 
to think they do give us such grounds and there is no reason to saddle the foundationalist 
with prima facie implausible commitments, all else being equal. Things would be 
different if  we were already convinced that this was the only way to spell out the claim 
that perception is basic so that a foundationalist really must deny that memory and 
testimony cannot also be sources of basic knowledge. But there is no reason to think this 
is so; w e’re about to see that there are at least two further ways in which to understand 
the claim that perception is basic.
I just said there is no reason for a foundationalist to reject the claim now being made 
about memory and testimony. In fact, this is a claim they have good reasons to accept. 
We saw earlier that it’s reflection upon ordinary, commonsense examples which first 
motivates the claim that perception is a source of non-inferential justification. So if 
reflection also suggests that memory and testimony may furnish us with such grounds, 
why not once again take reflection at face value?7
Moreover, a foundationalist has much to gain by thinking that memory and testimony can 
be sources of non-inferential justification. The foundationalist wants to account for the
(> Even some people, who agree with me about perceptual justification, think that is so: James van Cleve is a 
i2,ood example o f  som eone who thinks the case o f  testimony is relevantly different (van Cleve 2006).
The epistemic regress argument merely tells us that some o f  our beliefs must be non-inferentially 
justified, so there must be sources o f  such justification. That doesn’t tell us anything about which beliefs 
are non-inferentially justified or what the sources o f  such justification are. For an answer to that question 
we must look to examples.
188
justification of all our beliefs. If memory and testimony-based beliefs cannot be non-
inferentially justified then they cannot figure amongst the foundations o f our knowledge.
Is it really plausible to suppose we can reconstruct all the rest o f our knowledge if the
foundations are as limited as this response suggests? Many have thought not. In contrast,
if such beliefs can themselves figure amongst the foundations then the chances of
affecting a successful reconstruction look correspondingly better.8 This advantage is not
to be sniffed at. To fail adequately to explain what justifies all o f  our beliefs is to land up
*
being overly sceptical about the extent o f our knowledge. And such scepticism removes 
any reason we have to look favourably upon foundationalism in the first place.
I just said there is no reason for a foundationalist to deny that memory and testimony give 
us non-inferential justification for believing. This is not quite right; there is at least one 
reason, but it depends upon an assumption that we looked at in chapter 2 and previously 
found wanting. The Propositional Assumption claims the foundationalist must divide up 
beliefs into the inferentially and non-inferentially justified just on the basis of their 
propositional content or subject-matter so that if  belief in a given proposition ever counts 
as non-inferentially justified, it always counts as non-inferentially justified. On this 
picture, it is propositions which are or aren’t ‘foundational’.
This is specifically problematic when memory and testimony are taken into account, 
since virtually any proposition can be held on their basis. So if  propositions held on the 
basis of memory and testimony count as being non-inferentially justified, there will be no 
limit to the number o f propositions which count as being justified in this way. This would
8 Even traditional foundationalists saw this (Lewis 1946: 336).
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be to abandon the foundationalist’s idea that what is non-inferentially justified constitutes 
a privileged subset -  the ‘foundations’ upon which everything else rests. On this picture 
there is simply too little left for the foundations to support. Pollock and Cruz raise 
precisely that worry in connection with memory. They write:
The only way the foundationalist can allow that the process o f remembering can 
confer justification on a belief is by supposing that memory provides us with 
epistemologically basic beliefs. It is important to realize that what is remembered 
can be a proposition of any sort at all. Sometimes there is a temptation to suppose 
that we can only remember facts about the past, but memory is just the process o f 
retrieving stored information, and that information can be o f any sort. For 
example, I can remember that 4+7=11. This is a timeless truth. I can remember 
general truths e.g., that birds fly. And I can even remember facts about the future, 
such as that there will not be another solar eclipse in North America until 2032. 
By definition, epistemologically basic beliefs comprise a privileged subclass of 
the set o f all possible beliefs, so it cannot be true that the proposition remembered 
is always epistemologically basic. (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 47).9
This would be a principled reason for a foundationalist to deny that memory and 
testimony can be sources o f non-inferential justification, assuming they had reason to 
accept the Propositional Assumption. This is clearly what Pollock and Cruz are assuming. 
They write:
9 In a similar vein they later write: “There would be no epistem ologically basic beliefs if  this principle were 
true. The result would be a coherence theory rather than a foundations theory, because an essential claim o f  
a foundations theory is that the epistemologically basic beliefs form a privileged subset o f  beliefs on the 
basis o f  which other beliefs are justified” (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 60).
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Justification is a logical property o f propositions. A proposition cannot have such 
a property at one time and fail to have it at another (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 61). 
However, this is an assumption we have no reason to accept. We saw earlier that even the 
most traditional forms o f foundationalism, which hold that only beliefs about one’s own 
psychological states are non-inferentially justified, do not endorse the Propositional 
Assumption. What is important in determining whether or not a belief is inferentially or 
non-inferentially justified are the grounds upon which that belief is held. There is no 
reason to think we can, or must, determine what grounds a belief is actually held upon, 
just by looking at its propositional content.
The point here is really very simple: one and the same proposition can be believed on a 
variety o f different grounds. Testimony is just a particularly vivid illustration of this 
point, but even beliefs about one’s own psychological states can in principle be held on 
more than one basis. Given that that’s so we cannot hope to settle the question of whether 
or not a belief is non-inferentially justified just on the basis o f the propositions 
involved.10 We cannot even look to canonical grounds, or grounds upon which such 
propositions tend to be held. We need to look to actual grounds.11 This is to abandon the 
Propositional Assumption and with it any remaining reason to think that memory and 
testimony-based beliefs are problematic in principle for the foundationalist.12
Iu Perhaps things would be different if  such beliefs were justified in virtue o f  their content, but as we saw  
earlier they are not.
11 Traditional foundationalists may have thought we never do  hold b elief about our own minds on grounds 
other than observation: why would we, if  such grounds are always available? This doesn’t change the fact 
that we can hold them on other grounds or, therefore, that it isn’t their actual grounds (and not their 
content) which is important in explaining why they are justified.
12 O f course, a foundationalist may have specific epistemological views about memory and testimony 
according to which they turn out not to be non-inferential sources o f  justification. Still, this is not a
191
4. Generating Knowledge
The third reading that I am going to look at claims that perception is basic because it is 
the only ‘generative’ source o f knowledge. A generative source o f knowledge is one that 
increases our overall stock o f knowledge: it increases the number o f propositions which 
are actually known and not merely the number o f individuals who know them, or the 
number o f different ways in which those propositions are known. The traditional view 
about memory and testimony is that they are not generative sources o f knowledge. 
Memory merely ‘preserves’ knowledge from one time to another, while testimony 
‘transmits’ knowledge from one subject to another. Crucially, neither is thought to be 
capable o f generating knowledge in the first place; both rely upon some other source’s 
previously having done so. Let’s call this the traditional view o f memory and testimony.
Robert Audi describes this view as follows:
Just as we cannot know that p from memory unless we have come to know it in 
another way, say through perception, we cannot know that p on the basis o f 
testimony unless the attester...has come to know it (at least in part) in another 
w ay...M em ory and testimony...are not generative with respect to knowledge: 
characteristically, the former is preservative, the latter transmissive (Audi 1997: 
410 ) .13
principled reason why a foundationalist, per se, ought to think that such sources do not yield such 
justification.
13 Indeed, Audi claim s the fact they don’t generate knowledge is “the most important thing that memory 
and testimony have in com m on” (Audi 2006:44). Similarly, Michael Dummett writes “Memory is not a 
source, still less a ground, o f  knowledge: it is the maintenance o f  knowledge formerly acquired by 
whatever means” Dummett (1994: 262).
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The same is not true o f perception. In order for Ann to know that the squirrel is on the 
fence by means of perception, it is not necessary that Ann (or anyone else) already knows 
that the squirrel is on the fence; nor, a fortiori, is it necessary that Ann (or anyone else) 
knows that the squirrel is on the fence via a source other than perception. This is a way of 
making the obvious point that perception is a way in which things first come to be 
known; it is capable o f generating new knowledge in a way in which memory and 
testimony are commonly held not to be.
The third reading claims that perception is unique in this respect. It claims that perception 
is the only one o f these three sources that is a truly generative source o f knowledge and 
that is why it is basic. This is the reading o f (c) that I am going to defend. To traditional 
foundationalists it seemed obvious that perception was privileged in this respect and it is 
certainly a very natural view. However, it is one that has recently come under attack. In a 
series o f influential articles Jennifer Lackey has argued that it is false that perception is 
the only generative source o f  knowledge. Moreover it is false not just because, as we 
conceded in the introduction to this chapter, there are non-empirical sources of 
knowledge that are also generative. Rather, it is false because the traditional view about 
memory and testimony is false. According to Lackey, they are also generative sources of 
knowledge; they can also create new knowledge, even if they frequently do not.14 
Defending (c) requires showing this is false and that is the purpose o f the rest o f this 
section.
14 In fact, Lackey claim s more. She thinks the examples can also be framed in terms o f  ‘justified’ or 
'rational’ b e lie f  and hence that they promise to show that memory and testimony are not generative 
epistemic sources, more broadly speaking. This is also something that was also traditionally denied 
(Plantinga 1993: 61; Owens 2000: 156).
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I’m going to start with the case o f testimony since it is the more straightforward o f the
two cases. Here is Lackey’s first example:
Suppose that a Catholic elementary school requires that all teachers include 
sections on evolutionary theory in their science classes and that the teachers
conceal their own personal beliefs regarding this subject matter. Mrs Smith, a
teacher at the school in question, goes to the library, researches the literature from 
reliable sources, and on this basis develops a set o f reliable lecture notes from 
which she will teach the material to her students. Despite this, however, Mrs 
Smith is herself a devout creationist and hence does not believe that evolutionary 
theory is true, but she nonetheless follows the requirement to teach the theory to 
her students. Now assuming that evolutionary theory is true, in this case it seems 
reasonable to assume that Mrs Smith’s students can come to have knowledge via 
her testimony, despite the fact that she fails condition (ii) [the belief condition on 
knowledge] and hence does not have the knowledge in question herself. That is, it 
seems that she can give to her students what she does not herself have. For in 
spite o f Mrs Sm ith’s failure to believe and therewith to know the propositions she 
is reporting to her students about evolution, she is a reliable testifier for this 
information, and on the basis of her testimony it seems that the students in 
question can come to have knowledge o f evolutionary theory (Lackey 1999:477). 
Suppose we agree that the students in this example acquire knowledge they didn’t 
previously have and that they acquire it from someone who doesn’t themselves possess
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that knowledge viz. Mrs Smith.15 This is an attack on what I earlier called ‘the traditional 
view o f testimony’ -  the view that testimony is a transmission mechanism, and that a 
subject cannot transmit knowledge she does not possess. This is certainly how Audi 
presents the traditional view in the passage quoted above. He claims:
... we cannot know that p on the basis of testimony unless the attester.. .has come 
to know t (at least in part) in another way (Audi 1997: 410)
If Lackey’s example succeeds, this is false.
Still, Lackey’s example does not show that testimony can generate knowledge in the 
sense in which w e’re interested. It doesn’t show that testimony can increase the total 
number o f propositions that are known, as opposed to the number o f individuals who 
know them. Let ‘T ’ represent all the propositions about evolution, knowledge of which 
the students acquire. Lackey has certainly not described a case in which it was not known 
that T was true, it then comes to be known that T is true, and it comes to be known as a 
result o f testimony. That has no plausibility in this case; presumably nobody wants to say 
that T comes to be known for the first time as a result o f testimony. Darwin discovered 
that T was true by doing some empirical science and his results have subsequently been
Even this is less than obvious. We can acquire knowledge by listening to what other people say (“we can 
come to know via their testim ony” as Lackey likes to put it) without their testimony being the source o f  our 
knowledge. Other people can be mere ‘mouthpieces’: their words can give expression to the thoughts o f  
another and can make the other person’s knowledge available to us. Why think anything more is going on 
in Lackey’s example? In cases like this it is irrelevant whether or not the speaker knows. Indeed it’s not 
obvious the speaker must even understand what she says. Suppose Mrs Smith is ill and Elodie the French 
teacher steps in. Elodie d oesn ’t understand English, though she does a passable impression when she reads 
out material to the class from the books Mrs Smith left behind on her desk. In this case, the students also 
acquire knowledge and they acquire that knowledge by listening to Elodie. Such cases aren’t counter­
examples to the traditional view  o f  testimony: what testimony transmits is knowledge, but not every case in 
which we acquire know ledge by listening to x is a case in which x ’s testimony is itself the source o f  our 
knowledge.
195
passed on in a chain with the students at one end and him at the other. He certainly knew 
that T was true and his grounds were not testimonial.
So at most this example promises to show that we can acquire knowledge from other 
people even if  they do not themselves possess that knowledge, just as we can acquire 
shares in a company by relying on stockbrokers even if  the brokers do not themselves 
own those shares. The stockbroker acts an intermediary and the same is possible in the 
epistemic case. This doesn’t show that testimony can generate knowledge, any more than 
transfers on the stock market generate additional stock.
A more plausible example o f a case in which testimony generates knowledge is this one. 
Consider Norman, BonJour’s completely reliable clairvoyant: suppose Norman believes 
that Captain Molski will win the 3.30 as a result of his clairvoyant powers. Norman does 
not know that Captain Molski will win since, as we saw earlier, clairvoyance is not a 
source o f knowledge for the clairvoyant. But if  Norman tells me that Captain Molski will 
win and I happen to know that he formed this belief with his fully reliable clairvoyant 
powers then I will acquire knowledge that Captain Molski will win. Here, a proposition 
that genuinely was not known comes to be known and it comes to be known as a result o f 
testimony; that is, via N orm an’s having told me. So in this case testimony really is 
functioning as a generative source o f knowledge.
I hope you’ll agree that this case is more plausible than the last. Still, it is not terribly 
convincing. What is unconvincing in this case is the idea that Norman’s testimony is
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really the source o f my knowledge. In this case my belief that Captain Molski will win 
does not constitute knowledge just because Norman has told me that this is what is going 
to happen. It constitutes knowledge because (and only because) I know various facts 
about the provenance of Norman’s belief. Given that knowledge, I can use what Norman 
says to work out how things are in the world - in much the same way that we use 
instruments like thermometers. But in that case my knowledge is inferential, not 
testimonial. M y knowledge that Captain Molski will win derives from my knowledge that 
Norman is a clairvoyant and owes its epistemic credentials to that knowledge, just as a 
sailor’s knowledge that the water is shallow when he sees the lighthouse flashing owes its 
epistemic status to his knowledge that flashing lights mean shallow water.16
So we are still no closer to finding a case in which testimony itself generates knowledge. 
Lackey’s entire case therefore rests upon examples like this last one:
Jane is currently in the grips o f  sceptical worries that are so strong that she can 
scarcely be said to know anything at a ll.. .That is, her belief that she could now be 
the victim o f an evil demon is strong enough to defeat the justification she has for 
many o f her ordinary beliefs and moreover, it is currently an undefeated defeater. 
Jim, a passer-by, approaches her, asks her where the cafe is, and she reports that it 
is around the comer, but does not report her sceptical worries to Jim. Now Jim has 
never considered any sceptical possibilities at all, and hence he does not have any 
doxastic defeaters for his ordinary beliefs. Furthermore, he does have positive
16 Perhaps this is a case o f  testimonial knowledge in some suitably extended sense o f  ‘testim ony’. My 
knowledge does partly depends on Norm an’s having told me, just as the sailor’s knowledge partly depends 
on what he sees. N onetheless such cases do not represent the normal case and we should be sceptical about 
thinking they show anything substantive about the normal case. They certainly do not show that testimony 
can ordinarily generate knowledge by itself, where such background beliefs are absent.
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reasons for accepting Jane’s report, e.g., he has perceived a general conformity 
between facts and the reports o f many speakers in these types o f contexts and, he 
had inductively inferred that speakers are generally reliable when they are giving 
directions, and Jane does not indicate any behaviour which indicates a lack of 
sincerity or competence with respect to her report. So Jim forms the true belief 
that there is a cafe round the comer on the basis o f Jane’s testimony. Given that 
Jane has an undefeated defeater, which Jim does not have, he has knowledge, 
which she lacks. Yet at the say time it seems possible for Jim to come to know 
that the cafe is around the comer via Jane’s testimony even though her sceptical 
doubts currently undermine her knowing this...and thus it seems possible for a 
hearer to acquire knowledge on the basis o f a speaker’s testimony even when the 
speaker does not personally have the knowledge in question (Lackey 1999:484). 
The first thing to notice about this case is that it is like previous case in the following 
respect: Jim has justified beliefs on the basis of which he can infer that what the speaker 
says is likely to be true (whether or not he does infer that). If that is why Jim knows, then 
this is just another version o f the previous case and the same remarks apply to it. Jim may 
know, but his knowledge doesn’t really derive from testimony; it is inferential 
knowledge. Call this scenario 1.
However, we needn’t assume that Jim does rely upon those background beliefs. In this 
respect the case differs from the previous case: I only know that Captain Molski will win 
because I know that Nomian is a reliable clairvoyant. Jim on the other hand may just
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believe the shop is around the comer because Jane has told him and her testimony may 
accordingly be the source of his knowledge. Call this scenario 2.
Lackey does not clearly distinguish between scenarios 1 and 2. Only scenario 2 is 
relevant though, since only scenario 2 promises to show that testimony is capable o f 
generating new knowledge. So this is the important case to consider. Unfortunately, the 
case is completely implausible so construed. It is implausible either because (I) Jane does 
know and therefore passes on her own knowledge; or because (II) Jane does not know, 
but does not pass on any knowledge either. In neither case does Lackey have what she 
needs. (I) can be true either because belief is not a necessary condition for knowledge, 
thereby rendering Jane’s lack o f belief irrelevant; or because Jane does believe the shop is 
round the comer, whatever she says to the contrary.17 Both strike me as considerably 
more plausible than Lackey’s description. If you are convinced that Jane doesn’t know 
though, that still leaves option (II): Jane does not know, but does not pass on knowledge 
either. That is also more intuitive than Lackey’s own description. After all, if  Jane really 
doesn’t know where the shop is, why does she tell Jim it is round the comer? She is 
telling him something that, by her own lights, isn’t true and that sounds suspiciously like 
deception. Why, then, suppose that Jim acquires knowledge by listening to her?
Thus, Jane either does possess the knowledge she passes on; or she does not possess that 
knowledge, but does not pass it on either. In neither event do we have a case in which
17 One might think that the fact she tells Jim the shop is round the comer without intending to deceive him  
is evidence that she thinks precisely that. Moreover, it seems as if  she can believe that the shop is round the 
comer without necessarily believing things like the external world exists. In that sense her ‘scepticism ’ may 
be compatible with ordinary knowledge.
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testimony itself creates new knowledge, or therefore a counter-example to the claim that 
perception is the only generative source.
To summarise: I have argued that when you press hard on the point that it is the 
generation o f knowledge (and not whether or not a speaker must have knowledge in order 
to pass it on) which is relevant, the alleged counterexamples are either irrelevant or 
unconvincing. Hence, testimony is not a generative source o f knowledge and so is not a 
counter-example to the claim that perception is the only such source.
That still leaves the case o f memory. Is memory, at least, capable o f generating new 
knowledge? This case is more tricky. Let’s start by considering some examples from 
Lackey:
While an undergraduate in college, Nora was a very careful and epistemically 
reliable recipient o f testimony, with one notable exception: she was overly 
susceptible to peer pressure from two of her friends who belonged to a religious 
cult. After repeatedly hear them rant and rave about the corrupt minds of non­
believers she eventually became convinced that the testimony o f atheists is nearly 
completely unreliable. During this time, Nora had several conversations with 
Calvin, a fellow student in one o f her classes who, as a matter o f fact, was an 
extremely reliable source of information and whom she had every reason to 
believe was both competent and sincere with respect to his reports. Yet Nora also 
knew that Calvin was an atheist, and so she believed him to be a highly unreliable 
epistemic source. One day after class, they were discussing World War II and
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Calvin told Nora, much to her surprise that Hitler was raised a Christian. Being 
momentarily caught off guard, Nora found herself believing this proposition on 
the basis of Calvin’s otherwise epistemically flawless testimony. Now several 
years after graduating from college, Nora is no longer in touch with her friends 
who were members of the religious cult and she has ceased believing that the 
majority o f the testimony offered by atheists is highly unreliable - such a belief 
has simply faded from her memory. At the same time, however, she still believes 
on the basis o f memory dating back solely to Calvin’s testimony that Hitler was 
raised a Christian (Lackey 2005: 644-5).
What does this case show? Lackey takes it to show that the traditional view o f memory is 
false. It is false because this is a case in which a subject, Nora, first comes to know a 
proposition on the basis o f memory: the proposition that Hitler was raised a Christian. 
Nora didn’t know that Hitler was raised a Christian when she first acquired that belief 
due to the presence o f  relevant counter-beliefs (viz. her beliefs about the unreliability of 
atheists) and she cannot know that Hitler was raised a Christian as long as she has those 
beliefs. But since she no longer believes that atheists are unreliable, that belief no longer 
prevents her from having knowledge. So she now knows that Hitler was raised a 
Christian. Moreover, since she only continues to believe this on the basis o f a memory 
dating back to Calvin’s testimony, memory must be the source of her knowledge. So 
Nora now knows something on the basis o f memory that she did not know when she first 
acquired her belief. This is incompatible with the traditional view that memory is never 
capable of generating new knowledge.
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Here is Lackey’s second example:
Two days ago, Arthur was visiting his Aunt Lola and, while they were eating 
lunch she mentioned to him, without disclosing the source o f her information that 
the mayor o f their city had been caught accepting bribes in exchange for political 
favours. Arthur unhesitatingly formed the corresponding belief At the same time, 
however, there was a vast conspiracy on the part o f the mayor’s allies to protect 
his political reputation, and so they exploited their high-powered connections in 
the media to cover up this indiscretion. To this end they convinced all o f the 
major newspapers and television stations to report that the mayor’s political 
opponents had orchestrated a plan to win the upcoming election by falsely 
presenting him as having been the recipient of bribes. However, because both 
Arthur and Aunt Lola rarely pay attention to the news, they were entirely unaware 
o f all o f the stories surrounding the mayor. Thus unbeknownst to both Arthur and 
Aunt Lola, every major newspaper and television network was reporting that the 
mayor had not accepted bribes and was instead the victim o f a devious scheme at 
the very time that Arthur was forming the belief that the mayor had been the 
recipient o f bribes on the basis of Aunt Lola’s testimony. Now, as it turns out the 
mayor had in fact accepted bribes in exchange for political favours, all o f the 
reports to the contrary were false, Aunt Lola was not only a highly reliable source 
of information in general, but had also heard this news directly from the mayor’s 
epistemically reliable secretary, and Arthur’s true belief about the mayor was 
reliably formed. Since then and, once again, unbeknownst to Arthur and Aunt 
Lola, the scheme to cover up the mayor’s indiscretion has been exposed, and all
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of the major newspapers and televisions stations are now reporting that the mayor 
did accept political bribes. At the present time, then, there are no longer any vast 
amounts o f available evidence indicating that the mayor had been framed, 
Throughout all o f  this, Arthur has remained blissfully ignorant of all o f the 
relevant reports, and he currently continues or believe that the mayor was the 
recipient o f  bribes solely on the basis of remembering Aunt Lola’s original 
testimony (Lackey 2005: 640).
Again, Lackey takes this example to show that the traditional view o f memory is false. It 
is false because w hen Arthur first acquired his belief about the mayor he failed to acquire 
knowledge; Arthur did not initially know that the mayor had accepted bribes because o f 
the presence o f available counter-evidence, specifically, the newspaper and television 
reports to the contrary. Since that counter-evidence is no longer available, it no longer 
prevents Arthur from knowing that the mayor accepted bribes. So Arthur now knows this, 
despite the fact that he did not know this when he originally acquired a belief to that 
effect. Moreover, he now  knows this on the basis of memory, since he continues to 
believe the mayor accepted bribes solely on the basis of a memory dating back to his 
Aunt’s testimony. I f  this is right then the traditional view, that memory is never a 
generative source o f  knowledge, must be wrong.
What should we m ake o f  these examples? I think they are pretty unconvincing. What is 
unconvincing, specifically, is the claim that memory is the source o f the subject’s
i o
knowledge in these cases. Imagine asking how Nora knows that Hitler was raised a
18 This is not the only ground for doubt. It’s not obvious that Nora does come to know that Hitler was raised 
a Christian; or that Arthur didn’t know the mayor had accepted bribes all along. And if  the subjects did
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Christian. The obvious answer, surely, is: ‘because Calvin told her’. This, rather than 
memory, is the source of her knowledge. O f course, it is true that Nora did not know that 
Hitler was raised a Christian when Calvin first told her, but this does not mean his 
testimony cannot be the source of her later knowledge.
Exactly the same is true in Lackey’s second example. How does Arthur know that the 
mayor accepted bribes? Answer: because his Aunt told him. The fact he did not know this 
when he first acquired that information is irrelevant since it does not prevent that 
information being what explains how he later knows.
What I am claiming, in effect, is that the following makes perfectly good sense: a subject 
S now knows that p because in the past she was informed that p, even though (at that 
time) she did not know that p. Clearly Lackey thinks this does not make any sense; that is 
why she thinks memory must be the source of the subject’s knowledge. Later on, writing 
in her own defence, she claims:
A belief that was not known (or, in Case 2, justified or rational) when originally 
acquired became known (and, Case 2, justified/rational) at a later time without 
input or assistance from any other epistemic source besides memory. Thus, even 
though memory did not generate the belief in question, it generated the epistemic 
status o f the belief in question. And this is sufficient not only to falsify the 
[Preservation View of Memory], but also to conclude that memory has the 
capacity to function as a generative epistemic source (Lackey 2005: 649).
previously know (or do not now know) then these cases w on’t be counter-examples to the traditional view  
o f  memory. I suspect w e could develop Lackey’s stories either way.
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This is just a mistake. If I am right, testimony can be the source of the subject’s 
knowledge in these cases. So there is no pressure to look for an alternative source.
Certainly, this sounds better to my ear than claiming that memory is the source of Nora 
and A rthur’s knowledge. In these cases memory contributes absolutely nothing in its own 
right. It merely preserves a belief for long enough that other factors cease to be relevant. 
This is surely not enough to warrant claiming that it ‘generates’ the knowledge in 
question. The natural thing to say is that the source o f the subject’s knowledge in these 
cases is the source of her earlier information and in these cases that source is testimony 
not memory.19
Lackey’s own examples thus fail to show that memory is a generative source of 
knowledge since in the cases that she describes it is not the source o f the subject’s 
knowledge at all. But I think there are better examples. Suppose I get in late from work 
and absent-mindedly put my keys down on the sideboard before going up to bed. The 
next morning, wanting to leave the house, I start hunting around for my keys. Where are 
they I wonder? I try to think back to where I might have put them - mentally retracing my 
steps in memory - and then I remember: I put them on the sideboard.
19 If a subject can know that p because she was in the past informed that p (despite not then knowing that 
p), then her being informed that p does not entail that she knows that p. This doesn’t mean the fact she was 
informed can’t ever explain how S knows that p, or therefore that it cannot ever be the source o f  her 
knowledge. Throwing a brick at a glass window does not entail it will smash; that doesn’t mean it never 
explains why it does. So i f  that is Lackey’s worry then it is unfounded. Naturally, when S has been 
informed that p and still fails to know that p, we expect there to be some explanation o f  why that is so. But 
there is an explanation o f  why the subjects don’t acquire knowledge in Lackey’s examples: Lola believes 
that atheists are unreliable, and Arthur is in the midst o f  a political conspiracy. These factors prevent Arthur 
and Lola acquiring the knowledge they might otherwise have had and this is precisely why, when those 
obstacles later disappear, they do acquire the knowledge that previously was closed to them. In both cases, 
their beliefs must be preserved in memory, but that does not make memory the source o f  their knowledge.
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In this case it certainly sounds less odd to say that memory is the source of my 
knowledge. I come to know where my keys are by remembering where I left them. Such 
cases are not uncommon or wholly contrived. Thus, suppose there has been another 
murder in Peckham and the Scene of Crime Officer wants to know what I remember 
about that night: do I recall noticing anything odd or out o f the ordinary? I certainly 
wasn’t aware o f anything suspicious at the time, but I know it’s important so I keep at it -  
carefully going over the scene again in my mind. And yes, now I think back: I do 
remember having seen someone a bit suspicious. There was a man parked on the comer 
in a vintage blue Mercedes and I am forced to admit on reflection that certainly is 
somewhat unusual in Peckham.
I think cases like this pose the biggest threat to the view I want to defend -  that is, the 
view that memory is never a generative source of knowledge. In these cases there is at 
least some temptation to think memory is contributing something in its own right. These 
cases are not like Lackey’s examples where memory merely preserves a belief for long 
enough that other factors cease to be relevant; in these cases attending to the scene in 
memory seems to play a positive role in making knowledge possible. Accordingly, there 
is a recognizable temptation to say memory is the source of one’s knowledge.
Still, even these cases are not decisive. It is often just as natural to say that I have simply 
forgotten where I left my keys, or forgotten whether I noticed anyone suspicious in 
Peckham that night. These are things I did previously know for however brief a time, but
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which (being unimportant or distracted) I soon forgot. So I didn’t first acquire the 
knowledge in question via memory; I acquired it via perception. Memory is merely 
reminding me o f facts I have forgotten; it is not generating new knowledge.
This may be the more natural thing to say on reflection; but perhaps we have mixed 
intuitions. What is clear is that I must have registered the scene I later recall and that this 
registration is not itself a product of memory. More often than not it is the product o f 
perception. In the crime scene example, I remember having seen someone in a vintage 
blue Mercedes. Similarly, I presumably felt myself putting the keys down at the very 
instant I placed them on the sideboard, whether or not that remained at the forefront o f
9 0my mind for long. This makes it natural to suppose that the facts I later recall are at 
least ones that I could have known at the time, even if they are not ones I actually knew 
due to factors like lack o f attention. In that case, it is more natural to say the source of my 
knowledge is perception, rather than memory.
So while cases like the keys case do pose some sort of problem for my view, they are 
clearly not decisive. It is simply too unclear what is really going on in them for that to be 
plausible. The most that is plausible is that memory can sometimes make a contribution 
towards the generation o f knowledge (in a way in which it is hard to believe testimony
20 We presumably do not want to deny subjects can ever properly be said to perceive that which they fail to 
notice or actively attend to. This would rule out too much o f  what we ordinarily count as perception. 
Moreover there is normally an explanation o f  why subjects fail to perceive things which are in the vicinity 
e.g. they weren’t looking in the right direction. This needn’t be so in the cases I have described. Michael 
Martin argues the fact that a scene is later available to the subject in memory is precisely evidence the 
subject did once perceive it. On his view, memory involves a re-presentation o f  some past perception 
(Martin 1992). But even i f  this sort o f  registration does not always amount to conscious perception as 
Martin claims, it is not exactly unconscious either.
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does). Even if this is right though (and I am not unambiguously endorsing that claim21), 
memory is still not generating knowledge in its own right in the way that perception can. 
Intuitively, perception can be both the source o f your information and the source o f your 
knowledge and the same is not true of memory. Insofar as it has the capacity to generate 
knowledge at all, that capacity is essentially dependent upon information being registered 
via a source other than itself.
One way to put this would be to say that perception, unlike memory, is a non-dependent 
generative source. Memory and testimony are different from perception because their 
capacity to yield knowledge depends essentially upon the fact there exist other ways of
9 9acquiring information about the world.
In conclusion: none o f the potential counter-examples to (c) is decisive. Most are clearly 
no good and the one example that looks threatening, namely the keys examples, is not 
clearly problematic. This is not a good enough ground on which to reject the view that 
perception is the only generative source. So I have now defended the claim that 
perception is privileged in relation to memory and testimony in at least this respect; it is 
the only non-dependent generative source of empirical knowledge o f non-psychological 
reality. This is a way o f defending the claim that perception is a basic source of 
justification just as (c) claims. Spelling out the precise sense in which that is so turned out
21 As just seen it’s often just as natural to say the source o f  the subject’s knowledge is the source o f  her 
earlier information. M oreover, it is not clear in what sense ‘attention’ should be put down to memory. All I 
am claiming is that this is the most that can be said for the thesis that memory is a generative source. Part o f  
the problem here relates to unclarity in the notion o f a ‘source’ and what it is for something to be the source 
o f  your knowledge.
22 Perception may often rely on information from other sources, and if  it didn’t we would certainly know as 
lot less than we do via perception. But it doesn’t look like it absolutely must depend upon them in the same 
way in which memory and testimony do.
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to be harder than one might have expected, but it would be even harder to believe there is 
no such sense. The idea that perception is privileged is an overwhelmingly natural one 
and it is one that we can and should hold onto.
5. Perception and Explanation
I have now argued for (c). An obvious next question is this: why is (c) true? Is there any 
positive account we can give o f why perception is such a basic source o f knowledge? 
Indeed, is there any positive account we can give o f why perception is a source o f 
knowledge at all?
The reliabilist has an answer to this question. The answer goes like this: knowledge is 
true belief produced by a reliable process and perception is a source o f knowledge insofar 
as it satisfies this condition. According to the reliabilist we can explain why perception is 
a source o f knowledge in more basic terms. What makes this an explanation in more 
basic terms is that the notion o f a ‘true belief produced by a reliable process’ is one upon 
which we have an independent grip. Reliabilism claims to have a generic fix on 
knowledge, a general framework into which it can fit perception and thereby see it as an 
instance of some broader phenomenon depending on its fit or lack o f fit with the relevant 
criteria. That is the whole point o f reliabilism; it aims to give us general criteria for 
knowing.23 Whether perception lives up to those criteria is then an empirical question.
23 ‘Reliabilists’ who concede that we cannot grasp the notion o f  reliability independently o f  knowledge are 
not ‘reliabilists’ in m y sense. On my account, reliabilism is an essentially reductive project: if  not, I have no 
problem with it.
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Reliabilists are not the only people who promise to explain perception’s status as a source 
of knowledge in more basic terms. Any theory that offers a reductive analysis of 
knowledge -  that is, an analysis in terms of non-circular necessary and sufficient 
conditions - promises to do just that. The theory specifies general conditions for 
knowledge; whether perception lives up to those conditions is then an empirical matter. 
Thus a defender o f the ‘tripartite’ analysis o f knowledge will claim that knowledge is 
justified true belief, just as the reliabilist insists that knowledge is true belief produced by 
a reliable process. Both will claim that perception is a source o f knowledge only insofar 
as it meets these conditions.
I think that this idea is essentially foreign to foundationalism. For foundationalists there is 
an important sense in which we cannot explain why perception is a source o f knowledge 
in more basic terms. When it comes to knowing, perceiving is as basic as it gets.
I am going to call this the idea that perception is explanatorily basic. This offers a very 
different gloss on the idea that perception is a ‘basic’ source o f knowledge. Unlike the 
gloss on (c) offered in the previous section, the claim that perception is explanatorily 
basic does not attempt to privilege perception in relation to other sources of knowledge, 
like memory or testimony. It claims that perception enjoys a privilege in its own right - 
its status as a source o f knowledge cannot be further explained -  and this can be true 
whether the same is true o f all sources, or of none.
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I think that this claim is both true and defensible. The implication is that reliabilism and 
other forms of reductionism therefore fail to explain perception’s status as a source o f 
knowledge. They fail either because (i) they fail to explain how it yields knowledge, or 
because (ii) they fail to explain how it yields knowledge in more basic terms. Consider 
again what a reliabilist has to say: she claims that knowledge is true belief produced by a 
reliable process. Yet not all such beliefs are instances of knowledge: Norman’s 
clairvoyant beliefs do not amount to knowledge even if those beliefs are true and reliably 
formed. It might be a necessary condition for a belief to count as knowledge that it be 
reliably formed, but it is not a sufficient condition. So we cannot explain why perception 
is a source o f knowledge just by saying that it satisfies this condition. This is the first 
horn o f our dilemma.
So the reliabilist must supplement her original analysis or modify the way we understand 
it. However, when she tries and do that -  that is, tweak the notion o f reliability so that it 
really does cover all and only those cases that we genuinely want to count as cases o f 
knowledge - it becomes doubtful that the explanation given genuinely is one in more 
basic terms. In this case the relevant notion o f reliability is no longer one we can 
plausibly be said to grasp independently o f thinking about what it is meant to explain.24 
This is the second horn o f  our dilemma.
I think exactly parallel problems afflict all existing attempts to analyse the concept of 
knowledge. I think this concept can’t be analysed in more basic terms. This is not a claim
24 This is often known as the ‘generality problem’. I am assuming that reliabilists have failed to com e up 
with a convincing response to this problem. Clearly that’s something some o f  them may deny.
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I can hope to defend in the last ten pages o f this thesis, though it has been defended 
elsewhere.25 It is, however, part of what I am rejecting when I claim that perception is an 
‘explanatorily basic’ source of knowledge. I am claiming that we cannot understand 
perceptual knowledge as an instance of some independently intelligible notion of 
knowledge; it is a type o f knowledge that cannot be explained in more basic terms.
I don’t want to defend this claim because I think that it is essential to foundationalism. As 
a matter o f historical fact I think most foundationalists probably did  think that perception 
was explanatorily basic in this sense. I also think that this is part o f what, at the deepest 
level, distinguishes foundationalism from other important theories on the market. 
Reliabilists certainly do not think that perception is explanatorily basic in this sense. 
Nonetheless, it would be hard to defend the claim that this idea is really essential to 
foundationalism in the way in which I have claimed that (a), (b), and (c) are essential.
It would be hard for two reasons. The first is that it is an issue that very few of them ever 
explicitly addressed. People like Locke certainly never said  that the concept of 
knowledge could not analysed in this sense. I suspect most of them simply never thought 
about it. They certainly didn’t think this was what they ought to be doing. The idea that 
the concept of knowledge can usefully be analysed or that this is the proper task of 
epistemology is a modem preoccupation. More embarrassingly, it’s also an idea that 
some canonical foundationalists in the modem period apparently did go in for. Ayer 
claimed that knowing was ‘having the right to be sure’ (Ayer 2000: 22-44) and Chisholm 
tried to define knowledge in terms of the directly evident (Chisholm 1966). I don’t have
25 See (W illiamson 2000: esp. Ch. 1); and for problems, (Cassam, forthcoming).
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the space to explain why these explanations fail or why they are not genuinely reductive. 
So I will not try and defend the claim that all foundationalists must -  deep deep down -  
think perception is explanatorily basic.
Second, many will find any such defence unwelcome. Most people do not have the 
intuition that foundationalism is fundamentally opposed to positions such as reliabilism 
in the first place and these people will find any commitment on this score unduly 
restrictive. They will claim it prevents us seeing the things these positions have in 
common and that is more important than the respects in which they differ.
So I am not claiming that the idea that perception is explanatorily basic is one that all 
foundationalists either have accepted or must accept. I have deliberately refrained from 
describing it as an essential commitment o f foundationalism alongside the other three for 
precisely the reasons just given. Whether any version of ‘foundationalism’ worth the 
name must hold that perception is explanatorily basic seems to me to be a much less 
interesting question than the issue of whether or not perception is explanatorily basic. 
This is the issue I want to focus on. I think that perception is explanatorily basic and this 
is what I want to persuade you o f in the last part o f this chapter.
So far my claim has been purely negative: I have claimed that we cannot explain 
perception’s capacity to yield knowledge in more basic terms. The project of explaining 
perception status in more basic terms requires a reductive analysis o f knowledge itself, 
and that is what I have claimed is not possible. This raises an obvious question: if we do
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not explain why perception is a source of knowledge in more basic terms, with what right 
do we treat it as a source of knowledge at all? What positive explanation can we give if 
not the one latterly rejected?
I think foundationalists had a distinctive answer to that question. Consider the following 
remark from Paul Snowdon:
Another alternative, though, is that the link between perception and knowledge 
explains the content o f the concept of knowledge. Thus the idea might be that our 
fundamental understanding o f what knowledge is as what is yielded by perception 
in certain circumstances (Snowdon 1998: 301).
Suppose Snowdon is right and knowledge is what is yielded by perception. In that case it 
would be obvious why we could give no further explanation o f perception’s status as a 
source o f knowledge. On this account it is not that we first have an independent grip on 
knowledge and then get to the idea that perception is a source o f it. Rather, we start off 
with the idea that perception is a source of knowledge. Knowledge is then just what 
perceiving gets you. So there can be no explanation in more basic terms of why 
perception is a source o f  knowledge; on the contrary knowing just is the kind o f thing that 
perceiving can give us.
What, if anything, is wrong with that suggestion? The most obvious problem concerns 
seemingly non-perceptual sources of knowledge. It would be very implausible to have to 
claim that all knowledge is perceptual knowledge or that perception is the only source of 
knowledge. Memory and testimony are not ways of perceiving the world yet they are 
26 Notice, Snowdon does not h im self endorse this suggestion.
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sources o f knowledge. In addition, mathematical knowledge surely cannot be understood 
as that which is yielded by perception. Nor, on the face o f it, can the knowledge I have 
that I intend to go to Lebanon this summer. So it looks like it is false that perception is 
the only source of knowledge.
One response to this objection would be to simply bite the bullet and insist that these are 
all forms o f perceptual knowledge. Some people have argued that memory is a form of 
perception, namely, perception of the past. Traditional foundationalists certainly had no 
problem with the idea that self-knowledge was a form of perceptual knowledge. And the 
history o f debate about understanding-based knowledge or the so-called ‘a priori’ bears 
ample witness to the power o f the perceptual model and the grip it has on our thinking 
about knowledge. One sees by the natural light o f reason, and even for Descartes it clear 
and distinct perception that enables one to verify that God exists and is no deceiver. 
Indeed, even those hostile to a priori knowledge apparently succumb to the power of 
perception - the very idea that a priori knowledge is ‘mysterious’ seems to imply little 
more than a prejudice in favour of perception.
This response has certainly had famous defenders. However, it is implausible in its 
conception o f what perception can explain and unnecessarily hard-line. Snowdon’s 
original claim after all was merely that perception furnishes us with our ‘most 
fundamental grasp’ on what it is to know. This doesn’t entail that perception furnishes 
our only grasp upon knowledge.
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At this point, we can decide how liberal we want to be. We might claim that there are at 
least two different sources of knowledge -  perception and reason - both o f which non- 
derivatively put subjects in a position to know about the world and both of whose 
capacity to do so cannot be explained in more basic terms. This is what many of the 
traditional foundationalists thought. On this reading, perception still isn’t ‘the’ basic 
source o f knowledge if  that implies that it is the only source with these privileges, but it is 
one o f just two.
However, we needn’t be as restrictive as even this line of thought suggests. We cannot be 
if, unlike the traditional foundationalists, we are not convinced that self-knowledge is a 
form o f perceptual knowledge or that memory and testimony can be explained in wholly 
perceptual terms.
What is there to prevent us acknowledging that there are lots o f different ways o f 
acquiring knowledge? One problem is this: why do we count them all as sources o f 
knowledge, if not because we grasp what they have in common? Without some common 
factor it can seem that knowledge itself would lack unity. This problem is based on a 
false assumption, however, since we do grasp what they all have in common: they are all 
sources o f knowledge. That is the feature they all share and that can be the ground upon 
which we count them as such, just as we count cricket and chess and solitaire together on 
the basis that they are all games. All I am denying is that we classify them all as cases of 
knowledge by grasping something else they all have in common. To assume otherwise 
would be question-begging.
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The simple fact is that different sources o f knowledge - perception, memory, and 
testimony, self-knowledge -  may simply have too little in common out o f which to frame 
some more basic understanding of what it is for a source to yield knowledge that 
something is the case. This is not to deny they have anything significant in common, but 
the things they have in common do not give us the resources that we need.
Common factors tend to fall into two classes. On the one hand, they may be 
independently intelligible, but so general that when we abstract away from other features 
of the examples, we just aren’t left with something that intelligibly adds up to knowledge. 
As previously mentioned it’s very natural to think of reliability in this way. It’s plausible 
to think that it is at least a necessary condition for a source to be a source o f knowledge 
that it reliably produces true beliefs and that is obviously an independently intelligible 
ideal. However, it is not a sufficient condition; not all reliable sources are sources of 
knowledge. So we have to try and add something to reliability to get us back up to 
knowledge.
In trying to flesh out those further conditions, however, we then face the opposite 
problem: there simply don’t seem to be any further features that different sources of 
knowledge all have in common that mark them out as sources of knowledge. At least, 
none that are not trivial. Being sources of knowledge is something they all have in 
common, but that could hardly be reckoned a common factor in the present context.
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Once we move away from trivialities such as these, though, problems set in. For instance, 
I have claimed that conscious awareness is crucial to perceptual knowledge. Yet there is 
no clear sense in which it applies to knowledge grounded in intellection. We can talk 
about ‘seeing’ by the natural light of understanding, but such talk is at best metaphorical 
and the metaphors themselves are of no real help. More metaphorically speaking these 
sources do have something in common. It is tempting to say that both make it ‘manifest’ 
to us that things are a certain way, both possess a certain kind o f ‘evidence’ or 
perspicuity. But it is not as if we can use these notions to frame the required 
understanding o f knowledge since these notions are not independently intelligible. The 
only way to get hold o f the relevant notion of ‘evidence’ is by reference to these very 
examples.
This brings us back to the point with which we begun: the idea o f knowledge or a source 
o f knowledge may simply be too heterogeneous in the relevant respect to be grasped 
other than via its instances -  that is, by grasping particular ways in which we do in fact 
come to know things about the world around us. Knowing, we can then say, is having this 
sort o f access to the facts, or this sort o f connection (pointing now to perception, now to 
reason...). That may seem surprising until we stop and ask why it should be otherwise. 
Why should different cases o f knowledge have anything more in common with each 
other than their simply being cases of knowledge? Not all concepts can be explained in 
more basic terms; some must be primitive and there is no reason to suppose knowledge is 
a particularly bad candidate in this respect. While that may be frustrating from a 
philosophical perspective, it ought not to be surprising.
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If this is right -  if the concept of knowledge is essentially grasped through examples o f 
which perception and reason are paradigms -  that would explain why we cannot explain 
why or how these are sources o f knowledge in more basic terms. Moreover, the fact that 
perception is, as a matter of fact, the most pervasive o f these paradigms in the particular 
circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the fact that it plays a role in so many of 
the others, like memory and testimony, would do something to explain the continuing 
pull o f the perceptual model and our tendency to try and explain other forms of 
knowledge along these lines (even when it comes to equally basic sources such as 
reason).
This is not at all implausible. We certainly do not have as firm a grasp on how it is that 
reason puts us in a position to know about the world -  none, at least, that it is not shaken 
by the ‘slightest philosophy’. Nor do we have so clear a picture o f how we know about 
our own minds. This seems importantly different from the case o f perception. Philosophy 
can try and persuade us that we never perceive the world around us, though even here it 
frequently struggles to convince. But even philosophy is rarely so bold as to tell us that 
seeing an object plainly is not, in principle, a way of coming to find out about what that 
object is like. In this respect, perceiving that something is the case is a peculiarly good 
way of coming to know that it is the case: a conclusive response to the question ‘how do
• • 27you know?’ in a way in which testimony say, intuitively is not. So while perception
211 am not committed to thinking that it’s necessarily true that perceiving is a way o f  knowing or even that 
it is rationally unrevisable. It may be knowable apriori but so is the truth that all bachelors are unmarried 
males. The latter is not, for that reason, rationally unrevisable. For a defence o f  this distinction see
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may not be our only model o f what it is to come to know, it is the one we actually 
understand best.
6. Conclusion
I began this thesis by distinguishing between inferential and non-inferential justification. 
Most o f the thesis has defended the claim that there is such a thing as non-inferential 
justification and that perceptual justification is an example. These claims are still widely 
rejected. In this chapter, though, I have argued that there may be other sources of non- 
inferential justification: memory and testimony may also furnish us with such grounds. 
So if all it takes to be a foundationalist is to think that there is such a thing as non- 
inferential justification, then the foundationalist has already won.
In this chapter I have claimed that is not enough. I have argued that a foundationalist is 
also essentially someone who thinks that among the different sources o f knowledge and 
justification that we have access to, perception is special. What does that amount to? My 
first answer was that perception is a non-dependent generative source of knowledge and 
that that is what distinguishes it from other sources o f empirical knowledge. By non­
dependent I mean a source whose functioning as a source o f knowledge does not 
essentially depend upon the existence and functioning o f another. The same is not true of 
memory and testimony; they may be sources of knowledge, but to function as such they 
rely essentially upon the existence of other sources. I stand by what I said there:
(Giaquinto 1996). O f course, it is an empirical question whether we can ever be said to see that anything is 
the case.
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perception is a non-dependent source of knowledge in a way in which memory and 
testimony are not and this is something any foundationalist has got to think.
The problem we encountered is that this still doesn’t capture all o f what is most 
distinctive or most interesting about foundationalism. A reliabilist can think that 
perception is a non-dependent source of knowledge, but there is some interesting sense in 
which reliabilism isn’t a form of foundationalism.
That lead me to my next claim: perception is not only a non-dependent source of 
knowledge, it is also an explanatorily basic source of knowledge. Unlike the claim about 
dependence, I have refrained from describing this claim as an essential commitment of 
foundationalism. It is not an issue most o f them explicitly addressed and many do not 
have the strong intuition that reliabilism is not a form of foundationalism to begin with. 
Nonetheless, I hope to have made it plausible that this idea forms an important part of 
foundationalist thought and one that is genuinely absent in its rivals.
I think this is what foundationalists traditionally thought. They thought that perception is 
a way of coming to know about the world and that there is an important sense in which 
there is nothing more to be said about why that is so. When it comes to understanding 
what knowledge is, perception is as basic as it gets. This is not to say that perception is 
the only source o f knowledge, even the only basic source; maybe reason is another. So 
perception may not be the only basic source o f knowledge. Nonetheless, when it comes to 
empirical knowledge perception is unrivalled: it is the only non-dependent and
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explanatorily basic source of such knowledge. This is not only true I suggest, but what 
the foundationalist has been saying all along. For beings such as ourselves the very idea 
o f empirical knowledge is the idea o f perceptual knowledge.
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